Waltz

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See re systems analysis.
Lanyi on appeasement.

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# WORLD POLITICS

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# GEOPOLITICAL HYPOTHESES IN TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE*

By HAROLD SPROUT

GREAT wars, the rise and decline of empires, observed differences in the power and influence of nations, and in general the uneven levels of national achievement in international politics have inspired much speculation and hypothesis-building. Men have felt the need for satisfying explanations of past events and patterns, and even greater need for plausible hypotheses with which to approach the future. The last seventy-five years or so have witnessed a bumper crop of hypotheses designed to account for or to anticipate the ordering of political relationships in the society of nations. One characteristic of most of these activities has been a persistent search for the "master variable" that would provide a simple yet plausible and satisfying basis for explaining or predicting the ordering of political relationships among nations.

It is proposed in this essay to examine critically certain features of this geopolitical hypothesis-building, especially the manner in which the theorizers have dealt with the continuing scientific and technological revolution. In anticipation of certain propositions to be emphasized later, it may be noted briefly here that some geopolitical theorizers appear to have neglected, or even to have grossly underestimated, the possibilities and implications of continuing technological advances. On the other hand, certain others have built their geopolitical hypotheses expressly on the assumption that technological advance has become the "master variable" of international politics. But nearly all appear to have paid relatively little attention to institutional and other social factors that may set more or less rigid limits to the projects and accomplishments of national political communities. In the course of the following discussion, it is proposed to examine a number of more or less well-known geopolitical hypotheses from this perspective.

## I

It should be made quite clear at the outset how certain key terms are being used: in particular, the terms *international politics, political potential, geographical*, and *geopolitical*.

* This article is a revised version of a lecture given in May 1962 at the University of Oxford under the joint auspices of the School of Geography and the School of Modern History. It is also one of the fruits of a research program on the interrelations of geography and politics, undertaken several years ago with the aid of financial support provided by the Rockefeller Foundation and Princeton University.

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*International politics* is frequently used interchangeably with *international relations*, or even with *international affairs*. Such usage is unacceptable. These latter terms are notoriously imprecise. They may refer to all sorts of activities that extend beyond the boundaries of a single national political community: for example, private commerce, interpersonal correspondence, tourism, etc., as well as to transnational activities directly involving one or more national political communities in their organizational aspect. Transactions in this latter category, provided these also exhibit political quality, are more precisely designated *international politics*.

In order to acquire a political quality (as the adjective *political* is used here), a transaction must exhibit two features: (1) some substantial conflict of purpose or interest between the interacting parties; and (2) some exercise of coercion or of non-coercive influence, commonly designated by the term *political power*.

I prefer *political potential* to the term *power*. This preference derives from the overriding military connotation that *power* has acquired in recent years, and that probably cannot be altered significantly now. Political relationships unquestionably include a large element of coercion or threat thereof. But no such concept of power comes anywhere near to expressing the totality of political relationships. Neither hostility (in either a legal or a psychological sense) nor violence (in a military or a quasi-military sense) is a necessary ingredient of relationships universally regarded as political: that is, relationships that exhibit some conflict of purpose or interest, and some exercise of coercion or non-coercive influence. Conflicts of interest divide friends and allies as well as those who regard each other as present or prospective enemies. Governments employ a wide range of tools and techniques to gain their ends, many of which exhibit no property realistically describable as coercion or threat thereof.

It has long seemed to me that a term other than *power* is needed to cover both the military and non-military aspects of political interaction and relationship. For this purpose I have come to favor the term *political potential*, defined in a manner somewhat analogous to the meaning of *potential* in the physical sciences.[1]

In non-scientific discourse, the noun *potential* commonly denotes something that is possible though not yet achieved. This idea of latency is expressed, for example, in the familiar concepts of military potential and industrial potential, terms that refer generally to the magnitude of

[1] For a more extended discussion of this issue, see Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton 1962), ch. 4.

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a community's capacity to mobilize or redirect resources for military or industrial purposes. The idea of latency, or capacity for future achievement, would be more precisely expressed by the noun *potentiality* or the adjective *potential*: for example, the military potentiality of China is so-and-so; or the potential coal reserves of Britain are such-and-such.

In the vocabulary of physical science, the noun *potential* carries a different meaning, a meaning just the opposite of latency. About the closest one can come to expressing it verbally is to define potential as the measure of pressure, or pull, or attraction, or simply effect that one body exerts on another. This concept of potential is also expressed in physical systems by such terms as *voltage* and *gravitation*. This concept is manifestly not strictly transferable to social systems, but it does seem to suggest a fruitful analogy. By this analogy one may think of the combined coercive power and non-coercive influence of a state over other states in the international system as constituting its political potential: that is to say, its pressure, or pull, or attraction, or simply effect on their behaviors. To express this idea I prefer *political potential* to *power*, with its strong connotations of coercion and violence.

The reverse of political influence is political deference. Deferential behavior may be compliance with specific demands. Or it may be reflected in recognition of leadership or superior capabilities in the absence of specific demands. Potential and deference also embrace the idea of political prestige, defined as the attractive, or influential, impact of extraordinary achievements in sport, industry, the arts, science, engineering, etc.

Through time, relationships of influence and deference exhibit patterns that are more or less precisely describable. Many familiar terms of international politics denote such patterns: for example, alliance, coalition, sphere of influence, orbit, satellite, protectorate, command of the sea, bipolarity, Monroe Doctrine, Communist bloc, Atlantic community, European community, neutralism, and many others.

All such patterns have a geographical dimension—that is to say, they exhibit distributions and arrangements of phenomena upon or relatively close to the earth's surface. In this sense, the patterns of potential and deference have *geographical* as well as political quality, in precisely the same way as one observes a geographical quality in the layout and configuration of lands and seas, or in the variations of climate, or in the distribution of "natural" resources.

That such is the case nearly everyone would readily concede. What is decidedly more speculative and controversial is whether general hypotheses, or laws, can be derived—hypotheses that explain past in-

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ternational patterns satisfactorily and hypotheses that provide reasonably trustworthy guidance to future possibilities and probabilities in international politics.

Controversiality has not deterred a great many from trying. As noted at the outset, there is a rich assortment of propositions designed to explain or to provide a rational basis for predicting the ordering of political potential in the society of nations. All such propositions are appropriately called *geopolitical* hypotheses. They are geopolitical in the sense that they are propositions that purport to explain or to forecast the *geographical* distribution and patterning of political potential.

Right here a digression is necessary in order to say a few plain words about the adjective *geopolitical* and the noun *geopolitics* from which the adjective is derived. These words acquired a pejorative, epithetical quality during the period between the two world wars. This state of affairs seems to have stemmed from two sources in the main: partly from a certain deeply rooted American aversion to frank discussion of the phenomena of power in society; and partly from emotionally charged reactions against the manner in which certain German scholars put geographical (and indeed many other kinds of) knowledge at the disposal of the Nazi regime.

Long before Haushofer and the *Institut für Geopolitik* moved onto the stage, there had been evidence of resistance in the English-speaking countries to bringing geographic concepts and tools to the study of international politics. Shortly before his death in 1946, for example, Sir Halford Mackinder reminisced regarding hostility he had encountered to establishing the School of Geography at Oxford University near the end of the last century. One objection, Mackinder recalled, was that "the study of maps by the young promoted strategical, that is to say, militarist and imperialist ways of thinking."[2]

Similar attitudes and reactions prevailed widely in American colleges and universities during the 1930's. Politically oriented geography was associated with strategy. Strategy was associated with war-making. Teachers of international subjects were advised to concentrate on peace, not on war. The activities of Haushofer and his fellow "geopoliticians" re-enforced this point of view. Because the Nazis agitated for *Lebensraum* and exploited other geographic concepts for aggressive political purposes, it was illogically assumed that any mixing of geography and politics must be oriented towards war and conquest. Geographers insisted that geopolitics was a branch of political science. Political scien-

[2] Quoted by E. W. Gilbert in his obituary memoir on Mackinder, in *Geographical Journal*, CX (January 1948), 96.

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tists tossed the pariah-subject right back to the geographers. In the American political climate of the 1930's, anything that could be branded geopolitics became much "too hot to handle."

Now there was a world of difference between pre-1939 German *Geopolitik*, on the one hand, and American political geography and the emerging subject of international politics. The former represented an exploitation of knowledge to serve the political purposes of a national regime. The latter represented the utilization of knowledge in order to gain clearer understanding of political structures, processes, and relationships. This difference can be likened to the difference between science and engineering. Very few university administrators would withhold funds from scientific research because the products of that research might be utilized to make H-bombs, bacteriological weapons, ballistic missiles, or other apparatus of statecraft. Yet that would come close to the attitude that prevailed widely in America with regard to the application of geographic concepts and theories to the systematic study and interpretation of international politics.

In recent years such emotionally charged hostility to bringing geographic knowledge and perspective to bear in the analysis of political relationships has largely subsided. Even the term *geopolitics* has acquired a certain academic respectability. However, academic mores are not transformed quickly. If few teachers of international politics any longer exhibit hostility towards geographical hypotheses regarding political actions and relationships, it is likewise true that remarkably few show much awareness of what the geography discipline has to offer. It is probably no exaggeration to say that very few political science teachers have any significant grasp of what can, and what cannot, be done fruitfully with maps and other geographic tools and procedures. Too many books and lectures make a sort of token bow to "land and people," and a "glance at the map" (any old map handy), and then proceed to play fast and loose with the geographic dimensions of the subject under discussion.

Such neglect deprives political analysis of useful tools and ideas. Every political interaction and relationship, every exercise of power and influence, every manifestation of political potential, derives from demands and responses projected from one point to another upon the earth's surface. Every political demand, and every response thereto, is affected in some degree by the distribution and arrangement of phenomena upon or relatively close to the face of the earth. During the years when the term *geopolitics* was beyond the pale, some geographers and political scientists resorted to a hyphenated adjective, *geographical-*

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*political*. This cumbersome term has never "caught on," and it has no advantage over the contraction *geopolitical*. The latter is a handy adjective to denote the geographical dimension of political relationships, and it will be so used throughout this discussion.

Returning now to the main theme, I had (it will be recalled) characterized as geopolitical all hypotheses that purport to explain or to provide a rational basis for predicting geographic patterns of political potential in the international political system. Some geopolitical hypotheses relate to the capabilities of a particular nation, others to larger patterns, regional or global. When an American geographer asserted a few years ago that "the gap between [the Soviet Union] and Western Europe will narrow, but the permanent assets of the Atlantic powers should always exceed the limitations of continental Eurasia," he was stating a geopolitical hypothesis. When Mackinder said that "the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single world empire,"[3] he too was stating a geopolitical hypothesis. Other examples can, and will be, considered in the following pages.

All such hypotheses represent assessments of opportunities and limitations implicit in the milieux of the interacting nations. Such assessments, in the vocabulary of ecological theory, are essentially possibilistic, even though they may be expressed in deterministic or quasi-deterministic rhetoric. Implicit, if not explicit, in all political discussion of opportunities, limitations, and possibilities are observed facts, or assumptions, about political purposes, priorities, policies, and operational contingencies.

Geopolitical speculation represents attempts to identify a limited number of factors, the uneven distribution of which in space (and, in some instances, variation through time as well) provides a plausible basis for explanation and prediction. From this standpoint one can sort all geopolitical hypotheses into two broad categories: (1) those derived mainly (though never exclusively) from the layout and configuration of lands and seas, or from regional variations of climate, or from the uneven distribution of minerals and other earth materials; and (2) those derived from the distribution of people, or from some set of social institutions or other behavioral patterns.

All geopolitical theorizing involves making or accepting estimates regarding the tools and skills (that is, technology) available to the interacting communities. It also involves making assumptions regarding the

[3] Sir Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (rev. edn., New York 1942), 2.

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rate of future technological advance. In general, as noted at the outset, the tendency among non-scientists has been to underestimate the rate of increase of scientific knowledge and its engineering application, and to reach even more conservative conclusions regarding future advances in technology. Finally, before turning to some specific examples of geopolitical thinking, it should be noted that the geographical distribution of technology and its estimated rate of future variation can be treated as the strategic political variable, and thus form the basis of geopolitical theory-building.

## II

The first group of geopolitical hypotheses to be considered are those derived mainly from the layout and configuration of lands and seas. Only two exponents of such hypotheses will be considered here: Mahan and Mackinder, both of whom exerted a strong influence on subsequent geopolitical speculation as well as on practical policy-making.

For Captain A. T. Mahan, writing in the 1890's and early 1900's, the unbroken continuity of the oceans and connecting seas, the configuration of coastlines, and the comparative advantage of movement by sea over transport by land pointed to the generalization that control of the sea was the key to world political primacy. The oceans and connecting seas form a single body of water that envelops every continent and island. Overland routes everywhere end at a coastline, but the sea is continuous and uninterrupted. Ships (Mahan contended) are more capacious than land vehicles, and (for a given expenditure of energy) generally more efficient as well. As he read history, denial of access to the sea was a disaster that few nations could withstand.

Ability to control the use of the seas depended, in Mahan's view, on a nation possessing a productive, populous, and easily defended homeland, strategically located oversea bases, and a powerful navy. The most important land positions were those located close to a narrow seaway, vital to the traffic of many nations—for example, the English Channel or the Strait of Gibraltar. Mahan doubted whether any mainland state, sharing a continent with other powerful states, could ever compete successfully for command of the sea with a state wholly insular. He envisaged a future in which the insular states (among which he included the United States as "continentally insular" in a geopolitical sense) would continue to set the larger patterns of political relationship in the society of nations.

Sir Halford Mackinder (Mahan's contemporary) started from the same premise: that dominant seapower was the key to world primacy.

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He also concurred with Mahan that the layout and configuration of lands and seas provided the key to understanding international politics present and future. But in Mackinder's view, "the grouping of lands and seas" pointed not towards indefinite primacy of the insular states, but rather towards eventual emergence of a globally dominant empire located in the "Heartland" of Eurasia, a region imprecisely delineated but substantially that occupied by the Soviet Union today.

Mackinder eventually modified this prediction. In his later formulation, he envisaged two counterbalancing centers of power: the Eurasian Heartland and a community of nations grouped around the North Atlantic. But he persisted to the end of his days in the attempt to fit a rapidly changing world scene into a geopolitical conception built essentially upon the global layout and configuration of lands and seas.

Here one beholds two first-class intellects, viewing the same events, each deriving inspiration from the ideas of the other, and both building their geopolitical "castles in the air" upon essentially the same earthy foundations. Yet they produced nearly opposite predictions of the shape of future international politics. Why? In part perhaps because of the different weights that each assigned to the properties and significance of advancing technology.

In the 1890's and 1900's, evidence of accelerating technological change was discernible on all sides. But Mahan's intellectual universe was deeply rooted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was largely from that perspective that he judged events happening at the end of the nineteenth century. Nearly all his generalizations reflected judgments as to what would have been possible or impossible in the era that culminated in the Battle of Trafalgar.

Mahan paid scarcely any attention to the future political implications of the spreading railway grids. He beheld the early development of highway motor vehicles, submarines, and aircraft; yet there is hardly any evidence that he anticipated the unsettling impacts which these and other mechanical inventions would have in the years just ahead. That insular countries would become progressively more susceptible to blockade and eventually to direct attack by aircraft; that overland transport would come to rival movement by sea; that overland mobility, together with rapidly developing techniques in chemistry, weaponry, and other fields, would tip the scale increasingly against insular Britain—all these and many other aspects of the technological revolution taking shape before his eyes appear to have entered into Mahan's calculations very little, if at all. Mahan, like so many of his contemporaries, seems to have

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taken it for granted that the future would not be very different from the immediate past.

In this respect, Mackinder appears to have been more forward-looking than Mahan. Mackinder sensed some of the potentialities implicit in at least one branch of technology: overland transport. In 1904-1905, for example, he became deeply impressed by the spectacle of the war in the Far East, fought by the Russians thousands of miles from their primary industrial regions, at the end of a single-track transcontinental railroad. In that year he predicted (rather too optimistically, as things turned out) that the twentieth century would "not be old before all Asia is covered with railways."

Overland mobility opened to Mackinder the prospect of a vast Eurasian empire, of which Russia would form the nucleus, or "pivot area." "In the world at large," as Mackinder viewed it, Russia "occupies the central strategic position. . . . The full development of her modern railway mobility is merely a matter of time." Should this "pivot state" extend its power "over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia," it would attain control of all the requisites of a world empire: "vast continental resources," ports on every ocean, and a primary base of operations beyond the reach of hostile seapower.[4]

Historians and policy-makers remember Mackinder's generalizations, but they have largely forgotten (if indeed most of them ever knew about) the challenge that was put to Mackinder at his initial sortie into the realm of geopolitical speculation. Following the lecture before the Royal Geographical Society (in which Mackinder, in 1904, outlined his blueprint of a globally dominant Eurasian empire), one member of his audience voiced profound skepticism. That man was Leopold S. Amery, a political personage well known to the last generation in Britain, but known scarcely at all in America. Amery contended that "a great deal of this geographical distribution must lose its importance. . . ." "The successful Powers" of the future, he maintained, would be "those which have the greatest industrial basis." It would "not matter whether they are in the center of a continent or on an island; those people who have the industrial power and the power of invention and of science will be able to defeat all others."[5]

I do not propose at this late date to add Amery to the list of major prophets. But it is interesting to reflect on his prophetic words in the light of the latest advances in military technology. For the continuing

[4] H. J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal*, XXIII (April 1904), 436.

[5] *Ibid.*, 441.

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scientific and technological revolution has deeply eroded the foundations of all old-style geopolitical speculation. When naval forces are able to remain at sea for longer and longer periods without returning to port for fuel or refit, the value of outlying bases shrinks progressively. Modern overland transport, upon the surface and in the air, has likewise diminished the strategical value of narrow seas and other surface configurations. When it becomes possible to fire ballistic rockets armed with nuclear explosives from nearly any point on the earth's surface, either from land or from ships at sea, with a range and accuracy sufficient to lay waste any of the world's great conurbations, wherever they may be located, then we shall have reached the end of the line for geopolitical hypotheses based upon the layout and configuration of lands and seas.

## III

A different but comparable obsolescence pervades much of the geopolitical speculation based upon variations of climate in space and through time.

The human organism reacts physiologically to atmospheric temperature, relative humidity, air circulation, barometric pressure, and certain lesser climatic variables. Human societies react in various ways to economic and other opportunities and limitations implicit in climatic conditions. These physiological and social reactions have inspired another prolific assortment of geopolitical hypotheses.

The proposition that climate—by which is meant simply the recurring patterns of weather—affects human behavior and performance has a long and respectable lineage. A partial list of those who have expounded this hypothesis in one form or another through the centuries would include the Greek physician Hippocrates (about 400 B.C.), the Greek philosopher Aristotle (about 350 B.C.), the Roman historian Pliny (about 60 A.D.), the French political philosophers Bodin (1530-1596) and Montesquieu (1689-1755), the British physician Arbuthnot (1667-1735), the French naturalist Buffon (1707-1788), the French geographer Reclus (1830-1905), the Scottish historian Ferguson (1723-1816), the British historian Buckle (1821-1862), the Swiss-American geographer Guyot (1807-1884), and many others. In our century scholars who have discovered significant correlations between climate and human behavior and accomplishment include Ellsworth Huntington and Stephen Visher (geographers), Raymond H. Wheeler (psychologist), and Clarence A. Mills (medical research scientist).

Among the recent exponents of this brand of geopolitical theory,

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the outstanding figure has been Huntington, who died in 1947, only a year after Mackinder. Huntington's hypothesis is summed up in two short quotations. The first: "A certain type of climate prevails wherever civilization is high. In the past the same type seems to have prevailed wherever a great civilization arose. Therefore, such a climate seems to be a necessary condition of great progress."[6] From this premise, Huntington concluded that "the expansion of the great nations of the world is to a large extent determined by climatic conditions."[7]

Huntington explained the rise and decline of historic empires in terms of cyclic fluctuations of climate. In his view, the more "energizing" climates of the present century have been those of Western Europe, parts of North America, and a few other scattered localities. The less "energizing," in his view, have been those prevailing over most of South America, Africa, and Asia. On this basis he envisaged continued political primacy of the European nations and the United States, and an undistinguished political future for most of the rest of the world.

The psychologist R. H. Wheeler has marshaled a vast array of historical evidence in support of Huntington's conclusions. Wheeler has reported discovery of remarkably consistent correlations since the dawn of history between climatic cycles and recurrent social and political events. He is convinced that "intensive study of the climate of the past will ultimately lead to accurate prediction of trends far ahead into the future, and that the climatic phases of the future will probably produce the same types of cultural and behavioral problems as they seem to have produced in the past, over and over again, by controlling man's vitality and energy level. . . ."[8]

Clarence A. Mills, professor emeritus of the University of Cincinnati Medical School, has drawn even more specific conclusions from the climatic hypothesis. Mills has observed human behavior in varied climates, and has buttressed these observations by extensive experiments with laboratory animals. His findings were reported, in 1949, in the *Journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.*

Mills takes off from well-known facts regarding the human organism. He likens our bodies to inefficient internal combustion engines. We take in fuel (food), and our bodies transform some of it into useful work-energy. But for every unit so used, the human body must get rid of "three or four units" as "waste heat." This is accomplished by evapora-

[6] Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (New Haven 1915), 9.
[7] Ellsworth Huntington, *World-Power and Evolution* (New Haven 1919), 24.
[8] R. H. Wheeler, "Climate and Human Behavior," in *Encyclopaedia of Psychology* (New York 1946), 78ff.

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tion of sweat and by other well-understood physical and physiological processes. These processes are affected by air temperature, humidity, circulation, and other atmospheric factors. The human organism can adapt only within fairly narrow limits of variation. Prolonged exposure to extreme cold, heat, dampness, or other unfavorable conditions depresses initiative, learning capacity, memory recall, reasoning ability, and may even destroy the organism prematurely.

In these physio-psychic responses Mills finds confirmation of Huntington's observations and of his hypothesis that climate is the master variable determining the distribution of political potential over the earth. Mills opens his discussion with the following words: "Temperature bears an importance to man far beyond the matter of his hour-to-hour comfort. In some places it lays a heavy, stagnating hand over his life and holds him to a vegetative existence; in others it generates an energy and progressiveness which drive him forward with irresistible impetus. . . . Without favorable temperatures, neither individual nor nation can develop innate potentialities to the full. . . ."[9]

Accepting the somewhat inconclusive evidence that the earth is now in one of the periodic warming-up phases of the climatic cycle, Mills reaches the following conclusion, among others: "Retarded by the benumbing winter cold of past centuries, much of Russia today enjoys temperatures which are near the optimum for human endeavor. . . . In the warmer centuries ahead she may gain the sought-for place-in-the-sun, along with the lesser northern nations of Scandinavia and Canada. . . ."[10]

Critics have ruthlessly attacked the geopolitical conclusions of Huntington, Mills, and other modern pleaders of the climatic hypothesis. More sophisticated critics do not dispute most of the empirical observations reported by the climatic determinists. It is generally accepted that climatic patterns have fluctuated in cyclic rhythms in the past, and that such fluctuations are likely to continue. It is likewise conceded that climatic conditions affect bodily processes and, through these, the psychic behavior of people everywhere. There is no dispute that, in any given time and place, climatic conditions do set limits to human accomplishments of many kinds.

The case generally rests rather on climatic determinism's static assumptions regarding human adaptability and ability to control the micro-climate of enclosed spaces. Specifically, the issue is whether mod-

[9] Clarence A. Mills, "Temperature Dominance over Human Life," *Science*, CX (September 16, 1949), 267.
[10] *Ibid.*, 270.

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ern knowledge of diet, exercise, hygiene, and medicine, and modern techniques of heating, cooling, and ventilating enclosed spaces are sufficient in the aggregate to enable peoples of all races to attain substantially similar levels of achievement under widely varying conditions of macro-climate.

This issue presents two sets of variables: human and environmental. The human variables are in part genetic, and these remain outside the range of deliberate modification—so far. But human responses to air temperature, humidity, and other climatic variables can be modified within broader limits than most climatic determinists have recognized. Such adaptations include diet (kinds and quantities of food consumed), and muscular activity (kinds and quantities of exercise taken). Equally important, the micro-climate can be radically modified by clothing worn, and by artificial heating, cooling, dehumidifying, and ventilation. Great strides have also been made in overcoming indirect adverse effects of certain climatic milieux on human affairs: deserts have been watered, swamps drained, soil erosion halted; plants capable of maturing in a shorter season, or with less water, etc., have been bred; increasingly effective barriers have been built against disease-producing micro-organisms that thrive under conditions of heat, dampness, etc. In addition to this increasing control of the environment, there is considerable evidence that human adaptability to warmth is much greater than to cold.

It is quite true that the success of any society in utilizing modern technical knowledge depends upon the level of education (awareness of what is possible) in that society, and also upon the amounts of capital (equipment) available and other social factors. It is likewise true that the economic cost of overcoming climatic handicaps, or any other handicaps, varies from one country to another: for example, it costs more to heat buildings in the northern United States than it does in India. Ignorance, lack of capital, ineffective governing apparatus, or other social obstacles may prevent one society from coping with climate as effectively as another does. But the point here is that technological advance has shifted the most refractory limitations from the category of "natural" phenomena to the category of social phenomena. The problem becomes progressively less one of generating necessary technical knowledge than one of bringing existing knowledge effectively to bear.

So far we have been considering a growth of knowledge that has been piecemeal and fragmentary, though very considerable in the aggregate. It remains to consider the possibility of a major breakthrough in the control of climate on a macro-scale. The late John von Neumann

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was but one of a growing company of physicists, meteorologists, and engineers who have speculated on the odds of artificially modifying weather on a global scale. In an article published in 1955, shortly before his premature death, von Neumann threw out some hints regarding the "control possibilities" implicit in current knowledge and research.

I am not competent to describe these possibilities in any technical detail. I am even less competent to judge the scientific and engineering issues involved. But I am deeply impressed when a man of such authentic genius and scientific stature as von Neumann was universally recognized to be writes as follows:

"The climate of specific regions and levels of precipitation might be altered. . . . [The effects of] such actions would be more directly and truly world-wide than recent, or presumably, future wars, or than the economy at any time. Extensive human intervention would deeply affect the atmosphere's general circulation. . . . Measures in the Arctic may control the weather in temperate regions, or measures in one temperate region critically affect another, one quarter around the globe. . . . Once such possibilities become actual, they will be exploited. . . . All experience shows that even smaller technological changes than those now in the cards profoundly transform political and social relationships."[11]

This is a highly controversial issue. But controversy among meteorologists and other experts appears to focus chiefly on the potential consequences of various weather-controlling schemes and the byproducts of other human activities, including progressive pollution of the atmosphere and recurrent thermonuclear explosions. Numerous scientists have ridiculed the idea that such explosions have significant climatic effects. But, in the words of G. H. T. Kimble, American geographer and climatologist, "most of the people who give this answer are not meteorologists, but 'bomb' scientists and technicians. . . . If they were meteorologists, I have a feeling that some of them would be rather more impressed than they appear to be by the delicacy of the atmospheric balance."[12]

Whoever one prefers to believe on this explosive issue, there is no blinking the fact that competent scientists, of which John von Neumann was perhaps the most distinguished, have showed definite con-

[11] John von Neumann, "Can We Survive Technology?" *Fortune*, LI (June 1955), 106.

[12] "But Somebody Does Something About It," *New York Times Magazine*, July 8, 1962.

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cern over possible geopolitical consequences of human actions which (whether deliberately or fortuitously) may alter significantly the future weather patterns of the earth. If and when such possibilities definitely materialize, one can say (as was said above in connection with Mahan and Mackinder) that technological advance will have written finis to the long record of speculation and theory-building with regard to the geopolitical consequences of the "natural" variations of climate in space and through time.[13]

## IV

A third collection of geopolitical hypotheses has been built upon the uneven distribution of natural resources. Like most of the ones previously considered, resources hypotheses have tended to reflect some degree of failure to anticipate the political implications of technological advance.

These hypotheses generally take off from the proposition that a nation's political position in international politics is significantly related to its capacity to provide military instrumentalities of statecraft, and to keep on providing them even if the country should be tightly blockaded. Under modern conditions, in the words of one American exponent of this line of thinking, such capability depends upon large-scale industrialization and in turn upon "possession or ready availability of vast quantities of the basic industrial raw materials. . . ." Because these are so unevenly distributed, Nature "has rigidly set a limit to the number of states capable of achieving the status of Great Powers."[14]

Partly on this basis, the political scientist Robert Strausz-Hupé predicted at the close of World War II that the United States would continue, at least until 1970, to be the foremost industrial nation. He ranked the Soviet Union second—or third—depending on whether the West European industrial complex remained a congeries of separate national economies or amalgamated into a single integrated industrial system. He envisaged very much smaller industrial development to be possible in Japan, China, and India, because of the lesser distributions of basic raw materials located in eastern and southern Asia.[15]

No one these days should minimize the huge quantities of raw ma-

[13] For some additional commentaries on the issue of large-scale control of climate, see H. E. Landsberg, "Climate Made to Order," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVII (November 1961), 360-64; and L. D. Kaplan, "Could We Control the Climate?" *The New Scientist*, IX (March 9, 1961), 597-99.

[14] Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials* (New York 1934), 1.

[15] Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (New York 1945), 119, 156ff., 231.

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terials required by industrialized societies. Nevertheless, conclusions regarding the political implications of particular resources distribution, even conclusions reached as recently as 1952—the year of a massive U.S. government report on this subject—seem clearly as outdated and stale today as pre-1914 predictions that the submarine would not amount to much as an agent of naval blockade. In geopolitical speculation based upon the distribution of natural resources (as in such speculation regarding geographical configuration and climate), there exists a tendency to assume that the scientific and technological revolution has about run its course, and that the future will be pretty much like the recent past.

One who has attacked this time-lag in thinking about natural resources is the geochemist Harrison Brown of the California Institute of Technology. His argument runs about as follows:

The spread of industrial society is associated everywhere with accelerating consumption of non-renewable mineral fuels and ores. The higher the level of industrial development, the more rapid the rate of depletion of higher-grade and more easily accessible earth materials. In general, the earlier a society experiences the industrial revolution, the more quickly it is likely to pass from a condition of comparative abundance to a condition of increasing domestic scarcities of high-quality natural materials. As the older industrial economies of Western Europe and now the United States, too, have moved into this condition, they have turned increasingly to cheaper raw materials imported from less industrialized regions. But the drive for industrialization in the latter implies that they too will be consuming natural resources at rising rates. Thus the demands of the older industrial economies and of the newer industrializing ones converge to produce soaring demands for shrinking reserves of high-yield natural materials. As high-yield reserves become depleted, men will have to fall back on lower-yield materials. These include the oceans and the most widely distributed common rocks. This trend, Brown contends, is already discernible in numerous countries; and it will continue to spread as demands increase and high-yield resources become increasingly depleted.[16]

This brings us to the punch-line of Brown's argument. The further the above trend continues, the smaller will grow the differentials between the mineral-rich and the mineral-poor countries. Ability to exploit low-yield materials will depend increasingly upon the level of a society's engineering and technology. That is to say, the distribution

[16] Harrison Brown, "Technological Denudation," in W. L. Thomas, ed., *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth* (Chicago 1956), 1023-32.

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of natural resources is destined to become progressively less strategic than the distribution of higher technologies, as an indicator of the probable distribution of political potential in the society of nations. This is admittedly a long-range proposition. But as Harrison Brown and others keep emphasizing these days, time-tables of technological advance exhibit a persistent tendency to accelerate beyond the expectations of most lay observers.

## V

Next to the physical earth, and its climates, minerals, etc., the uneven distribution of population has attracted the interest of geopolitical theory-builders. Men have quoted tirelessly the old maxim, attributed to a seventeenth-century general, that "God is always on the side of the big battalions."[17]

With the proliferation of more complex tools and skills, it has become customary to insert a *ceteris paribus* proviso. Thus, Mackinder, in 1919: "Manpower does not imply a counting only of heads, though other things being equal, numbers are decisive."[18]

In more recent variants of this thesis, numbers are linked still more tightly to the level of technology. Thus, Robert Strausz-Hupé, in 1945: "Crude manpower is of little military significance. No matter how large their populations, backward countries do not make power-political history but must suffer it. Without developed industries and natural resources a large population is a source of military weakness. . . . Strenuous efforts and higher quality weigh heavily against mere numerical superiority. Yet as the spread of technological proficiency turns quantity into quality, large numbers are transformed into greater military power. The more populous a country is, the larger the industrial plant it can man. . . . There is no way of dodging the weight of numbers either on the battlefield or on the home front. . . . Power contests are a crude business in which accounts are settled in numbers of men."[19]

Even from a purely military standpoint, technological advance may be eroding the premise that relative superiority in numbers is a necessary condition of superior political potential in international politics. The enormous increase in firepower per capita since 1945 has raised doubt in many minds regarding the future value of mass armies. Development of automatic and semi-automatic processes in industry has like-

[17] Attributed to Marshal Turenne (1611-1675); also to Voltaire, who quoted the maxim in a letter in 1770.

[18] *Democratic Ideals*, 140.

[19] Strausz-Hupé, 48, 57, 63.

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wise raised doubt regarding the inevitable advantage of a larger labor force.

But such doubts, however well-founded, do not *ipso facto* refute Strausz-Hupé's thesis, either as applied narrowly to the military aspect of power (as he does), or as applied to all kinds of interactive effects of political communities on each other's behaviors. Some years ago the physicist J. Q. Stewart said: "Common sense indicates that the influence of many people is more than the influence of a few, and that their influence at a great distance is less than near at hand." To give this idea mathematical expression, he propounded the rule that "The influence is proportional to the number of people divided by their distance away from the point where their influence is measured."[20]

Stewart and the geographer William Warntz have tested this rule and have found it to hold with remarkable regularity for various activities. But they have also discovered that the rule holds with greater regularity when the social units compared exhibit fairly similar levels of technological proficiency. Under the opposite condition—radically different technological levels—Stewart has suggested the need for an appropriate "weighting factor." For this purpose he has suggested the concept of "social mass," which he defines as the "tonnage of material moved or fabricated for social purposes" per capita in a unit of time within the areas under comparison. The magnitude of a political community's social mass will depend, he continues, in part on the work energy available per capita, and in part on the "amount of information at hand to be communicated from one person to another, or incorporated into the patterns of mechanical or intellectual tools."[21]

Implicit in Stewart's argument, it seems to me, is the proposition that the wider the difference between communities in technological levels, the less tenable are conclusions derived from population-size and distance alone. In a system such as the international political system of today, in which technological differentials among members of the system range from slight to enormous, the technological weighting factor may well be more significant than the other two variables as a rough and ready indicator of relative levels of political potential.

In the light of this consideration it is interesting to speculate whether the technologically more advanced units of the international system are maintaining or increasing their lead, or whether the less advanced units are catching up or are likely to. It is also relevant to ask whether

[20] J. Q. Stewart, *Coasts, Waves and Weather* (New York 1945), 163.
[21] J. Q. Stewart, "Natural Law Factors in United States Foreign Policy," *Social Science*, XXIX (June 1954), 127-34.

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catching up or holding a lead may be related significantly in the long run to the relative size of population of the nations in the system. For a discussion of these issues, let us go to a challenging geopolitical hypothesis recently propounded by the British chemist and government administrator of scientific and engineering research, B. K. Blount.[22]

## VI

In Blount's view the decisive factor in the politics of our age is science and its practical applications in engineering projects of all kinds. This is a relatively new state of affairs. It differentiates our age from all previous periods. It renders largely irrelevant most of the historical analogies drawn from periods earlier than about the end of the eighteenth century. According to Blount: "Man has been making experiments of one sort or another throughout his history; moreover, astronomers have for several thousand years been deducing laws governing the motion of heavenly bodies, making predictions and verifying them. What is new in the history of civilization is the systematic application of the combination of these methods to the study of the nature of the physical world—a process which has produced in a comparatively short space of time an astonishing corpus of knowledge, extending from cosmology, which thinks in millions of years and billions of tons, to nuclear physics, which deals with quantities of time and mass so small as not to have any meaning except in mathematical terms." This new factor, Blount contends, "enables a country seriously to examine its national resources and plan, if it so wishes, to occupy the position in the world which these resources, properly exploited, would allow."[23]

A nation's capacity to maximize its power and influence (i.e., its political potential) through systematic application of scientific knowledge and engineering techniques will depend increasingly, in Blount's view, on three sets of variables. The first is the relative number (i.e., relative to other nations) of its "scientists of the highest grade," men and women of authentic genius capable of imagining and formulating new scientific theories, envisaging their engineering applications, and capable also of presenting daring projects convincingly to politicians and officials responsible for policy-making.

[22] Blount's hypothesis and supporting arguments were first presented at a meeting of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, and subsequently published as "Science as a Factor in International Relations" in *International Affairs*, XXXIII (January 1957), 71ff. A more concise and tightly reasoned version appeared later in *The New Scientist*, XXXII (June 27, 1957), under the title "Science Will Change the Balance of Power."

[23] "Science as a Factor," 71-72.

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The second set of strategic variables is the much larger number of lesser scientists and trained technologists required to give maximal engineering expression to the discoveries and theories of the scientific geniuses. The third set of variables are the levels of awareness of the potentialities of new scientific knowledge, especially among non-scientists, and the willingness of politicians and administrators to rely on the advice of scientists whose projects they will only dimly comprehend as a rule.[24]

Blount asserts that differences among nations with respect to level-of-awareness are diminishing, and will become progressively less consequential. "All countries [I suppose he refers here only to influential elites within political communities] are aware of the overriding importance of science, though many are impeded in varying degrees by their institutions from moving quickly"—and, he might well have added, by varying degrees of conservative reluctance to scrap obsolete tools and ways of doing things. Nevertheless, Blount is confident that all nations will become increasingly oriented towards scientific and technological advance. Hence, in his view, degree of awareness of the potentialities of technological innovation (at the level of governmental decision-making at least) promises to become *less and less a differentiating factor* among nations. To the degree that this actually occurs, differences in the capabilities of nations will come to depend increasingly upon the other two sets of variables: the incidence of genius and the numbers of lesser scientists, engineers, and technologists.

As to the latter—lesser scientists, etc.—the supply in any community depends partly on educational policies and the allocation of social roles. But a population's size sets absolute limits. Given two countries with comparably effective educational policies and role-allocation, "the actual numbers of scientists and technologists produced will depend on the intake into the educational system; that is, on the population" of the countries being compared. Given comparable identification of talented individuals, comparable educational facilities, similar standards of proficiency, etc., the more populous community will inevitably produce more scientists and technologists than the smaller one. Furthermore, the more intensively governments strive to maximize this resource, *the more decisive* relative size of population is likely to become.

Finally, with respect to the incidence of persons of exceptional ability, persons of authentic genius: such persons—the Einsteins, the von Neumanns, and their like—"appear to turn up at random in the population

[24] The above quotations and those that follow are from "Science Will Change the Balance of Power."

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of the world." At least Blount assumes this to be the case in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In the incidence of potential genius, "there is no master race." If this is so, then the number of men and women of potentially authentic genius, the exceptionally gifted individuals, born into any political community will in the long run be "directly proportional to population."

Today as in the past, national communities vary enormously in the degree to which they succeed in identifying, educating fruitfully, and utilizing imaginatively their more gifted members. But Blount observes that such differences are narrowing. It seems likely to him that within a generation or two most nations will be identifying about the same proportion of the potential geniuses and lesser gifted children in their respective populations. If this proves to be the case, then China, for example, will produce roughly three times as many men and women of genius as either the Soviet Union or the United States, rather more than India, and at least ten times as many as the United Kingdom or any other European country.

Reasoning from these premises, Blount concludes that "in the future (though the transition may take a little time) power will move away from the relatively small, now highly advanced nations, and the great centers of population in Asia will come into their own. China and India will become leading nations eclipsing, perhaps, even Russia and the United States, and the little countries of Europe—Britain and Germany, France and Holland—will sink into obscurity. This is not a pleasing prospect, and there is only one ray of comfort [for Europeans]. A really united Europe would not be negligible: only just a first-class power, perhaps, but it would have a future."

This prospect is surely no more pleasing to Russians and Americans than to Europeans. What is one to make of this image of the future? Some will doubtless shrug it off as patently incredible, even ridiculous. A more enlightened reaction is to examine critically the assumptions and reasoning that have led Blount to this conclusion.

One of his strategic assumptions is the essential linkage between a national community's relative stature and the number of its gifted scientists, engineers, and trained technicians. That there is some correlation between these human resources and the community's technological advancement seems indisputable. Is there a comparable necessary correlation between technological level and international power and influence? If one could show that no such correlation exists, that a state's political potential does not, in fact, vary in proportion to its scientific and technological resources, then Blount's whole hypothesis would collapse.

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One suspects there is a good deal of support for a negative view here. One observes, for example, widespread resistance on both sides of the Atlantic to rising demands for more and better education for an ever increasing proportion of each nation's youth. Such resistance is sometimes defended by presumably well-informed persons on the explicit ground that most higher education is a luxury, that modern national communities require relatively few highly educated specialists in order to carry on well enough. Such persons also appear to believe that extending education beyond minimum needs incurs considerable risk, since the more educated a citizenry is, the less docile it is likely to be.

All such views ignore the increasingly complex mechanical and social structures that proliferate in modern communities. Every nation, even the richest and most affluent, suffers from more or less acute shortages of top-level scientists, engineers, expert technicians—and, one might add, adequately educated non-scientists as well. To produce, maintain, operate, and regulate the use of military equipment, transport, communications, machine tools, and indeed most of the complex apparatus of modern society requires quantities of trained personnel far in excess of the needs of preindustrial societies. The contemporary international scene provides impressive evidence that the quantity and the quality of a nation's scientists, engineers, and technicians are variables of great political significance. Politicians, civil servants, and military staffs can operate only with the instrumentalities available; and the specific instrumentalities of statecraft as well as the intangibles of national prestige have come to depend increasingly upon the quantity as well as the quality of a nation's science and technology. In short, to challenge Blount's initial assumption is to attack him at his strongest point.

Another possible line of attack would be to challenge his assumption that the incidence of genius and of lesser gifted individuals varies directly in proportion to population. If one could demonstrate that this is not so, that too would go far towards demolishing the credibility of Blount's geopolitical hypothesis. Blount, be it remembered, frankly labels this an assumption accepted without positive proof—but an assumption that he regards as the only "reasonable" one in the absence of evidence to the contrary. He knows of no such evidence. Any contrary assumption, it is clear, must rest upon the proposition that certain races and nationalities are genetically inferior to others.

That many people in many lands believe in the inherent inequality of races is indisputable. This idea has formed the basis of notorious national policies. More subtle social discriminations also reflect such beliefs. But Blount would challenge these racists to cite any credible scien-

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tific evidence in support of their convictions. On this issue virtually all scientists would probably accept his proposition that "as far as the production of genius is concerned, there is no master race."

If the political significance of relative levels of science and technology be conceded, and if it be further conceded that the incidence of gifted individuals varies directly in proportion to population, then the focus of criticism narrows to the issues of identification, education, and subsequent utilization of human resources, especially superior human resources. Specifically, does available evidence justify Blount's apparent optimism that virtually all governments are likely to move rather promptly towards policies and practices calculated to make the most of the human talent at their disposal?

This question is certainly debatable. National policies and practices vary widely on these issues today. Political communities vary in the degree of their success in "spotting" gifted children. They differ also in the quantity and quality of education that can be made available. They differ even more radically in the degree to which gifted individuals are admitted to responsible roles on the basis of universalistic criteria—that is, on the basis of what they know and can do—rather than on the basis of who they are, or who their relatives and friends are, or what class they come from, or other particularistic criteria.

Experts differ as to the relative success of different nations in identifying gifted children. One hears it argued on both sides of the Atlantic that schoolteachers are constantly watching for latent talent, and that few gifted children are missed. The Communists too, especially the Russians, have made pretentious claims about their search for talent. However all this may be, there can be no doubt whatever that facilities for formal education differ enormously from country to country. The kinds and quantities of education that any community can provide depend in considerable degree on the level of economic development already achieved. This level not only limits the amount of capital that can be allocated to schools and universities, laboratories and libraries. It also affects attitudes and decisions as to who may attend schools, of what kinds, and for how long. The lower the economic productivity of the community per capita, the greater the pressure usually is to turn children into productive workers at an earlier age. Education on the scale and to the levels contemplated by Blount involves raising the age at which individuals become economically productive. It also involves allocating scarce capital in competition with other more immediate and urgently felt needs. The Russian example appears to indicate that a great deal more can be done in less time than most Western observers

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imagined to be possible. But one should not underestimate the limitations that a low GNP per capita imposes on a community's ability to maximize its human talent.[25]

Another set of limitations derives from social rules and customs that determine who may do what. One thinks immediately of taboos against persons performing certain roles because of race, or sex, or social class, or economic status, or party affiliation, or other particularistic criteria. Such wastage of talent is pervasive and deeply rooted in every country. It seems unrealistic to assume that it will be quickly eradicated anywhere. The issue here is which nations are likely to move more effectively towards minimizing the wastage of scarce human resources. Will it be the older, more conservative, more stable societies? Or will it be those that have more recently experienced violent social upheavals? Specifically, for example, does it seem likely on the present showing that the United States, or Britain, or any other Western nation will outpace the Soviet Union or China in making the most of the talent at its disposal? Aside from advantages derived from a long head-start in economic development, if Western societies should prove to be relatively more successful in early identification of gifted children, more imaginative in providing superior educational opportunities and programs, and more effective in utilizing the talents of their most gifted citizens, such achievements might go far towards preventing, or at least retarding, the eastward shift of political potential predicted by Blount.

## VII

The geopolitical hypotheses examined above all represent attempts to identify one or a limited number of factors that seem to account for historic distributions of political potential in the society of nations, or to provide a rational basis for predicting future distributions and patterns. These, as well as many similar attempts that might be cited, were highly regarded in their day. Some appear to have significantly influenced teaching and scholarship as well as governmental policies. Yet nearly all geopolitical hypotheses based on features of the physical environment, and older-style theorizing based on the distribution of

[25] There is a respectable body of opinion that doubts the ability of the underdeveloped countries to overtake those that are technologically most advanced. P. M. S. Blackett, for example, recently argued before the British Association for the Advancement of Science that the underdeveloped countries "have missed the bus, not by default but by chance of history," and that science is no good to them directly, though "it helps us [the Western nations] to provide them more cheaply with the things they need." (*New York Times*, August 29, 1962.)

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population, appear stale and dated when viewed from the perspective of today.

It has become fashionable to crack jokes about, and otherwise deride, such men as Mahan, Mackinder, Huntington, and others who have formulated general hypotheses that purported to explain and plot the larger patterns of international politics. But these men were neither crackpots nor phonies, but with few exceptions serious, astute, and imaginative observers and scholars. Why, then, should so many of them have failed so conspicuously to anticipate more accurately the larger patterns and trends of international politics?

Numerous historians and some geographers and political scientists will perhaps reply that all such projects are destined to fail because every political configuration is unique and history never repeats. One could cite many exhibits of this thesis. One will suffice—the closing sentence of the essay on Machiavelli, by the distinguished British historian C. V. Wedgwood: "The interpretation of historical facts differs radically from the interpretation of natural phenomena because the same fact does not appear in the same light to any two observers and the relative importance, or even the notice, accorded to individual facts differs with the judgment and character of every historian. Thus Machiavelli's discovery of a method which was later to be valuable when applied to the natural sciences was made in a branch of knowledge where it was liable to be misleading and dangerous. Since his time the practice of assuming general laws from selected historical facts has been practiced by hundreds without the tenth part of his dexterity or percipience. It is possible that his most harmful legacy to the modern world is this fallacious practice of arguing to supposed general principles from the insecure and imperfectly apprehended premises which are all that history has to offer."[26]

Not everyone is so pessimistic regarding the possibility of discovering regularities and patterns in political and other social relationships, identifying apparently significant variables, and incorporating these into general hypotheses that provide a rational basis for predicting future regularities and patterns. For most social scientists the point at issue is not whether generalizing is fruitful, but rather which variables are strategic in the class of cases under consideration. It is in this latter respect, it would appear, that most geopolitical theorizing has fallen short during the past seventy-five years or so. In particular, one notes a rather general and persistent failure on the part of non-scientists:

[26] C. V. Wedgwood, *Truth and Opinion: Historical Essays* (London 1960), 61.

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(1) to appreciate the magnitude of the continuing scientific revolution; and (2) to anticipate the full political significance of engineering applications of new scientific knowledge. Scientists—such as von Neumann, Brown, Stewart, and Blount, among many others—appear frequently to pass over rather too casually the structural and other social factors that significantly affect the rate at which different national communities are able to create or to borrow scientific knowledge and to apply it to politically important projects. But one merit of the thinking of the scientists cited is their firm grasp of the key significance of scientific and technological advances that have transformed and continue to change radically the values and meanings of all the other variables, both non-human and human, in the environment of nations.

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# INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ASIAN STUDIES

## The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia

By MICHAEL BRECHER*

### I. Introduction

ASIAN studies have long since ventured beyond the traditional limits of Orientalia to embrace history and the social sciences; they have not as yet, however, applied the insights of international relations to an area framework. Similarly, international relations specialists have all but ignored the relevance of their discipline to Asia.[1] The purpose of this article is to help bridge the serious gap between these two fields.

Until a few years ago the sole level of analysis in international relations was the nation-state. Almost all texts adopted this approach,[2] and many included surveys of the foreign policy of selected states.[3] One reason was the relative abundance of data on the state actors. Another was the lack of effective supra-state authority to ensure orderly relations among them, thereby accentuating their individual roles.

The unit or actor focus is not without great merit. It can provide studies in depth of state behavior that are essential to a comparative analysis of foreign policy.[4] It encourages the gathering of data useful

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[1] Whether or not international relations is an autonomous discipline, an emerging discipline, or simply a branch of political science is still subject to sharp controversy. See C. A. W. Manning, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations* (Paris 1954); P. D. Marchant, "Theory and Practice in the Study of International Relations," *International Relations*, I (April 1955), 95-102; Charles A. McClelland, "Systems and History in International Relations: Some Perspectives for Empirical Research and Theory," *General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research*, III (1958), 221-47 [these two articles are reprinted in whole or in part in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 18-23 and 24-35, respectively]; and Morton A. Kaplan, "Is International Relations a Discipline?" *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (August 1961), 462-76.

[2] A notable partial exception is Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (3rd edn., New York 1960).

[3] See, for example, Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community* (6th edn., New York 1958).

[4] A preliminary effort in this direction, not entirely satisfactory, is Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (2nd edn., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962).

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for the study of decision-making, motives, and elite images of the external world. And it permits an inquiry into the content of "national interest."[5] This focus, micro-analysis, will probably continue to be the most widely used because "as things stand today—and are likely to remain for an indefinite period—there can be no serious doubt about the paramount position of the nation-state or about the superiority of its influence and power."[6] Yet new macro-perspectives have emerged.

Some of the ablest minds in international relations have set out on "the long road to theory," as part of the general search for a science of politics.[7] Their most suggestive innovation, creating a new level of analysis, is the concept of an "international system." As so often in the past, the more rigorous models of economic theory have provided both a challenge and an assumed analogy. Since an international economic system exists apart from the national economic systems within it, there must also be an international political system related to, but distinct from, the political systems of nation-states; such is a rationale of the new approach.[8]

The body of literature is already impressive and the range of method striking. At one extreme is the pure theory of Morton Kaplan, who postulates six types of system: "balance of power," loose bipolar, tight bipolar, universal, hierarchical, and unit veto; only the first two have historical counterparts and "essential rules," but all are logically plau-

[5] This has long been concealed by the exponents of metaphysical realism. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York 1951).

[6] Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in William T. R. Fox, ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* (Notre Dame 1959), 101. For dissenting views on this point, see Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London 1945), esp. 53ff.; and John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York 1959), Part 1, esp. 96ff.

[7] The rapidly growing interest in theory and method is well reflected in five recent collections of papers and one volume: Fox, ed.; Stanley Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960); *The Place of Theory in the Conduct and Study of International Relations*, special issue of *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IV (September 1960); Rosenau, ed.; Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, special issue of *World Politics*, XIV (October 1961); and Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York 1955).

Among the notable illustrations of model-building in international relations are Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957); and George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957). For a critique of "scientism" in American political science, see Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (London 1959).

[8] See Fred A. Sondermann, "The Linkage Between Foreign Policy and International Politics," in Rosenau, ed., 10. A notable earlier example of the use of economics concepts for the analysis of international politics is the "developmental" and "equilibrium" concepts in Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York 1935), ch. 1.

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sible.[9] At the other extreme is the inductive method of Stanley Hoffmann, based on "systematic historical research" or a comparative historical sociology.[10] Others concentrate on the contemporary international system, the most stimulating model being that of John Herz in *International Politics in the Atomic Age*.[11]

The basic features of this contemporary system, as viewed by Herz and others, may be noted briefly. *First* is its universality, its geographic expansion to global terms with the coming of independence to Asia and Africa; the state membership has more than doubled in fifteen years. *Second* is the continued absence of law and order within the system and a fragmentation of power; this is in sharp contrast with the authority pattern in the state units of the system, where a monopoly of the means of violence usually obtains. *Third* is a unique pyramid of power, which takes the form of bipolarity, with two superpowers acting as centers of decision, military organization, economic coordination, and diplomatic cooperation involving a large segment of the system—though not all its members. *Fourth* is the presence of new types of actors; states still predominate in number and influence, but there are also bloc actors, a universal actor (the United Nations), and various regional actor organizations. *Fifth* is the decline of Europe, a shift in the power center from the continental core of the Western state system to the periphery (Soviet Union) and beyond the seas (United States); this was due partly to the end of empire, partly to the division of Europe by power and ideology into two blocs, and partly to a technological revolution, the *sixth* and most vital feature of the contemporary system.

Massive technological change, especially the development of nuclear weapons and missiles, has tended to undermine (Herz says, has ended) the physical defensibility or impermeability of states, the material basis of the preceding system. Even if exaggerated as far as the superpowers are concerned, the "decline of the territorial state" and the technology responsible for it have had a tremendous impact on the system. They have created both the possibility and the necessity for the creation of blocs, in order to provide greater security for related units; they have produced the new type of actor, the superpower, which raises the level of fear for all other units and thereby induces bloc formation; and they have destroyed the classical balance of power. The very presence of superpowers eliminates the role of balancer—in global terms—and the

[9] Kaplan, *System and Process*, ch. 2. See also his "Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in International Politics," in Knorr and Verba, eds., 6-24.

[10] Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), esp. 366ff.

[11] New York 1959.

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traditional balancing process. What exists today is a balance of terror, which performs only the negative function of the classical balance—namely, to deny preponderance of power to states seeking to change the *status quo* by violence—not the positive function of facilitating preponderance on the side of the *status quo*.[12]

A *seventh* characteristic of the contemporary system is the rise of ideology to prominence, another component of the multiple revolution still in progress. In the Europe-centered nineteenth-century system, interstate conflict was for limited power, prestige, and profits, with exceptions—notably, Napoleonic France. The coming of Fascism, Nazism and communism, however, sundered the value consensus of the international system. The last, especially, helped to accentuate intra-bloc rigidity and inter-bloc rivalry—in short, underpinned the fragmentation of the system into blocs. Ideology and power became intertwined, each strengthening the intensity of the other; the result was to aggravate the tendency of actors to seek unlimited power, now possible because of the technological revolution.

This, in turn, points up *another* critical feature—the total character of the political process in the contemporary system, in every sense. The goals have become total, whether defined in terms of Morgenthau's "nationalistic universalism" or "liberation" or world communism; the instruments have become total, with weapons of unparalleled destructive capacity; and the consequences have become total, for people everywhere on the planet.[13] The globalization of politics, referred to earlier, has also marked the disappearance of the colonial frontier, at least in the traditional meaning of that term.[14] *Finally*, there is an ever-widening gap between the rate of progress in means of destruction and the rate of progress towards international order, incomparably greater than at any other time in history.

Much of the literature on international relations in the past decade or more reveals an almost pathological concern with Soviet-American relations, most of it policy-oriented and transitory. Even among the few, like Herz, who have constructed a sophisticated model, there is evident a preoccupation with the dominant system of inter-state politics, i.e., the bipolar bloc system. This is natural and appropriate, for as William Fox observed many years ago, ". . . we will never reach [a

[12] Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?" *World Politics*, v (July 1953), 442-77.

[13] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, ch. 22.

[14] For a stimulating general analysis of the Western colonial epoch in Asia and Africa, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), esp. Part I.

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well-ordered world] by ignoring the differences between the elephants and the squirrels of international politics."[15] Apart from assisting a rational process of framing policy, the primary stress on the Dominant (bipolar bloc) System provides data to test and refine models of international systems—notably, Kaplan's loose and tight bipolar types.

By the same token, it is dangerous to assume that the elephants are the only members of the system or to ignore the squirrels by virtue of a specious claim that the elephants determine all or most of their actions. Yet this is often done. The focus on the superpowers rests on the premise, rarely stated, that the Dominant System is synonymous with the International System. This assumption is then elevated to the status of truth and is invoked to justify the exclusion or neglect of all other inter-state patterns. For certain features of contemporary international politics the assumption is valid. But there is an array of inter-state problems, conflicts, and relationships among actors outside the blocs that have nothing or little to do with the bloc system, in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and even in Europe; and these are ignored, or distorted, by a model that identifies the bipolar bloc system with the totality of inter-state politics. More important, this assumption obscures another vital pattern of relations—the *Subordinate State System.*

The existence of this pattern would seem to be obvious. A few writers pay lip service to it.[16] Kaplan's type-models and Hoffmann's historical systems can theoretically be applied with this focus. Yet thus far there have been few efforts to explore a specific subordinate system of inter-state politics.[17] This gap in both international relations and Asian studies suggests a need to apply the combined skills of a discipline and area knowledge.[18]

The foregoing discussion gives rise to the following propositions: (a) There are two broad levels of analysis, the unit (nation-state) level and the systems level; the latter, however, reveals three distinct foci of attention—in ascending order, Subordinate Systems, the Dominant System, and the World or Global Political System; in theory, the Dominant System may be geographically and organizationally coterminous with

[15] W. T. R. Fox, *The Super-Powers—The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union: Their Responsibility for Peace* (New York 1944), 3.

[16] See, for example, Rosenau, ed., 77-78.

[17] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, x (April 1958), 408-29; George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of South-East Asia," *International Relations*, II (April 1961), 143-55; and Thomas Hodgkin, "The New West Africa State System," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, xxxi (October 1961), 74-82.

[18] A thoughtful policy-oriented paper is Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, xi (April 1959), 325-45.

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the Global System, but this threefold classification is valid for the contemporary world.[19] (b) There are at least five definable subordinate systems at present—Middle Eastern, American, Southern Asian, West European, and West African. (c) The World System is not merely the sum of relations within the Dominant (bipolar bloc) System and in all subordinate systems; rather, there is a need to link a model of the Dominant System with those of the subordinate systems in order to devise a comprehensive model of the World System. This task has not even been started.

The focus of this article is the Subordinate State System of Southern Asia. Some of its features will be sketched and, where appropriate, comparisons with other systems will be drawn. The strokes will be sweeping, as befits a preliminary inquiry. The operative terms are "structure" and "texture." "Structure" will be used here to denote the basic features of the pattern of relations among and between the units of the system.[20] "Texture" connotes the broad characteristics of the environment—material, political, ideological—in which those relationships function.

What is the rationale for exploring the Southern Asian System or any Subordinate System? In the broadest sense, it will enrich both area study and international relations. The concept of system gives the one-country Asian specialist a region-wide perspective that can deepen his insight into the foreign relations of his particular state. Moreover, this approach can contribute a common analytical framework and hence comparable data to all students of Asia with an international relations interest, and thereby enrich the study of inter-state relations in the region as a whole; the area has too long been characterized by isolated, one-country, compartmentalized study. Stated in different terms, this focus will permit a study of the *interaction* among states in Southern Asia rather than *action* alone, i.e., the foreign policy of one state. To the international relations specialist, the application of systems concepts to a region will increase greatly the data for case studies of state systems. There have been relatively few Dominant Systems in history; the Subordinate System focus will permit tentative hypotheses about unit behavior in comparable milieux. It will, therefore, be a step towards an empirically oriented theory of comparative systems.

Various specific reasons strengthen the case for this approach. *First*, a system sets limits to the foreign policy choices of all actors within it

[19] For a discussion of levels of analysis, see David J. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Knorr and Verba, eds., 77-92.

[20] Used in this way, "structure" is very similar to Herz's "system." (Herz, 7.)

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—i.e., it creates external givens that impinge on both the content (goals) and the conduct (techniques) of all actors' foreign policy. Some writers attach great importance to the notion of "system determinism"—i.e., that policy is determined by the character and distribution of power within the system of which it is a member.[21] Although this may be exaggerated, it points up the vital fact that a state's foreign policy is the product of external, as well as internal, conditions. A *second* factor is that states operate at different levels and usually have various associations. Aside from being part of the Global System, they may be members of the Dominant System and one or more subordinate systems. Different actions and decisions derive from different associations; it is useful to separate and correlate policy acts with specific membership roles. Thus, for example, Pakistan belongs to two subordinate systems (Southern Asian and, marginally at least, Middle Eastern), the Dominant (bipolar bloc) System, and the Global System. Its policy on Kashmir, Israel, Germany, and nuclear tests may be viewed in terms of these four associations respectively.

A *third* justification, noted earlier, is that an exclusive Dominant System focus distorts all inter-state relations except those within the bipolar bloc system—and most exist outside that framework. The constant intrusion of that focus leads to errors of judgment and, frequently, of policy as well. *Finally*, the study of subordinate systems would help to resolve a sterile debate on the merits of deductive and inductive approaches to a more rigorous discipline of international relations.[22] Both methods have a legitimate place in this quest. An application of existing models will test their validity and lead to refined theory. The accumulation of data about subordinate inter-state politics will facilitate inductive hypotheses to be tested frequently in the light of steadily increasing data. In the cross-fertilization of international relations and Asian studies, both will benefit.

## II. Definition of the Southern Asian System

Any concept must be defined precisely if it is to serve a useful analytical purpose. Yet, as James Rosenau observed, since all bilateral interaction may be viewed in a systems framework, the one hundred contemporary states can theoretically form almost five thousand dyadic systems.[23] The concept of Subordinate State System is more rigorous

[21] See, for example, Herz, 115; and Sondermann, in Rosenau, ed., 13.

[22] For extreme formulations, see Singer, 92, and Hoffmann, "International Relations," 356-58, respectively.

[23] Rosenau, ed., 77.

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and requires six conditions: (1) its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region; (2) there are at least three actors; (3) taken together, they are objectively recognized by other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the Global System; (4) the members identify themselves as such; (5) the units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System, using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on the Subordinate System than the reverse. In the present Global System, as we have said, there are five subordinate systems—Middle Eastern, American, Southern Asian, West European, and West African; others may emerge.

Using conventional geographic terminology, Southern Asia extends from Pakistan to Indonesia; the state members are Pakistan, India, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. China is not formally within the region and is usually excluded from the designation "South and Southeast Asia" or the more recent category, "Southern Asia." However, the Subordinate System is a political as well as a geographic concept; the region is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for definition.

China is a vital peripheral state, analogous to Russia in the eighteenth-century European system, Macedon in the Greek city-state system, and Ch'in in the Chou system of China before the seventh century B.C. Moreover, the subsequent roles of Macedon and Ch'in are not wholly irrelevant to China and the present Southern Asian System.[24]

There are other persuasive reasons for China's inclusion in this system. The presence of 12 million Chinese in the states of Southeast Asia gives China great influence within that region, comparable to that of the scattered German communities in Eastern Europe in the past half-century; more pointed is the analogy of the Chinese in Singapore-Malaya and the Germans in Sudetenland. Closely related is the unstabilizing effect of China's minorities on the internal politics of various states; this accentuates her influence in the system. Another reason derives from Chinese territorial contiguity with many states of the region; this permits continuous Chinese interaction with these weaker units, a vital test of membership in any international political system. This pattern assumes special significance in the light of China's historic hegemony in Southeast Asia and its goal of renewed domination of that area.[25]

[24] A brief description of inter-state politics in antiquity is to be found in Schuman, ch. 1.

[25] See Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London 1951).

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Thus, this article treats China as a member of the Southern Asian System.[26] She is, of course, a member of other systems, too.

China's inclusion suggests a system comprising three overlapping fields—South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China.[27] Only two actors, India and China, have a high intensity relationship to and influence on most actors in all three fields, both through bilateral links.

The selection of a date for the *origin* of the system is somewhat arbitrary. The year 1949 would seem to be valid, for it marks the rounding out of the system—with the coming of independence to Indonesia and the emergence of a united mainland China, following on the transfer of power to the Philippines, Ceylon, Pakistan, India, and Burma. The remaining two phases, the creation of four weak units in Indo-China in 1954 and the end of British rule in Malaya in 1957, were marginal to the system. Prior to the end of World War II, the entire area, except Thailand and a weakened China, was totally dependent on European actors; Southern Asia was a geographic, economic, and political appendage of the Dominant (European) System. The countries of the region were objects, not subjects, of politics; they lacked autonomy of power and freedom of decision-making in external affairs.

Having delineated the State System of Southern Asia in space and time, we may now turn to its salient structural and textural characteristics.

## III. Structural Features

A key structural feature of any system is the *Configuration (Distribution and Level) of Power*. The general level in Southern Asia is low, in both absolute and relative terms. No member of the system appears to be capable of producing nuclear weapons or missiles; the armed forces of all states, except China, are small in number and severely limited as to skills and weapons. All units are characterized by an arrested economy, a low standard of living, a stagnant agriculture, a shortage of capital and skills, little heavy industry, and (most states) a disturbing rate of population growth.[28] Only India and China are poten-

[26] For a different view, excluding Great Powers from subordinate systems—in this case, India and China—see Modelski, 148-50.

[27] Neither Japan nor either of the Koreas is included in the Southern Asian Subordinate System. Unlike China, they do not meet conditions (3) or (4) as noted earlier—i.e., they are not (usually) treated as part of that system by outside actors and do not so identify themselves. They do, of course, have relations with some states in Southern Asia and, in theory, could become full members of the system. Apart from periods of disunity, by contrast, China has regarded itself as part of the Southern Asian System and has, throughout history, played a major role therein.

[28] Strictly speaking, the level of technology and economy is an environmental or textural feature. However, the level of power is a direct function of technological and

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tial "Great Powers"; Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines are "Middle Powers"; all the rest are squirrels.

In systems of advanced technology—for example, where two actors possess thousands of H-bombs and adequate delivery systems—the power margin is inconsequential. In Southern Asia the differences *tend* to be accentuated by the low general level. Yet this tendency is offset by other factors. Vast geographic distances, along with an underdeveloped economy, confine the effectiveness of India's and China's power to their respective fields; India's superior military strength may be effective vis-à-vis Nepal, Pakistan, and Ceylon, but it diminishes rapidly and steadily farther east. For China's influence, the barriers of distance and technology are especially noticeable in the offshore island areas of Southeast Asia; there, the lack of naval and air power is crucial. For all other actors in the system, their low level of power and technology restricts the exercise of influence, at best, to neighboring states.

This general weakness also invites intervention by superpowers and blocs to fill the power vacuum, a penetration that is resented and feared by many states in the Subordinate System.[29] Indeed, it is the low level of power in Southern Asia that gives China, an extra-area actor, virtual *carte blanche* access to the system, as well as *de facto* membership in it. Moreover, the presence of a relatively powerful peripheral state, China, further diminishes the application of India's power, not only in Southeast Asia but also with respect to immediate neighbors, such as Nepal and Pakistan. There is, then, diffusion of power in Southern Asia, with neither of two potential Great Powers able to dominate the system because of technological underdevelopment.

How does this power configuration compare with other systems? The pattern in Southern Asia is much more pyramidal than in *nineteenth-century Europe*, where there were five relatively equal Great Powers—England, France, Prussia (Germany), Austria, and Russia. Another striking difference was the absence of a major peripheral state upsetting all power calculations within the system proper; Russia had by then become a formal member, and the United States, the only possible analogy to China vis-à-vis Southern Asia today, remained a passive onlooker until the last years of the European system's century of peace. Like China in Southern Asia, when the United States became an active

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economic characteristics in the area covered by this system. In short, this is an overlapping feature, falling into both Structure and Texture categories.

[29] An extreme illustration of resentment was Krishna Menon's comment on SEATO: ". . . this is not a regional organization. . . . It is a modern version of a protectorate. . . ." (*Daily Indiagram* [Ottawa], August 30, 1954.)

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participant in 1917, it, too, acquired *de facto* membership in the system.

The distribution of power also differed in the state system of *ancient China*. Among the multiplicity of states were seven major units—notably, leagues of states under the leadership of Ch'u, Chin, Ch'in, and Wu. Gradually, over the course of centuries, a bipolar pattern emerged, with Chin and Ch'u as the superpowers—until the peripheral state, Ch'in, established its hegemony.[30] A similar pattern is observable in *ancient Greece*, with most city-states ultimately being linked to Athens or Sparta—and Macedon destroying the system. Southern Asia today does not reveal a bipolar pattern. Moreover, neither China nor Greece was a subordinate system; both were autonomous during most of their existence.

The hierarchy of power in Southern Asia is superficially akin to the *contemporary Dominant System*, with its two superpowers, its four "Middle Powers"—England, France, Germany, and China—and the host of squirrels. There are, however, striking differences. The general level of power in the Dominant System is infinitely higher. And the power margin of the superpowers in the Dominant System is greater both quantitatively and qualitatively. This, in turn, has two vital consequences: it makes each a hegemonial state within each bloc, to a much greater degree than India in South Asia; and it enables both to exert a life-and-death influence on all actors in the Dominant System, which neither India's nor China's power margin permits in the Subordinate System. The substantive differences, then, are very great indeed.

The level of power in Southern Asia is comparable to that of the *Middle East System*, but the distribution is markedly different. There is no Great Power in the Middle East, real or potential. Most units in the Arab core are of the same order of power; Egypt and Iraq are the strongest, but neither has the power status of India or China in Southern Asia. In fact, two of the peripheral states, Turkey and Israel, are at present stronger than any single Arab actor—though the margin is not decisive. The distribution of power in the *American System* reveals still another pattern, that of a superpower whose superior technology and military and economic strength give it hegemonial status. Not even the Soviet Union can claim such unqualified domination within its bloc in the Dominant System.

Another structural feature concerns *organizational integration* (as distinct from social integration). Southern Asia is acutely underdeveloped in this respect. There is no system-wide political institution, judicial

[30] On this and other aspects of inter-state politics in that autonomous system, see Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China* (Hamden, Conn., 1953).

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body, or security machinery. And neither of the two economic organizations embracing almost all units plays a vital role. Indeed, the process of integration has barely begun.

The *political* sphere is characterized by infrequent conferences among the actors of the system. Noteworthy events were the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, the Delhi Conference on Indonesia in 1949, and the Bandung Conference of 1955. No permanent machinery for regional cooperation emerged, despite serious efforts at the first and third of these conclaves. One reason was the rivalry of India and China, neither willing to concede Asian leadership to the other. A second was fear among the smaller states that one or both giants would dominate the system. As for the Colombo Powers, formed in 1954, or the Asian Group within the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations, they lack organic unity or even a common attitude to the Dominant System and its conflicts. Yet Bandung was a turning point in the evolution of the Southern Asian System, for it symbolized rejection of the Western view that everything was secondary to the Cold War. By asserting the primacy of anti-colonialism, the Conference proclaimed the regional autonomy of this Subordinate System and its noninvolvement, where possible, in the bipolar struggle for power.[31]

The lack of integration in the *security* field is even more striking. The only formal organization, SEATO, includes but three units of the system—Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines—and is dominated by extra-area Powers; it is also opposed by various states within Southern Asia. Nor are the members' obligations impressive—"to meet the common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes" in case of aggression, and to consult immediately on appropriate measures in case of subversion (Article 4); and even this is aimed at only one kind of danger, the threat from Communist China. Finally, the organizational links are minimal and the military power of the Southern Asian members grossly inadequate; it is extra-area power, that of the United States, which gives SEATO meaning.[32]

[31] For accounts of Bandung, see George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference* (Ithaca 1956); and A. Appadorai, *The Bandung Conference* (New Delhi 1955). On the steps taken in the direction of political integration, see Russell H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958* (New York 1958), ch. 10; Guy Wint, "South Asia: Unity and Disunity," *International Conciliation*, No. 500 (November 1954), 162-73; and William Henderson, "The Development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia," *International Organization*, IX (November 1955), 463-76.

[32] See Ralph Braibanti, "The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," *Pacific Affairs*, XXX (December 1957), 321-41; and Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Collective Defence in South East Asia: The Manila Treaty and Its Implications* (London 1956).

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The efforts to forge *economic* unity are more impressive and more successful. The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) has functioned since 1947, and the Colombo Plan since 1950. Both include most states in Southern Asia, as well as extra-area units. Both were designed to assist the process of economic development, but both are advisory in character. ECAFE possesses a permanent secretariat that conducts valuable research and recommends policies to members, who meet annually in formal conference and more frequently in sundry committees; the Commission proposes, but the states dispose. As for the Colombo Plan, really a collection of individual state plans, the organizational links are even less developed. A Consultative Committee meets annually to hear reports and to facilitate an exchange of views. The Bureau in Colombo acts as a clearing house for information, technical assistance, and the like. Both institutions have achieved much in promoting international cooperation and in creating a climate of opinion conducive to the granting of aid by wealthier actors outside the area.[33]

The level of organizational integration in Southern Asia is much lower than in other systems. Although not highly institutionalized, the Concert of Europe performed security and political functions from 1815 to 1848, and in a modified form throughout the nineteenth century. The Permanent Court of Arbitration provided quasi-judicial services towards the close of the *European System*, and a series of technical inter-state organizations emerged to serve member needs.[34] Each bloc in the *current Dominant System* has a high degree of integration. Thus, in the U.S.-led bloc there is a sophisticated security institution (NATO), a judicial body (European Court), a host of economic organizations (OECD, Schuman Plan, Common Market, etc.), and a legislative-executive organ (Council of Europe).[35] The Soviet bloc also possesses a security machine (Warsaw Pact), an economic organization (Council for Economic Mutual Assistance), specialized organs (Danube Commission and the Institute for Nuclear Research), and a multitude of

[33] For the work of ECAFE and the Colombo Plan, see, respectively, United Nations: *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East for . . .* (annual since 1947, New York); and Colombo Plan: Consultative Committee, *Annual Report*, Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (London, Wellington, Singapore, *et al.*). See also P. S. Lokanathan, "ECAFE—The Economic Parliament of Asia," in *Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1953*, II (Madras 1953), 3-26.

[34] See Gerard J. Mangone, *A Short History of International Organization* (New York 1954), chs. 2 and 3.

[35] See Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (London 1958) and *Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe* (London 1960).

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bilateral agreements covering a wide range of inter-state cooperation. Underpinning these institutional aspects is the Communist Party; frequent meetings of Politburo (Presidium) members and gatherings at Congresses enhance the integration process.[36]

An extreme contrast to Southern Asia in this respect is the *American System*. Indeed, the Organization of American States (OAS) provides the most comprehensive, formal machinery in the history of state systems. There is a legislative organ (Inter-American Conference), a permanent executive body (the Council), a secretariat (Pan American Union), a multifaceted security machinery (Foreign Ministers' meetings, Inter-American Peace Committee, Defense Board and Advisory Defense Committee), specialized organs (Economic and Social Council, Cultural Council and Council of Jurists) and specialized agencies (Commission of Women, Statistical Institute, Sanitary Bureau, etc.), and, finally, an abundance of conferences and congresses on functional matters. The structure is impressive on paper, but its effectiveness as an instrument of cooperation among the twenty-one republics is often wanting.[37] Similar duality obtains in the *Middle East System*. The counterpart of the OAS is the Arab League, which has an organ of consultation (Majlis or Council), seven permanent committees to deal with political, economic, social, cultural, and health matters, a secretariat, a security machine (Joint Defense Council, Military Organization, Chiefs of Staff Committee, etc.), and a growing number of specialized agencies. The League is even less effective than the OAS in security and other spheres, but it has the organizational foundations that are still lacking in Southern Asia.[38]

The degree of integration is closely related to a third structural feature—*Character and Frequency of Interaction* among the members. Of all the states in the system, only India has active relations with almost all other units. Apart from formal diplomatic ties, other actors have limited inter-state relations—for example, Pakistan with India and, through SEATO, with Thailand and the Philippines; Ceylon with In-

[36] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), 175-209; and George Modelski, *The Communist International System* (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1960).

[37] See Manuel S. Canyes, ed., *The Organization of American States and the United Nations* (4th edn., Washington 1958); C. G. Fenwick, "The Inter-American Regional System: 50 Years of Progress," *American Journal of International Law*, L (January 1956), 18-31; Martin B. Travis, Jr., "The Organization of American States: A Guide to the Future," *Western Political Quarterly*, X (September 1957), 491-511; and Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca 1954).

[38] See T. R. Little, "The Arab League: A Reassessment," *Middle East Journal*, X (Spring 1956), 138-50; and Paul Seabury, "The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement," *International Organization*, III (November 1949), 633-42.

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dia; Burma with India and China; the Philippines with her SEATO partners; Malaya with Indonesia; Thailand with Burma and Cambodia, etc. Interaction among the members is, then, incomplete or spatially discontinuous within the system. Moreover, it is almost entirely bilateral in form, the only examples of multilateralism being ECAFE and the Colombo Plan, SEATO, and the United Nations, which do not bind the actors. Most inter-state relations are of low intensity, though there are variations, the extremes being near-continuous tension between India and Pakistan and rarely disturbed tranquillity between India and Indonesia. Mainland China has resumed active relations with many states in Southern Asia since Bandung, but these remain less stable than those of India.[39]

In this sphere, too, Southern Asia is less developed than other systems. In the *Middle East*, for example, relations among the core Arab members are spatially continuous and complete, intense and acutely multilateral. The half-dozen actors are in constant contact, at every level, and use every form of interaction—diplomatic, political, social, economic, cultural, personal; the process of interaction even includes close links between domestic politics in any one state and the internal and external affairs of all others. At the same time, there are no relations with one peripheral unit, Israel, and limited ties with two others, Turkey and Iran.[40]

The pattern differs somewhat in *America*. All actors have continuous bilateral ties with the hegemonial power. Multilateral lines in the system as a whole are channeled through the OAS. And contact among the twenty Latin units varies in intensity. It is at a high level in Central America, which resembles the Arab core in this respect, fairly high in the deep south of the hemisphere, and declines sharply among the others.

Apart from these three basic structural features, which apply to all systems of inter-state politics, there is the question of the *linkage between the Subordinate and Dominant Systems* of the time. An inquiry into the nature and extent of penetration (or interpenetration) of the two systems will shed light on the degree of autonomy of the Subordinate System and its units. It will also represent a first step towards achieving the goal noted earlier—an all-inclusive model of the World Political System.

[39] On China's role in international politics, see H. Arthur Steiner, "Communist China in the World Community," *International Conciliation*, No. 533 (May 1961); and Howard L. Boorman, "Peking in World Politics," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIV (Fall 1961), 227-41.
[40] Binder, 423-26.

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All states in Southern Asia are members of the Global System, and almost all belong to the universal international organization, the United Nations. Some also participate in the Dominant System—Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines (and South Viet Nam) via SEATO; China and North Viet Nam via the Soviet bloc. Others are relatively free actors—India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya.[41] All, of course, are also units of a subordinate system.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Southern Asian Subordinate System is the constant penetration by the Dominant System. The Western bloc penetrates through a security instrument (SEATO), an economic organization (Colombo Plan), a multipurpose association (Commonwealth), bilateral aid, and propaganda. The Soviet bloc penetrates through a security instrument (Communist military bloc), bilateral aid from Moscow and Peking, subversion (Chinese minority), a political organization (Communist Party), and propaganda. Both blocs court the uncommitted states in Southern Asia—notably, India and Indonesia. Both blocs also intrude in the problems of the area—directly in Laos and Viet Nam, indirectly in Kashmir and West New Guinea (West Irian).[42] This intervention is facilitated by three conditions: the dire need of Southern Asian states for economic aid, which can be provided only by extra-area Powers; ideological disunity and the lack of integration; and the political instability of most units within the system.

Among all members of the Subordinate System, only India reciprocates actively. Indeed, it penetrates the Dominant System effectively and continuously, through a conscious mediatory role at the United Nations and elsewhere, in regard to the Middle East, the Congo, Laos, disarmament, and Berlin. For all states but India and China, the Subordinate System is the primary, if not exclusive, framework for foreign policy. Even those units that are militarily linked to a bloc are motivated essentially by regional considerations—Pakistan fears India and desires aid in the struggle for Kashmir; Thailand and the Philippines fear Chinese expansion.

India's policy towards some issues reflects a local ("national interest") or subordinate system outlook—for example, Goa, Kashmir, and the treatment of Indians in Ceylon, Burma, or Malaya. On other vital questions, however, there is a primary stress on implications for the

[41] Nepal, Cambodia, and Laos are too exposed to be termed "free actors." At the same time, they do not participate formally in bloc military alliances.

[42] As reflected in various Anglo-American-sponsored resolutions on Kashmir in the Security Council and the Soviet vetoes, and the U.S. (Bunker) mediation between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

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Global System or the Dominant System—Tibet in 1950, Laos since 1954, South Viet Nam today.

China's motivations are more difficult to unravel. In some cases, her role in the Dominant (bipolar bloc) System is primary, as with her aid to Castro and the F.L.N. in Algeria, and her attitude in the Congo and in Hungary in 1956. In others, her membership in the Subordinate System is decisive—for example, the border disputes and settlements with Burma and Nepal, her performance at Bandung, and the placatory offer to Asian states on the double nationality problem. But in another category the lines are blurred, with both systems appearing to fuse; the outstanding examples are Formosa and the border conflict with India. China's aim of hegemony in Southern Asia is clearly involved, but so is the larger struggle in the Dominant System—between the blocs in the Formosa case, within the Communist bloc in the Indian border case. For the two giants of Southern Asia, then, interpenetration is frequent and vital.

The *Middle East Subordinate System* is similar to Southern Asia in this respect, but not altogether. The blocs penetrate through security or military ties (CENTO and Soviet arms aid to Egypt), economic assistance, and propaganda. They also intervene in regional problems—the Arab-Israel conflict continuously, Jordan and Lebanon in 1958, Kuwait in 1961, etc. The basic difference is the absence of a reverse penetration, except by Egypt on a rare occasion, as a prominent Afro-Asian neutralist. The *American System* was strikingly different until 1959. Apart from limited diplomatic contacts and the presence of some weak Communist parties, effective Soviet bloc penetration was prevented by United States hegemony; this is simply another way of saying that Southern Asia was a power vacuum, open to extra-area pressure, and that America was not. This has changed somewhat with the rise of Castro, facilitating Soviet bloc entry into the American Subordinate System on an unparalleled scale. Like the Middle East, and unlike Southern Asia, reverse penetration is nonexistent, except at the United Nations, for no Latin American state is powerful enough or sufficiently uncommitted to play India's role.

## IV. Textural Features

Various textural features of Southern Asia merit attention, however brief. One is the *low intensity of communications and transport* within the system. Another is the complex of *common and conflicting ideologies and values*. A third is the *diversity of political systems*. And a fourth

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is *internal instability within the member-units.* Contrasts and similarities with other systems are striking.

Distances are vast in Southern Asia, topographic barriers are great, means of transport are limited, and extreme poverty restricts travel to a few. Inter-state radio contact is minimal, except for India-Pakistan, India-Ceylon, India-Burma, and bilateral links in parts of Southeast Asia. Press communications are also minimal, though some leading Indian, Pakistani, and Ceylonese newspapers may be available in the other countries. Television is practically nonexistent. And the language barrier is formidable, not only within the system, but often within individual states as well—for example, fourteen languages in India, two or more in Pakistan and Ceylon, and no less diversity in other lands. Indeed, inter-state communication is confined to the elite—at the United Nations, diplomatic conclaves, regional conferences, and the like. The communications network of each unit is virtually closed to the others, hardly an inducement to integration and cooperation.

The *Middle East System* lies at the other extreme of communications interaction. Distances are much less, states are territorially contiguous, and topography, though a barrier, is not insurmountable. The great contrast, however, is the common language of the Arab core, which eases communication via press, radio, visiting leaders, and the spoken and written word generally. Face-to-face contact is much greater. Arabic is also widely understood in the peripheral states—Israel, Turkey, and Iran. There is, in short, an open communications system, which strengthens the interaction process. The *American System* is similarly endowed with an integrated communications network. A common language is an asset, though the hegemonial power and Brazil stand apart. A developed air transport service assists the process. And radio, press, and TV knit the actors together in an information sense.

All states in Southern Asia share the goals of economic development, social progress, and a viable political order; this permits widespread cooperation in such associations as ECAFE and/or the Colombo Plan. Most have a common experience of foreign, white, rule, inducing a common reaction to many international issues involving the ills of colonialism and racialism. They are also deeply attached to nationalism and fear renewed domination. In all these important intangibles they are psychologically knit together in a community, fulfilling the fourth condition of a Subordinate System; this is also a temporary substitute for organizational integration.

Beyond these, however, is a wide gulf in regard to values. There is a clash between the secular and religious orientation to public policy, as

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illustrated in Indian and Pakistani constitution-making.[43] A variant is the conflict between modernist and traditionalist approaches to the achievement of common goals. Some follow the liberal path in politics and economics, others the Communist way, and still others various types of a "middle way." There are sharp cleavages within the system on the proper attitude to the bloc struggle within the Dominant System. Unlike Western Europe or America, there are several distinct civilizations —Buddhist, Muslim, and Hindu. Their economies are competitive. Enormous distance is a barrier to close contact. Racial, linguistic, and cultural differences are numerous and deep. Historic antagonisms persist, especially fear and resentment by the weaker peoples and states in Southern Asia. And, as in Africa, there are zones of English, French, and Dutch influence, with different traditions of education, law, and administration. No wonder, then, that the initiative for inter-state organizations in Southern Asia has usually come from outside the system, as with SEATO, ECAFE, and the Colombo Plan.[44] Yet their existence testifies to the presence of the third condition of a Subordinate System—objective treatment by outside actors as a distinct system or community.

In *nineteenth-century Europe*, too, there were differing values and ideologies—liberalism versus conservatism, revolution versus legitimacy, democracy versus absolutism. It is true that Christian civilization provided a unifying thread and common standards of behavior—until 1917. And yet the great gulf in values between the blocs today does not detract from their membership in a system—indeed, the *Dominant System*. Nor does ideological diversity, *per se*, deny the existence of a Southern Asian System. The *Middle East* Arab core is far more united in values and ideology; it has a common religion, for the most part, a common way of life, thought, and action, and the common experience, problems, and aspirations of Southern Asian states. Yet there is a basic clash in values with other members of the system. Apart from the United States, the *American System* is immeasurably more homogeneous in terms of cultural and ideological foundations—a common history, religion, way of life, and basic values.

There are three general types of political system in Southern Asia. Democracy, based on the Anglo-American models, may be found with deviations in India, the Philippines, Malaya, and Ceylon. The Soviet

[43] See, for example, Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961).

[44] Exceptions are the quiescent Asian Relations Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian States.

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or Communist model is evident in China and North Viet Nam. All other states reveal some form of authoritarianism. It may be mild, as in Pakistan since 1958, or severe, as in South Viet Nam since 1955. It may be military rule, as in Thailand and Burma, or civilian dictatorship, as in South Viet Nam, or an uneasy blend of civil-military control, as in Indonesia, or absolute monarchy, as in Nepal. In all of these cases the essential components of democracy are absent, in whole or in part. In some, the disregard for civil liberties is as great as in Communist lands, and the instruments of control are no less oppressive. In most, the army has become a major political force, either exercising power directly or standing in the wings ready to seize control from a faltering civil authority and acting as guardian of the political order. But in none of these states is authoritarianism total; this is one vital distinction between Communist governments and those of the middle zone. Another is the commitment in principle to democracy, though this has lessened in recent years. For the present, however, they remain almost as far removed from democracy as is communism; and many are less welfare-oriented than either of the polar models. All three types of political system in Southern Asia are "Western" in the sense that they are legacies of the Western epoch in Asian history. Democracy is the direct intrusion of colonial rulers. Communism is the product of Western ideas and the example of a non-Asian state. And even the non-Communist authoritarians use Western-derived techniques and political forms to maintain power.

Diversity in political forms and substance is not unique to Southern Asia. Nor is it a necessary source of conflict within the system. *Nineteenth-century Europe* had constitutional democracy (England) coexisting with autocracy, constitutional and other (Prussia, Austria, Russia, etc.). In the *Middle East* today there is democracy (Israel and, with qualifications, Lebanon) and non-Communist authoritarianism of different forms—military (Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen), absolute monarchy (Saudi Arabia), and constitutional autocracy (Iran and Jordan). As for *America*, all three types are represented—democratic (U.S., Uruguay and, occasionally, others), Communist (Cuba), and authoritarian (the majority, most of the time).

The dominant feature of internal politics in Southern Asia is instability. The record is emphatic on this theme.[45] Pakistan and Indonesia

[45] The record and the causes are examined in Michael Brecher, "Political Instability in the New States of Asia," in David E. Apter and Harry Eckstein, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (forthcoming).

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are the most persuasive illustrations. In the first eleven years of statehood, Pakistan had four heads of state and eight cabinets; there were seven Chief Ministers of Sind from 1947 to 1955. Constitutional government broke down in the provinces three times—in the Punjab (1948-1951), in Sind (1951-1953), and in East Bengal (1954-1955). No national election was ever held. A grave constitutional crisis occurred in 1954. Politics was controlled by a club of 150 opportunistic men engaged in a dismal game of political chairs. The rot was swept aside in 1958 by Mohammed Ayub Khan. The military remained in power until 1962, and Field Marshal Ayub continues to rule as President under the new constitution.[46]

The crisis of instability was as severe in Indonesia. Violence has been endemic since the Japanese departed in 1945. Banditry has never been stamped out. Nor has guerrilla war. The main area of disorder has been the outer islands, scene of four major insurrections in the 1950's. In the political arena, too, fragmentation has been the keynote. None of the three major parties—the Nationalists, Masjumi, and the Communists—was strong enough to establish a firm majority, leading to coalition government, often the bane of political order. Only Sukarno, President since independence, created the image of continuity. With the coming of "Guided Democracy" in 1958, the search for a viable polity took a new path.[47]

The pattern of instability in the *Middle East System* is similar—if anything, more acute. There, it has led to sharp change in foreign policy, as with Nasser in Egypt and Kassem in Iraq since 1958. In the *American System*, only when the entire political order is transformed, as in Cuba, does instability lead to a new path in external affairs. Thus far, the ubiquitous flux of Southern Asian politics has not seriously undermined the continuity of foreign policy—in Burma, Pakistan, or Indonesia, for example. However, this is a potential effect on the actors. Moreover, political change within the states makes a prediction of probable actor behavior more difficult. It also accentuates the image of power weakness in the system as a whole.

[46] For acute analyses of Pakistan's politics, see Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London 1957) and *Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959* (New York 1959); Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi 1959); and Khalid bin Sayeed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal*, XIII (Autumn 1959), 389-406.

[47] See George McTurnan Kahin, ed., *Major Governments of Asia* (Ithaca 1958), chs. 21-23; Guy J. Pauker, "U.S. Foreign Policy in South-East Asia," in *United States Foreign Policy: Asia* (Conlon Report, Washington 1959), esp. 56-62; and John D. Legge, *Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia* (Ithaca 1957).

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## V. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis suggests certain observations. The state system of Southern Asia consists of fourteen units, most of which are weak and under grave internal stress. Each jealously guards its newly won status and asserts the primacy of national interests over group interests that could induce organizational integration. The process is rudimentary and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Southern Asia is clearly the most underdeveloped of all contemporary Subordinate State Systems.

The vast majority of states lack sufficient power to ensure their independence. Apart from India and China, it is certain that no actor will have the surplus power to play a major role outside the system in the coming decades. The region of Southern Asia is a power vacuum buffeted by both blocs in the Dominant System. The presence of American and Soviet-Chinese power, real and potential, creates a precarious equilibrium and a dangerously rigid link between Dominant and Subordinate Systems.

Viewed in these terms, Southern Asia bears a striking resemblance to the Balkans before 1914. It lies between two centers of power and ideology. Its units are very weak compared with extra-area powers, three of which have actively intervened—like Germany and Russia in the Balkans; indeed, one of them is a member of the system. And conflicts within Southern Asia—for example, in Laos and Viet Nam—attract intervention by the superpowers.

The real danger in such an unstable system of power is that one or more of the units will disintegrate or even come under the control of outside states. If this were to occur in a unit like India or Indonesia, the consequences would be far-reaching. The whole system would be unsettled, and pressure from without would increase for all Southern Asian states. The line dividing Dominant from Subordinate System would disappear, and bloc rigidity would be further accentuated. In case of Indian disintegration, probably nothing could prevent the rapid assertion of Sino-Soviet domination over the whole system. In brief, the domestic stability of most units in Southern Asia is necessary for the maintenance of a system at all. And the maintenance of an autonomous system in Southern Asia is conducive to stability in the World Political System.

One final observation is in order. Space limitations have not permitted discussion of the next two logical stages of the analysis. The first is a demonstration of how the Subordinate System of Southern Asia *qua*

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system helps to shape the broad outlines and specific acts of the foreign policy of member-states. The other is a projection of the likely evolution of the system as a whole. This article has attempted only to provide an analytical framework within which these tasks can be performed fruitfully. It is now up to those with special knowledge of individual states in Southern Asia to link the system and the foreign policy of a particular unit. Only then can the broader task of charting the future of the system be undertaken.

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# POLICY AND SYSTEM IN DEFENSE

## The Australian Case*

By B. B. SCHAFFER

### I

DEFENSE policy and civil-military relations are now well established fields for political science. They raise problems that are important and exciting in their own right and as dramatic instances of general institutional problems of policy-making and control. Comparative and particular aspects of this field should be appreciated. What are the special characteristics of the Australian type of situation?

One characteristic is its sheer lack of dimension. Australian defense expenditure amounts to about £200 million per annum as against current United States expenditure of over £20,000 million. A second characteristic is its apparently high relative dependence on decisions elsewhere, through alliances and agreements about missions, bases, research, production, and weapons systems. The quickest study of the situation would also detect certain points at which the Australian was apparently similar to other systems: e.g., the pressure towards unification in the military establishment and in the organization of Defence Departments since the war, and its relative lack of success, too. A quick study also reveals other features, such as the notably poor parliamentary performances by the Australian legislature and by the Opposition in particular.

Such a degree of restriction and dependence raises the question of how far the Australian is just a repetition of the situation elsewhere on a smaller scale, or how far these conditions heighten the problems or even actually change them. We may say that a study of the Australian defense policy and system concerns something that is likely to be increasingly common: defense in countries that simply cannot afford to provide adequate expenditures for a worthwhile system on their own account, and yet are forced, in various ways, to provide some sort of show. The Australian set-up is merely a case in point. This article will indicate the main outlines of the policy, and the influences that operate.

The argument underlying the article is that defense policy urgently requires special sources of criticism and argument as a guarantee against rigidity. The relative lack of party questions and the overwhelming

* The main sources for this paper were interviews with officials. Other sources have been indicated where they are appropriate. The author is indebted to many officials for their courtesy and time, but the responsibility for the views expressed is his.

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influence of the budgetary factor necessitate this, but, furthermore, the basic decisions in defense tend to be impulsive and traditional because they are so nearly immeasurable. Once taken, they are institutionalized as very few other policy decisions are. The traditions created, for example, around a separation of arms or even, indeed, a particular weapons system (a tank and its corps) are peculiarly binding. It is, then, fortunate that up to a point any defense organization does also have a series of natural irritants. It has a double look and therefore at least a double series of interests, motivations, and organizational participants, military and civilian, several departments, a high degree of line-staff and headquarter-field separation, a limitation of simple hierarchy and a use of joint interdepartmental committees, a peacetime set-up that includes techniques for wartime transition, regular and reserve forces, and so on. These are enhanced by traditions of exercise and training, by the participation of influential outside groups, like science, industry, and supply, and by the conflicting motivations of top military and top civilian personnel.

In particular, defense policy requires an absolute military contribution: that is, a contribution from military advisers from their own point of view, not one already dominated by non-military factors. An active conflict of ideas—military, financial, and political—is required at a very high level. The question for the Australian type of system is whether such entrenched sources of argument about policy are not undeveloped or vitiated to a dangerous degree. Two sources will be described, and their severe limitations indicated—i.e., the higher defense organization and the military profession. Other aspects of control and of the civil-military balance will be only very briefly mentioned. The article will conclude with a criticism and a suggestion for change.

## II

Australian defense policy has emerged out of the situation dominated by the original Menzies policy for preparation for total war readiness within three years (that is to say, from 1949, when the Menzies government came into office, to 1952). The first statement of that policy virtually preceded the era of massive retaliation. It also preceded the famous confession by Sir Frederick Shedden (then Secretary to the Australian Defence Department) to the Public Accounts Committee that that three-year preparation had never been effective and, indeed, that by 1956, let alone 1952, preparation for a total conflict had not been achieved. For this and other reasons, the policy was surrendered and

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was replaced by a current policy that has been repeated in ministerial statement after statement in recent years.

Nominally, defense policy is reviewed once every three years, and the policy and the strategic philosophy that dominate it also dominate the program over the ensuing three years. In fact, the ministerial statements that introduce these programs and that review them from time to time have all, since the surrender of the previous policy, described very much the same unchanging structure, along the following lines. In the first place, Australia is not preparing for global or total conflict. That is to say, Australia has to assume either that nuclear war is unlikely or that Australia could not play a worthwhile role in such a conflict and could certainly not protect itself against nuclear attack. Hence expenditures on civil defense are dismally low. Furthermore, the assumption goes, non-nuclear attacks on the Australian territory itself are unlikely. Hence, the strategic role for which Australia prepares itself is a role in the Cold War and in limited wars.[1] It provides the type of forces that give it a voice in Cold War alliances and that can play a useful role in putting out brushfires (but not in defending Australia itself). The Australian forces in Malaya are the classical case in point. Indeed, while Malaya may not be really central to Australia's strategic position, the continuity of operations there and the degree to which they show the successful handling of a limited outbreak have so dominated Australian military thinking as to provide a parallel with, say, Britain and India in the last century. Other recent cases are the movement of token forces into Thailand (from Malaya) under SEATO, and of instructors into Vietnam.

This situation might appear to provide a clear instance of a rational piece of policy-making, a determination of ends, a costing of these ends, and an allocation to these ends, in the most efficient way, of the many competing possible means. Unfortunately, there are some reasons to be concerned about the truth of this rational model. In the first place, the policy has presented us with a defense program that has consistently spent close to the £200 million per annum figure. Do we really have here a policy that has to be met by an expenditure of £200 million, or do we have a compromise between a series of impulsive or instinctive decisions on the one hand (e.g., that Australia must have some sort of defense forces) and a purely extrinsic decision that the expenditure will be fixed at no more and no less than £200 million? It is possible that we have achieved the worst sort of compromise: a defense system

[1] *Parliamentary Debates, Australian House of Representatives*, November 26, 1959, and March 29, 1960.

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that has stabilized at a particular level of expenditure, high enough to be a burden on the economy but not high enough to provide a worthwhile defense at all.

In the second place, the statements of the basis of this defense policy have been unusually unchanging at least since 1957. The three-year defense program of 1957-1959 had the same basis as the 1959-1961 program. We can now see that it is providing a similar basis again for the current 1961-1963 program. It is clear that the defense policy is heavily influenced by one particular strategic philosophy, and there is little evidence of any effect in Australia over the last five years of the sort of critical reassessment that has been occurring elsewhere, notably in the United States. Nominally, any defense policy may be a result of particular national objectives. Historically, however, such policies have always been deeply influenced by the strategic philosophies of the time, such as command of the seas, say, or preparation for total war in three years. The recent debate has taken us away from a notion of preventive war via massive retaliation and brinkmanship to the current theories of counterforce strategy. This is going to have an effect on United Kingdom policy about the independent deterrent. It is probably going to have a radical effect in the United States and the United Kingdom on levels of civil defense expenditure. Should Australia be exempt from this influence? Clearly not. Is there anything in the system to ensure that the effect will be rational and speedy? This is to be doubted. A central concern of this article is whether a dependent situation (in addition to a restricted situation) can provide not simply weapons, scientific resources, etc., but the immediate sources of argument and change that are currently required.

The whole problem may be seen clearly in relation to defense science. In theory, this ought to be one of the most powerful influences making for radical change. Australia, however, has to buy its defense science. But while there is one sense in which it can, indeed, be bought, there is another in which it cannot. The Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science meets once every two or three years.[2] There is a scientific adviser in Australia and a Defence Research and Development Policy Committee apparently at or near the top of things. What is lacking is the activity and the infrastructure to make the adviser and the committee effective. In their absence the sort of thing represented by the rare meetings of the Commonwealth Advisory Committee is an inadequate way of providing what Australia itself cannot provide.

[2] *The Times* (London), July 18, 1961, 6.

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Another instance in which built-in rigidity can be seen is the handling of the Moreshead Report, the confidential report of 1958 on the whole Australian defense structure.[3] Its handling suggests not only that dependence and financial limitations produce rigidity, but that rigidity once present reinforces itself. The handling of this case showed that a report that attempted to be radical was ineffective; secondly, that many organizational possibilities (for instance, the example of the United States Marines) were not considered at all; and thirdly, that there was no force at work within the Australian defense structure that was a powerful influence for change rather than against it. But the outstanding case is the recent reorganization of the Australian military forces themselves to a pentropic system.[4]

This change was accompanied by a sacking of various senior officers that aroused, in early 1960, a degree of parliamentary attention to defense matters quite unusual in Australia. It is true that parliamentary information and performance throughout were notably poor. The idea was introduced to Parliament in two separate stages, in 1959 and 1960. Parliamentary interest focused constantly more on the generals to be sacrificed than the achievements to be secured. As against this, the change showed that the Returned Servicemen's League (R.S.L.), theoretically one of the most powerful pressure groups in Australia, could be virtually ignored when the Government wished. The R.S.L. was and is deeply committed to National Service training, but the Government was able to drop the policy very easily. Why was this? What gave the Government its peculiar strength and its peculiar incentive to change on this occasion was simply the enormous savings to be secured by the abolition of National Service training and the reliance on a large Citizen Military Force (C.M.F.) and a restricted regular (A.R.A.) element. One A.R.A. man costs £1,200, one C.M.F. man about £90 per annum. The economics of the change were extraordinarily tempting ones. It certainly was proper to get away from the situation in which, while there were only 4,100 A.R.A. men in the sole mobile brigade, there were 3,000 men directly employed on National Service training alone. But whether it is worthwhile pretending that two pentropic divisions, one of which consists purely of C.M.F. men and the other of

[3] See especially *Parl. Debs.*, H. of R., October 22, 1959.

[4] The battalion-brigade division is to be replaced by a five-battle-group (pentropic division) system. Including the purely volunteer Citizen Military Force (C.M.F.) of (it is hoped) 30,000 men, there will be two pentropic divisions, one consisting of two Australian Regular Army (A.R.A.) battle groups, plus three C.M.F. battle groups, and the other of five C.M.F. battle groups. The A.R.A. itself, therefore, provides two battle groups, a battalion in Malaya, the Pacific Islands Regiment, and certain additional and logistic support groups.

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a majority of C.M.F. men, are really a notable strengthening of Australian defense is another matter. What is sure is that they represent a considerable economy.

## III

Here we have, then, a restricted and dependent defense policy in which change appears to be difficult just because of those characteristics, save only where financial, rather than defense, reasons are effective.

Dependence means insulation from some things (e.g., defense science and strategic debate), delay (e.g., in re-equipment), and the acceptance of certain overseas doctrines (e.g., the United Kingdom assumption about the organizational faults of the old German high command). Delay is particularly notable. The Royal Australian Navy is to be re-equipped with two guided missile destroyers of the *Charles F. Adams* type with Tartar sea-to-air missiles.[5] This destroyer was long ago designed in the United States, it was first commissioned in the United States in September 1960, it was ordered by Australia in 1961, and first delivery is not due until the end of 1965 and the second until the end of 1966. This sort of dependence, particularly in equipment, research, and development, does lead to a great deal of debate and activity. An example is the interpretation of the United States-Australia Mutual Weapons Defence Programme Agreement about the inconvenient and tricky "indigenous use" rule.[6] But the problems here are the availability of United States funds, the nature of the agreement, and its definitions. Furthermore, while Australia is involved in a series of overlapping and sometimes conflicting agreements and alliances that create particular pieces of machinery and devices for consultation, for many of her allies these arrangements are of marginal or secondary importance. They do not create a single hierarchy of defense policy nor do they take Australia to the central point of argument and decision-making with the key powers.

Dependence means that Australia is deprived both of certain types of decision-making and certain types of equipment and strategic change. Financial restriction means that it is priced out of weapons systems also. Furthermore, financial restriction is so tight that there is no point, high or low, at which finance is secondary in decision-making. Even in the original decision about ends or strategic philosophy, pricing out means that many weapons systems and activities have to be eliminated

[5] Other instances can be seen in statements on re-equipment; e.g., *Parl. Debs.*, H. of R., June 29, 1961.

[6] Australia Treaties, 1960, Mutual Weapons Defence Programme Agreement between Australia and the United States of America, Treaties Series, No. 11.

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from consideration, and this in its turn determines basic strategic policy as much as anything does. This has operated in relation to carriers, to aircraft, to nuclear submarines, to defense science, and ultimately to manpower and National Service training in particular.

There are certain definite implications of this situation. One is that the civilian (as against the military) element enters at all levels of decision-making and not merely at the very top. Secondly, the starting point for decisions about all the details of defense is finance: the total available; the financial implications of the apparently inescapable elements in the structure; and the financial interpretation of the "absolute" military statements—that is, the statements from the military on particular policies, programs, and requirements.

This is seen very clearly in the preparation of the annual estimates of the Army Department. This must begin with the annual finance available under the defense program, which is pretty well fixed from program to program and from year to year. Secondly, once there are 21,000 A.R.A. plus a C.M.F. force plus a civilian element, there are inescapable costs of pay, feeding, accommodation, and so forth about which there can be very little debate. Particular branches then work out, on these and other bases (for instance, statements about training policy), actual requirements—e.g., ammunition, transport, and so forth. But these come after the previous elements. Clearly, then, the actual decisions are almost overwhelmingly a result of the original rigid financial restriction plus an equally rigid set of givens. There ought to be a clash between the military and civil elements—e.g., between a political determination of priorities and absolute military advice on priorities. But this potential clash is reduced in scale: the narrowness of the margin for maneuver is quite obvious to all participants. This in turn eliminates the proper military, and also the civil, roles to a considerable extent. Significant changes come as a result of external factors. From time to time, cuts might appear in the guise of military change, like the abolition of National Service training. For the most part they will be inevitably directed to the only part of the vote—i.e., in American terms, appropriation—where there is any room for maneuver—that is to say, "Works and Equipment" and especially "Capital Equipment."[7] Here is where clashes and arguments about policy ought to take place; it is also the easiest place to cut. Changes here are, by definition, policy matters, but a policy that is the result of finance rather than military advice. Like the diet of the poor, a narrow military budget is much duller

[7] Capital equipment means net changes in total equipment due to policy decisions (as against the simple maintenance of the stock of equipment).

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and more repetitive than a relatively rich one. Granted the original restrictive financial decision about defense policy (that you can spend £200 million per annum), the rest, apparently, follows. Of the whole Army Department vote, only 16.16 per cent is for new equipment.[8] That includes clothing and medical and dental stores and the like, as well as more warlike capital equipment. Is such rigidity alleviated in any way?

The key occasion for the central policy argument is the triennial review of the defense program. The three-year period coincides with the parliamentary term; and the programs became triennial after a quinquennial experiment. Changes can be introduced during the three years, as a result of external factors like the Korean crisis. Planning for the new program will begin before the three-year period is up, as planning for the 1962 and ensuing program was begun during 1961. There is not, however, a permanent, broad plan in operation, looking three years ahead. At the moment of formulating the plan, there should be the clearest clash of argument between finance and economy on the one hand, and the program implied by purely strategic objectives on the other hand. But, as I have already indicated, the record of financial rigidity vitiates the statement of the strategic objects even before it comes to the crunch. A limited and rigid financial total aggravates the sheer difficulties of the size and costing of defense expenditure, in fields like science or development, or of a decision to purchase a new piece of equipment like the American destroyers. Costing in defense expenditure is notoriously tricky, especially in research, in development, in radically new projects where comparisons are unavailable, in overseas orders, and in joint projects. These are precisely the projects that are potentially of key importance to Australia but that the system makes it most difficult to achieve. The results may well be disastrous, in cuts of new capital equipment, but even more so in the avoidance of changes that will endanger the even annual total one year, or even one defense program with another. This overwhelmingly financial approach applies most strongly in the matter of possible top political intervention. Formally, decisions go to the Cabinet when a major or a new type of equipment is involved, for works costing more than £200,000, for the annual defense works program, and for the approval of the Annual Estimates. Virtually all these matters are presented for obviously financial and economic rather than defense reasons: they all appear in a financial guise.

[8] Draft Estimates 1961-1962, Department of the Army, Explanatory Notes, Division 511, p. 2.

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The three main weaknesses here seem to be, first, the lack of a continual three-years-ahead plan, and therefore the severe reduction of the sheer number of occasions when the Cabinet can intervene; secondly, the vitiation of non-financial advice by financial considerations; and thirdly, the fact that changes have occurred only for financial or for extrinsic reasons. The machine itself does not appear to produce change. Financial crises, pressure from allies (as about Thailand), or actual conflicts (e.g., Korea) may.

It does not follow, at all, that the program does not matter. Before the Defence Programme has been formulated by the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee to go to Cabinet, the Army Military Board, for example, will have prepared a series of alternative statements. Each will be a statement of needs, costs, and priorities, with the Budget Section influential in costing. A consideration of costs and priorities has therefore entered at a very early stage indeed in the formulation even of the particular parts of the program by the particular departments. The key papers that emerge[9] are really statements of what the military advisers expect to get rather than what they think they ought to have.[10] The Defence Programme is of vast importance and influence throughout the defense structure. What it does is to impose a sense of financial rigidity year by year and triennium by triennium. In particular, as far as the Defence Department's role is concerned, its real effort, as a result, occurs in relation to the evenness and continuity of expenditures and the fulfillment of the Annual Estimates. For the last three months of the year, this is indeed a day-to-day function of the Finance Section of the Department.

Secondly, then, departments know that they have to phase their orders so as to meet expenditures that will fall into line with Annual Estimates, which are relatively unchanging year by year. The tradition of even and detailed Estimates, full expenditure of the Estimates within the year, and a minimal use of the Treasurer's Advance and Additional Estimates, all tend to vitiate the potential role of the Defence Depart-

[9] "The Strategic Basis of the Defence Programme" and "The Composition of Forces."

[10] Clear instances of the operation of this factor can be seen in the ministerial statements of 1959, 1960, and 1961, particularly on the naval program. It was quite clear at an early stage that the program really needed nuclear submarines, and it became equally clear that no one was prepared to fight for the considerable cost of getting them. Similarly, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* has been retained, after many previous decisions to scrap it, partly for prestige and partly because it was much cheaper to achieve something by retaining the *Melbourne* and equipping it with helicopters than to scrap the *Melbourne* and move over to nuclear submarines. H.M.A.S. *Sydney* will come out of reserve as a transport, where an entirely new air transport command would have been preferable but also more expensive.

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ment and of financial control. Thirdly, the program determines the relations between Service Departments and the Defence Department. Service Departments will go back to the Defence Department on questions that are likely to change or have a direct impact on the program itself.

## IV

Is there, then, anything in the organization and control, or in the structure of the military profession, that is going to produce in Australia itself the possibility of real argument and change in defense policy?

Let us first look at organization, and in particular at the higher defense organization. Certain brief comments may be made about the chart reproduced on the following page. First of all, it shows formally a high degree of international influence. Australia has to have a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee because its opposite numbers overseas have a similar appointment. Secondly, there is clearly a marked influence at the top by civilian officials. The position of the permanent head of the Defence Department, the Defence Committee, and the Assistant Secretaries serving the Secretary, Department of Defence, should be particularly noted. Thirdly, there is a complex interdepartmental infrastructure and a great variety of participants. One can distinguish, for instance, between the Department and the committees. The Department of Defence exists to administer the joint secretariat and the higher defense organization as a whole, to meet the function of apportionment and certain specific functions like the integration program, to assist the phasing of annual expenditure, and so forth. With the committees there is a distinction between major committees (Defence Committee, Chiefs of Staff Committee), other committees, sub-committees working with the other committees, and the staffs, particularly the joint staffs of these committees. All this is usual in defense administration but relatively unusual in Australian administration as a whole. While other committees may formally appear on the same line as the Defence Committee and Chiefs of Staff Committee (Joint War Production Committee, Defence Administration Committee, and Defence Business Board), it is these first two committees that really matter, partly because they have beneath them a structure of other committees and the Joint Planning Committee in particular. The Joint Administrative Planning Committee, which handles logistics, also counts. The Principal Administrative Officers' Committees (Maintenance and Material, and Personnel) matter much less.

The history of this structure is not the same as the history of com-

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# AUSTRALIAN HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION




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parable structures in the United States or the United Kingdom. The Australian began with one Defence Department and has, so to speak, cast off other organizations from that nucleus from time to time. On the other hand, it has in recent years met problems that are similar to those of defense administration in general and it has sought to copy the overseas model. But there are differences between the United Kingdom and Australian structures; moreover, there are other alternatives and some of them might have suited the Australian situation much better.

What seems particularly unfortunate in the Australian situation is that while the model as a whole may appear to be similar to the United Kingdom's, it is in fact different in two important respects. One is the relative lack of specific political—that is, top-level Cabinet—machinery.[11] This is partly a result of the restriction of references to the Cabinet, already commented on. It has other aspects. The Opposition, for example, is one factor. The way in which it interprets its role affects both the Defence Department and the Cabinet itself, and thus Cabinet machinery, too. There is a political fear that, in the absence of a more instructed role, the Opposition would tend to concentrate on any apparently radical changes in expenditure from one year to another. Presumably this is the opposite of what the political critic should want, yet it is in fact all that his presence in the Australian system achieves.

The fact is that the Parliamentary system, unlike the Congressional, tends to weaken the role of a party Opposition in this field: there is both a lack of means of influence, and a lack of partisan questions. The

[11] There was originally a Statutory Council for Defence, which was a ministerial body assisted by chiefs of staff in an advisory capacity. They had one department and particular boards (including the Civil Aviation Board, Munitions Board, and so forth) that were thrown off and became departments, like the Department of Supply in 1938. In 1939, under Menzies and with Shedden as the top civilian official, the Department of Defence Coordination became the Department of Defence. Under it developed the Joint Services Organisation, the Chiefs of Staff Organisation, the War Cabinet Secretariat, and so on. This Secretariat was serving the War Cabinet, which had replaced the lapsed Council of Defence. But the War Cabinet was simply the ordinary Cabinet for a few special purposes. The 1940 Advisory War Council replaced in Australia the actual coalition that emerged in the United Kingdom. In 1942 Treasury control was strengthened with the creation of its specialized Defence Division. By 1944 Shedden was considering postwar defense organization. He visited the United Kingdom and under Chifley in 1945 began to handle the move over to a peacetime organization. After 1945 the institution of a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Wells, Dowling, Scherger) appeared and the Statutory Council for Defence was revised, with its decisions carrying the authority of Cabinet decisions. But in 1949 a new Prime Minister and a new strategic philosophy meant the lapsing of the Council and its replacement by the Defence Preparations Committee. With the passing of this policy, that committee in turn lapsed. Menzies' division of the whole Cabinet into two—an inner Cabinet and the rest—meant, in conjunction with these changes, that no special Cabinet Defence Committee was revived or existed.

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present Opposition does nothing to amend this. From this point flow many of the limitations of the political contribution. Cabinet will deal with the questions that matter to it—that is, with questions that are policy ones in the sense that they substantially affect its fate. On the whole, Australian defense policy does not fall into this group. It may well be that the size of Australian defense expenditure urgently needs Cabinet discussion, but its very limitation plus the Opposition situation tend to remove precisely this discussion from the Cabinet's agenda. Things are accordingly left to the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, and mostly to one or the other of them. Political intervention occurs on marginal points, and on some few top appointments. So the Defence Committee is official, the Defence Council defunct.

The ministerial role, except for that of the Minister of Defence himself, is very limited, and one minister does not start arguments with his own decisions. This limitation, then, is a further part of the Cabinet problem. The difficulty is that some of the political points of view—for example, about overseas bases or about the placing of orders—can be handled by the Ministry of Defence. The other departmental ministers can merely express the extrinsic points of view that may occur on questions like the administration of military justice. If a minister intervenes in questions of allocation and priority, he will be endangering the absolute quality of the advice, presumably military, that the Government (or the Higher Defence Organisation) receives; if he does not, little save a secondary role is left. This problem is enhanced in Australia by the organization and procedures of the Military Boards, and notably by the Australian tradition that establishes a wider gap between the minister and his department than occurs in the United Kingdom. The Service Departments are now in Canberra; even when the Army Department was in Melbourne, it tended never to have a "Melbourne" minister. Ministers almost certainly do not and cannot attend sufficient Boards; they are inevitably uninformed, partly because of the weakness of the Parliamentary role and therefore a lack of respect for it (shown in the Defence Pay Regulations case, where the Departments simply neglected, over years, to secure the necessary Parliamentary approval for amended scales). Ultimately the departmental minister becomes a factor of rigidity rather than change. One result of this situation is that in practice this has meant no proper Cabinet consideration of defense, and so a transfer of the civilian function from the politicians to the officials. Furthermore, the top civilians somewhat outbalance the top military. This in turn has meant the rise of the Secretary of the Defence Department and the Defence Committee to an extraordinary degree of in-

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fluence. This is a second contrast with the situation in the United Kingdom, where the Secretary of the Defence Department recently retired from the Civil Service because he had insufficient to do. The Prime Minister's decision, on the occasion of the Moreshead report, not to unify but to increase the authority of the Ministry of Defence in the control of the joint services machinery and the application of defense votes has enhanced this influence.

The Defence Department has created a civilian departmental hierarchy at an administrative level of Secretary, First Assistant Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries. This partly reflects the tradition set by Shedden (for so long the Secretary) of bringing into the Department good, often graduate, staff with continuity in office. From the Chairmanship of the Defence Committee, at the top, down to Secretaryships of sub-committees, the civilian element has an element of control at all levels; and an Assistant Secretary serves on all the top committees other than the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The branches of the Assistant Secretaries prepare papers and provide expertise—for example, on such matters as who should be consulted and who co-opted (what is broadly meant by the administrative direction and control referred to above). A parallel between the civilian staffing hierarchy and the organizational hierarchy is carefully maintained. This is a stronger position than exists in the U.K. Department of Defence, and it is unusual for Australia. Defense administration is still Australian, of course. Full details of civilian Commonwealth Public Service jobs will still be put in the *Commonwealth Gazette* so as to maintain the rights of appeal of all other Commonwealth servants against provisional promotions, even if this means revealing, as on occasions it has, the full details of the organization of scientific establishments of the Supply Department, or current intelligence activity under the Joint Intelligence Committee. An Assistant Secretary, as, say, a Joint Secretary is going to be a much more influential colleague than a lieutenant colonel, when that colonel has not been and will not be long in office. The officer profession in the A.R.A., partly because of tradition and partly because of size, cannot develop specialists, including the type of specialist in staff (or, as we might call it, Whitehall) work that is being developed in the United Kingdom. This continuity of the Defence Department officials has given them a sense of representing the real essence of defense policy (as against what is represented by the civilians of the Treasury Defence Division). This is an impressive but perhaps not altogether a proper thing.

These factors can be seen at work in the operation of the whole sys-

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tem of committees. Defense organization is never dominated by a simple hierarchy; the anti-linear factors operate in Australia, but not at all sufficiently. Committees proliferate in the Defence Department but not within the particular Service Departments. Relations between the Defence Department and the Service Departments are somewhat specialized. The Army Department has a policy opposed to permanent as against *ad hoc* committees or informal consultation. Formal committees (Estimates, Weapons Equipment Policy, Army Works Development) are relatively secondary and few. Furthermore, in the Higher Defence Organisation as a whole there are only two dominant committees, the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (as measured by the criteria of terms of reference, chairmanship, size of the committee, sub-committees, structure underneath the committee, and staff). Some of the other committees possess much less influence and produce much less key decision-making than they ought to. The political element is altogether missing from this overall structure, with the exception of the Minister for Defence and, by implication, the Prime Minister himself. The one committee not mentioned here which does matter (Treasury Finance Committee) exists for "consideration from the joint service aspect, of policy matters, conditions of service, personnel of the defence forces,"[12] and it matters perhaps much less than it should.

Even the Chiefs of Staff Committee is not as powerful as it might be. The normal model is for an external, political-civilian decision on the financial total and on broad ends of policy (Hart's grand strategy); while military thinking about the use of these resources (especially finance in peacetime, manpower in war) should be at some point "absolute"—that is, independent. There are many reasons why this cannot operate in Australia, including the very small total itself. One way out of this is to attempt to separate financial and military advice altogether, but that would not make for very relevant military advice. Another is to provide top military advice with its own financial advisers. This is no doubt what is supposed to happen in Australia, and in the Departments themselves up to a point it is what happens, but at the top of the Higher Defence Organization this is not so. The chief civilian official, the chief financial adviser, has his own committee separate from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Inevitably the influence of that committee, the Defence Committee, is very strong and the Chiefs of Staff are somewhat overwhelmed.

Overall, one doubts whether there are sufficient points of independent influence here; a clear enough source of absolute military thinking;

[12] Public Accounts Committee, No. 50, 1960, Part III.

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sufficient impact from science or, now, from business (on central issues). The civil-military balance contains few powerful sources of change. The dominant element is one top official civilian group that operates, not through a unified department, but through the joint service machinery and the Defence Committee especially, and through the financial decisions, which include decisions about strategy, class of weapons, and so forth. This group is very small. The civilian role in the other Service Departments is unfortunately much narrower, the staffing standard poorer, the contribution, as in the Department of Army, continually eroded. Again, this aspect cannot be fully explored. It involves the role of the departmental permanent head,[13] and civilians generally, in the operation of financial control and the emphasis on continuity, for example; and the severe problems of adequate civilian staffing in these Service Departments. But it is a pity that in a situation where the whole requirement is a search for change, the essence of the civilian contribution in the Service Departments generally is, apart from financial control, continuity in its narrowest sense.[14]

Certain forces exist to establish a minimum below which the departmental civilian role cannot fall, such as financial control, the need to interpret the military style, and the need to conceal its more embarrassing absoluteness—for example, in a concern for safety in arranging exercises. But, for the rest, the role as it is filled in the Australian Service Departments at present is not very impressive. A vicious circle continually reduces the significance of the civilian contribution in the Service Departments. Against this a struggle is put up by the sheer quality of some few men at the top and by a few institutions like the Planning and Programme organization in the Air Department. But in general there is a vast contrast between the high potential demand that the civilian contribution could meet and the minimal actualities that are provided. Except at the very top—notably, of course, in the Defence Department—military staffing is more impressive. If the general imbalance in the Australian defense system is seen partly in too

[13] Cf. Public Service Act, S.25(2), and Naval Forces Regulations, Reg. 18.

[14] This continuity is very impressive. There have been, for example, only three Secretaries of the Navy Department. The first was G. L. Macandie, who was clerk in the Queensland Navy Office in the 1890's, Senior Clerk when the Commonwealth Navy Office was established and, from July 12, 1915, when the Department was created, the first Secretary, in which capacity he continued to serve until the 1940's. (G. L. Macandie, *The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy*, Melbourne 1949.) His successor, A. R. Nankervis, was on the Navy Board in the 1930's as Financial and Civil Member, and served as Secretary from 1939 to 1950, when he was succeeded by the present Secretary, T. J. Hawkins, who had entered the Department himself when it was set up in 1915. This is an astonishing record of continuity; whether it is a proper one is another matter.

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great a civilian control in the Defence Department, it is also seen in the underdevelopment of the civilian role in the Service Departments.

A further decisive organizational factor is the Australian acceptance of the United Kingdom doctrine against what is held to be the fundamental error of the German military machine in the two world wars: the separation of command from top staff functions. The fact is that both the United States and the United Kingdom have built up such vast top staff machines now that complete careers can develop within them. What Australia has is some of this machine without its men, its scale, or some of its detail. The domination by the Secretary and the Defence Committee and the lack of scale, of numbers, of the career staff men (whom doctrine would so condemn) and of points of countervailing power (like the American President's use of General Taylor as a special adviser on defense, or Churchill's use of Cherwell and his team as a counterbriefing unit whose search was for truth rather than agreement): all this makes the top organization in Australia altogether too simple and intimate a system to provide the sort of conflict that ought to be occurring.

Unification then is certainly not the answer. Australia, like other defense systems, has been subject to unification propaganda ever since the war. The arguments are the usual ones: that unification would provide economy; that the ultimate situation in weapons systems will impose unification; the model of the United States Marine Corps; the case for introducing sudden rather than gradual changes, and so forth. The record, here as elsewhere, of unification (as against greater authority for the Ministry of Defence and some integration of particular functions) is very limited. The amalgamation of the Departments of Supply and Defence Production is almost the only case in point; no other departments, no services, no particular fighting arms, and few civilian elements have been unified. There has been some integration (apprentice training in Navy and Army schools, canteen services, design inspection staffs) but integration is inherently difficult. The case against unification as such is not mainly the size of the vote, not that in war the departments might have to be split, not the political or even the constitutional difficulty in Australia of providing Assistant Ministers, but simply that unification is a simplistic solution to the difficulty of defense policy. The difficulty is that decisions on the overall defense effort and the grand strategy can be a military matter scarcely anywhere, still less so in Australia, where the factors are civil (financial) or extrinsic, and where the military themselves cannot have the know-how on the technical matters that do enter into Great Power strategy. If the

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Australian military is expert (that is, representative of measurable and verifiable judgment) at all, it is so only on very low-level questions. This may be a general phenomenon. It is at its extreme in the Australian type of situation. The military, then, are professional advisers, not "experts"; accordingly, there is a need at the top for variety, division, balance, argument, not for unification.

This argument has emerged elsewhere since the war. The whole of defense organization is indeed a striking example of a struggle between common international patterns on the one hand, and indigenous influences and problems on the other. This is true both for organization itself and for the structure of the military establishment, which ought, of course, to operate as one of the most powerful of all the sources of argument and balance in the defense system. As far as organization itself is concerned, we have seen that there are differences and similarities between the Australian and the United Kingdom situations. The differences between the Australian and the American structures are also significant. The United States, particularly since the days of MacArthur, has had considerable influence on the actual Australian system (quite apart from policy). Equipment, SEATO, and ANZUS are now increasing this degree of influence. But the outstanding point about the organization of the Australian defense system is the absence from it of those very features of the American system that are so often criticized but in many ways so much to be admired: the manifold levels and points of argument and difference, and the deep political intervention into its structure. Australia may strive after this copy but cannot by itself adequately manage to follow the whole of it; following part of it might mean the worst of both worlds.

## V

The military establishment itself ought to act as a major force for criticism and change. Unfortunately, the officer profession in Australia (though individual members are of the very highest caliber) has certain inherent structural problems: it is virtually forced to base itself on a model that, apart from its dysfunctions elsewhere, cannot operate properly in the local conditions.

Basically the Australian system tries to copy the general military model. How does this work out? First, in the A.R.A., despite the variety of methods of entry, the overwhelming point is the conscious and increasing domination by the Royal Military College (R.M.C.) graduate. There is another form of entry through the Officer Candidate School

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at Portsea. Candidates for the O.C.S. are eligible either from the ranks on certain conditions, from university students or graduates, or from those between the ages of 18 and 23 with an intermediate (as against a leaving) certificate. But the R.M.C. graduate will be always somewhat, often very much, younger than the O.C.S. graduate, he will graduate a few days before to give him seniority, and it is prescribed that he will maintain that seniority until the rank of major.

These are the groups of A.R.A. officers with long service commissions, arranged according to avenues of entry:[15]

| | |
|---|---|
| R.M.C. | 631 |
| O.C.S. | 305 |
| R.M.C. wings | 423 |
| Officers' qualifying courses | 187 |
| Other ranks' qualifying courses | 86 |
| Technical officers | 42 |
| Prescribed corps | 276 |
| Medical and dental officers | 11 |

In addition there are 118 short-service officers, mainly in the prescribed corps as medical and dental officers and as chaplains. Of the current normal entry, 28 per cent are from the O.C.S. and 33 per cent from the R.M.C., but it is the R.M.C. graduate who in the end is going to head the profession. The R.M.C. has provided less than one-third of the entry in the past, it now provides approximately one-third, and it is recommended that it provide 50 per cent; but it gets 100 per cent of the top jobs. The O.C.S. has existed only since 1951, and there has been no "normal" long-term situation. But other officers than R.M.C. graduates were and are available (for example, ex-militia officers). They have failed to get to the top. This is partly a problem of the age at which they reach certain ranks (as against the age at which the R.M.C. graduate will reach these ranks), but that is not, of course, the only factor.

Two points stand out from Tables 1 and 2. The first is that the A.R.A. has rather a large number of officers at the level of brigadier or above in proportion to the number of regular soldiers—1:600. If the C.M.F. figures are taken into account, the ratio works out as approximately 1:1000.[16] In the second place, R.M.C. men, though forming approximately one-fifth of the total number of officers in the corps, provide all

[15] *Report on the Production of Officers for the Australian Regular Army*, April 6, 1959, 20.

[16] This contrasts with the United States, where under the Officer Grade Limitation Act there is one brigadier or general to 1,835 men.

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TABLE 1. STRUCTURE OF OFFICER CORPS, JULY 26, 1961

| *Rank* | *No. in Rank* | *RMC* | % | *Others* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lieutenant General | 2 | 2 | 100 | — |
| Major General | 11 | 9 | 81 | 2 |
| Brigadier | 25 | 21 | 82 | 4 |
| Colonel | 58 | 35 | 59 | 23 |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 208 | 84 | 42 | 124 |
| Major | 749 | 117 | 16 | 632 |
| Captain | 904 | 188 | 21 | 716 |
| Lieutenant and 2nd Lieutenant | 681 | 111 | 16.5 | 570 |
| TOTAL | 2,638 | 567 | | 2,071 |
| Note: above rank of major | | RMC: 151 | | Others: 153 |

TABLE 2. PROMOTIONS IN 1958

| | *Total* | *RMC* | % | *Others* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| To Lieutenant General | 1 | 1 | 100 | |
| To Major General | 1 | 1 | 100 | |
| To Brigadier | 1 | 1 | 100 | |
| To Colonel | 3 | 3 | 100 | |
| To Lieutenant Colonel | 24 | 21 | 85 | 3 |
| To Major | 52 | 26 | 50 | 26 |
| To Captain | 72 | 34 | 49 | 38 |
| To Lieutenant | 92 | 38 | 42 | 54 |

save six of the present officers at the brigadier level or above. Furthermore, the present promotion pattern is going to maintain this structure. While up to the career rank of major others do as well as the R.M.C. graduate, from lieutenant colonel and upwards the R.M.C. has a virtual monopoly. In future, O.C.S. men might do better, but it has to be noted that in the past war-experienced officers who were not normal R.M.C. graduates did not.

This is both an unusual type of profession for Australia (certainly as far as the Public Services are concerned) and also, despite the emphasis on traditions, a relatively new thing, for the history of the A.R.A. officer corps has been an extremely broken one. That is, we have had here a continual effort to introduce an overseas model that does not fit easily into Australia and has not so far found normal times in which it can operate.

The professional military model is based on early recruitment, notably in the R.A.N., but in the other services, too. The pressures towards this are very severe: the A.R.A. is introducing fifty scholarships per annum

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to allow future cadets to complete their matriculation. The cadet college, careful career planning, staff colleges, and postgraduate work: all these are the normal characteristics. They are normal, that is, in the military profession, but not in the Australian Public Service tradition. It is a striking fact that there is probably a much higher degree of international similarity (as measured by the officer production system) between military than there is between civilian public services. In this sense, we may say that a military career is more like a profession than is a civilian public service career. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Australian military has been consciously created on a basis of a general professional model rather than of local circumstances. Whether the international model can really work within the highly restricted Australian defense system is another matter.

Certainly the profession is quite different from the Commonwealth Public Service. The essential tradition of the Australian Commonwealth Public Service is to obscure the distinction between officers and other ranks in classification methods, and in confusion of the difference between promotion and advancement, particularly as this affects administrative careers. The Army not only maintains this distinction overall, but within the officer profession itself establishes a perfectly proper difference between advancement (a fairly guaranteed degree of movement to the rank of major) and promotion (the riskier but more enticing business of ultimate promotion to general officer). In the Australian military forces, there is an impressive document[17] that lays down avenues of entry, conditions of appointment, selection procedure, promotion procedures, confidential reports, and so forth, in regard to the officer's career. No such document could be prepared for the Commonwealth Public Service. The Commonwealth Public Service does not have planned careers and rotation; it does not lay down careful and different methods of appointment and promotion control for different levels. It is just beginning to use psychological tests for entry into clerical-administrative ranks, but they are not designed (as those for the A.R.A. officer are) to test officer potential.

The whole A.R.A. ethos is to develop the administrative generalist; this is foreign to the Commonwealth Public Service tradition. The very careful relationship of promotion to particular career planning, examinations, and postgraduate training is a further distinction. The Defence Act itself[18] provides that officers must qualify by a course of instruction before promotion to the substantive ranks of major and of lieutenant col-

[17] Military Board Instructions, No. 124.
[18] Sections 21A (i) and (ii).

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onel. It would be a major revolution to introduce any such thing into the Public Service. The officer profession uses annual assessment reports very carefully designed and very carefully handled. These are absent from the Public Service as a whole and from almost all, though not quite all, its departments. Age-for-rank retirement is a further distinction. So is the careful maintenance of the career pyramid by controlling numbers of entry and numbers at each rank. For example, the number of R.M.C. graduates must not exceed 100 per annum, so that the prospect of promotion above major should never be worse than 1:3.[19] The officer is consciously prepared through education, training, and so forth for promotion to a rank two levels above that which he is normally holding.[20] Like the U.K. administrative class in Lord Bridges' portrayal of it, the officer profession is dominated by a single group with a strong *esprit de corps*: the R.M.C. graduates. There is no such elite domination, and no such single norm, in the Public Service. This is perhaps the major difference of all.

However, as we have said, the history of the officer profession in Australia has been very broken. Some of its features, such as career rotation, are achieved partly by accident. There are strong local influences: the distribution of levels of pay is much more equal than in other military services. In any case, it is not clear that the external prestige of the officer corps has been very highly established. In 1961 there were 100 vacancies at the R.M.C. The number of applicants suitable to go before the selection board was 118. Only 54 were selected. This left 46 vacancies. Second applications were called, but even after these were heard, there still remained 23 vacancies.[21]

Furthermore, the model being slavishly followed here has its own inherent problems: the image and its dilemma. The image sought after is a professional one, based on liberal education and technical training that will provide a basis for independence. This leads to the characteristic emphasis on early selection, training, postgraduate education, promotion tests, and so forth, and in general to a professional sense.[22] The *Report on the Production of Officers* apparently accepts the theories of military education of Huntington or Masland and Radway.[23] These are, centrally, that the significance of the military profession, the width

[19] *Report on Production of Officers*, 31.
[20] *Ibid.*, 27.
[21] R.M.C. Annual Report, 1960, 3.
[22] "Portsea," Adjutant-General Publications, No. 28/60, 19.
[23] *Report on Production of Officers*, 25-26. Cf. J. W. Masland and L. I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars* (Princeton 1957); S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

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of the factors determining its role, and the special difficulties that affect it provide very high requirements for entry and education. The standards are as demanding as those of a liberal profession; the implication, then, is that the military is indeed, at least in part, a profession. There is some truth but also some confusion in this. Independence may be in part created by technical expertise and this may be appropriate. But the independence that comes from a humane tradition (like the assumption of radical and rational methods) and a transferable vocation (governing itself with its own standards and providing easy movement from job to job) are not relevant to the military structure. In Australia the limitation of scale itself makes even the degree of technical expertise less effective or relevant. If the general military situation cannot fit into the full professional model, the Australian can do so even less.[24]

In general, we may say that the Australian system is seeking after an image that is inherently paradoxical and especially difficult for Australia to meet. For example, the idea of the officer as the generalist moving rapidly from job to job is all very well in organizations of vast size, where some officers can be generalists, some specialists, and all can be promoted to comparatively high posts. In Australia it means a frustration of the specialist and therefore a further reduction of the variety of participant influences and motivations. The R.A.A.F. and the R.A.N. officer serving at headquarters has to feel (or at least pretend to feel) that he is uncomfortable and wishes only to be at sea or in the air or on a station. The military mind has also to be a managerial one, and so on. But these role tensions do not assist the effectiveness of the contribution. Furthermore, while Australia is following this particular doctrine, other influential military professions (as Janowitz has shown in his study of the military in the United States[25]) have been radically changing. The United States has been developing its specialists, its scientists, its engineers, and both the U.S. and the U.K. have been developing their Whitehall-type experts. It is in a way only the specialists like, say, General Gavin in the United States who have any degree of transferability and therefore real professional independence. It is precisely these that the A.R.A. must, perforce, do without, especially at anything like a senior (brigadier or above) level. In Australia under present presuppositions (and virtually perforce within the local scale), it must be the

[24] Yet it is in the Australian situation that very large claims are made; "Duntroon," Adjutant-General Publications, No. 27/60, 5. The officer will be "an ambassador at large . . . [who] must take great public responsibilities and not only in the purely military sphere."

[25] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960).

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generalists who get to the top, and as "arts" men they are more dependent on the A.R.A.[26] A relatively isolated group is not the same as a relatively independent one. The military profession in Australia is unusual and is isolated within a settled policy. It is not, therefore, necessarily of very much help if there is a need for radical questions about the structure and dimensions of that policy.

## VI

Granted a dependent and restricted defense program that is overwhelmingly determined by a rigid financial decision, do the organization of the Defence Departments, the military profession, and the processes of control provide ways of jolting this rigidity from time to time, or do the organization, the advisers, the controls simply reflect the existing established policy? Have we here another field of settled policy in fact? Ultimately this must depend on the total balance of military-civil relations: the civil role must primarily relate to financial control, the military role be relatively independent within narrow limits. These are the basic sources of conflict where objective control, in Huntington's sense, exists at all. Clearly, however, the result that Huntington expects from his model can be threatened in different ways in different systems. In the Australian type, there is an inherent imbalance that inhibits it. In the first place, in Australia the problem may be that the field for independence granted to a professional adviser is simply altogether too small for any worthwhile influence at all. Hart has described the military role as defining the most profitable use of a given means or force towards some given end, object, or policy.[27] But if the means are too limited to achieve any worthwhile end or significant policy, independence in creating the definition is itself not very significant. The model may be very useful in certain circumstances—for example, in creating a new army for a new state, or in providing criticisms of the role given to a supreme commander of an allied force. But in the Australian type of situation, which may be an increasingly usual one, the restriction of expenditure might be so much the most important decision (in one sense, because of its importance, the only "policy" decision) that, once taken, few other policy decisions are left to be influenced. In this case, perhaps the military must go beyond the lines laid down by Huntington, which are anyway substantially more generous within the limits

[26] *Report on Production of Officers*, 39; ". . . bearing in mind that most of the higher commanders would probably come from cadets doing the R.M.C. arts course."
[27] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York 1955), p. 334.

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of American expenditure. The Esher system, embodied in the U.K. Orders-in-Council about the Imperial General Staff, and highly influential in Australian defense organization, especially in the Army Department, might not be at all appropriate. An altogether more ambitious military spirit might be radically needed. But this is precisely what is unlikely to develop here. The military role is ineffectual within the too narrow confines of its independence.

A second fundamental is that the system has to buy overseas a good deal of what it needs, but it cannot buy quite enough: it cannot buy the sort of argument that tends to be absent from its own set-up. Quite particular agreements (e.g., about a U.S. naval radio communications center at Exmouth Gulf) do not replace intrinsic debate. The embarrassing end of the Bluestreak cooperation was one case in point.[28] The equally embarrassing position of Australia in relation to the recent decision to reorganize the United Kingdom's command structure in Singapore is another. A third case is the clumsy artifices that have had to be used to transfer just one R.A.A.F. squadron from Malaya (there under one agreement nominally ruling out such movements) to Thailand (under another agreement), the whole move being sponsored by a third. The discontinuous hierarchies of the international agreements with which Australia is involved frequently fail to bring her in until too late, or without embarrassment, on matters that may be details for others but policy for her. When Australia was indeed simply one part of a single Commonwealth defense structure, this problem did not arise. If she is now more dependent on her own sources of argument, in her present situation only financial exigency prompts radical change and there is no guarantee at all that this is a sufficient incentive. If she is dependent on others, the system works very oddly.

Meanwhile, it is not possible to doubt the urgency of the requirement in defense policy for argument rather than its alternatives: either easy compromise or a single dominant influence, whether of the civilian financial controller or a single commander or a single strategic doctrine (like Sir Charles Harris in the wartime bombing case). After all, policy decisions, which are important and risky substantial commitments, always tend to be avoided in any field of governmental activity, so that the shape of activity expresses a certain degree of prejudice. This is both especially likely and especially dangerous in defense. It is especially dangerous because at certain times defense matters so much, and because on the other hand defense institutions can constitute a total

[28] Cf. B. B. Schaffer, "Military Affairs as a Field for Political Science in Australia," *Australian Political Studies Association News* (Sydney), No. 2 (May 1961), 5.

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waste. This at least could virtually never be the case in fields like social services, education, and health, where even a little activity must be better than none, and nothing is utterly beside the point.

The dependence of the Australian defense system, plus its narrow financial limitations, enhance rigidity. Wrong decisions are more likely to be taken and to be maintained, for it is only finance or discrete outside interventions that prompt them. Now this may be a matter of general importance, since it may illustrate the way in which several Western allies, particularly those outside NATO, have not been brought into the continuous strategic discourse. To find techniques of closer integration in some single defense alliance rather than limited and essentially occasional participation in several is a painful but probably a very necessary process for such systems. Meanwhile Australia may be getting the worst of all worlds; perhaps much less could be spent to achieve roughly the same degree of actual self-defense (now virtually nil); perhaps much greater expenditure must be provided before a minimum degree of defense is achieved; perhaps radical reallocations are necessary. All these policy decisions would be painful. They are more likely to come about through a different system of alliance, and also through internal organizational changes: a Cabinet Committee, defense advisers for Prime Minister and Cabinet independent of the Ministry of Defence, and a strengthening of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as against the Defence Committee and of the civilian contribution to the specialist service departments.

As the Jackson hearings have shown in the United States,[29] it is of the greatest difficulty to find in this policy field the correct balance between argument and agreement. What is clear is that at present the Australian system does not provide that balance from any of its most important or likeliest sources. The changes that would be required are peculiarly unpleasant ones but an avoidance of them is probably dangerous and certainly wasteful. This article has attempted to show, provisionally, how in a dependent and restricted situation some counters against rigidity tend to be absent. The implication is that changes in expenditure, alliance, and organization are probably required.

[29] U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy, Interim Report and Hearings, "Organizing for National Security," 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington 1960; Senator Henry M. Jackson, "Organizing for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38 (April 1960), pp. 446-56.

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# AUTHORITARIAN AND SINGLE-PARTY TENDENCIES IN AFRICAN POLITICS

By MARTIN L. KILSON*

## I. Introduction

WITH the exception of Libya, Egypt, the Sudanese Republic, and Ethiopia, where no political parties exist, some variation of the single-party political system or a distinctive tendency in that direction may be found in nearly all of the independent African states.[1] That this should have come to pass within the relatively short period of the rise of African states has been a surprise to some observers of African nationalist movements and parties during the colonial period —who were rather sanguine about the prospects of Western-type democracy and party systems in Africa—as well as to the colonial powers themselves (especially Britain and France)—who presumably assumed that their policies of decolonization in Africa were providing the institutional framework within which Western-type party systems and politics would prevail.

Inasmuch as African nationalist leaders attacked the colonial situation in their countries in democratic terms, it may be assumed that they too accepted the feasibility or applicability of Western-type party politics to African circumstances. However, much of the process of party competition adopted by African nationalists during the preindependence period was a function of the decolonization policies, which generally required free competition among political groups. In other words, since the colonial situation in its decolonization phase was strong

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[1] My concern in this article is with independent African states in which the indigenous majority participates in government. Thus, Southern Rhodesia, which has had self-government since 1921, and the Republic of South Africa, independent since 1910, are not considered. It is noteworthy that though in these states a democratic system applies to parties and groups within the dominant white (minority) community, when viewed in reference to the overwhelming African majority these white parties constitute, for all practical purposes, *a single-party system—a single political community*—over and against the African majority. (Cf. Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* [Oxford 1959].) They represent what may be termed an oligarchic single-party system, whose key feature is an alien minority that dominates political power, with a consequent absence of a meaningful franchise for the African majority. In this connection, Liberia is more akin to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa than to other African states, though its alien dominant minority is Negro, being of Negro-American slave origin.

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enough to define the conditions and framework of the struggle for political power among African parties, the parties had little alternative but to function within this framework, irrespective of whether they accepted its principles and its feasibility as a framework for African development in the post-colonial period.

Our purpose in this article is to delineate and analyze the causes of the single-party tendency in African politics. Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to define what I mean by "single-party rule" in the African context. As I understand it, there are at least two usages of this term as applied to African party politics: (1) It may be used to denote a situation in which only one political party, the governing party, exists or is permitted to exist. This represents single-party rule properly so-called, and applies to the party situation in at least half of the nineteen African states in which the single-party tendency is dominant. For instance, it applies to the position of the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG), the *Union Soudanaise* in Mali, the *Parti Dahoméen de l'Unité* (PDU), the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), the *Union pour le Progrès du Tchad* (UPT), and the True Whig Party in Liberia, among several others.

(2) A second usage of the term "single-party rule" is in reference to a situation in which two or more parties exist, but the governing party has both an overwhelming legislative majority and employs its legal, police, and political powers to restrict the competitive position of opposition parties and groups. This usage applies to the position of the Convention People's Party (CPP) in Ghana, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in Northern Nigeria, and the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS), among others. In these situations, the direction or main thrust of the party system—that is, its dominant tendency—is single-party rule; and though it has not attained single-party rule properly so-called, the tenuous status of opposition parties, owing to restrictive measures by the governing party, is nearly tantamount to non-existence.

Common to the situations in Africa to which the foregoing usages of the term "single-party rule" apply is an authoritarian (extra-constitutional) use of political power as an essential fact in the continuance in office of a single party. Gosnell expressed the essence of an authoritarian party situation, viewed in its simplest form, when he observed that "without the possibility of a minority party becoming a majority party the democratic system could not exist . . . [and] an essential part of the system is the positive belief in the desirability of replacing one govern-

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ment with another by peaceful methods."[2] The more specific authoritarian features of the single-party tendency in African politics will become apparent in our analysis of its causes.

## II. Causes of Single-Party Rule

Beyond defining what one means by the term "single-party rule" in an African context, the more perplexing problem is to uncover the motivating forces and predisposing circumstances that make for it. One thing is certain: it is extremely difficult to isolate any single factor, such as Marxist ideology or a certain type of political party structure, as being in itself responsible for this widespread tendency in African politics. Yet, there are instances where Marxist ideology and certain characteristics of a party's structure have contributed to single-party rule, though other factors have been operative as well. Among the many possible contributors, we have isolated five as crucial and will consider them in turn: (1) type of political party; (2) Marxist ideology; (3) political instability stemming from tribal conflict or unrest; (4) political insecurity stemming from real or supposed external threats; and (5) traditionally oriented ideological preference for a slowly changing *status quo*.

### (1) type of political party

African political parties may be classified, on the basis of their organizational features, into *mass-type* and *caucus-type* parties. It would appear that the former (of which the CPP, PDG, *Union Soudanaise*, and PDCI are examples) have a greater organizational propensity to pre-empt the realm of political party activity, and in fact the single-party tendency first appeared in African states governed by mass-type parties. Unlike the caucus-type party, whose organization rests mainly upon notable and influential persons in local society such as chiefs, emirs, headmen, and religious leaders (examples are the SLPP, NPC, and the *Union Progressiste Mauritanienne* (UPM), the mass-type party builds its organization primarily upon direct links with the masses through large-scale party membership, which is mobilized into thousands of party branches.[3] Thus, whereas in 1960 the SLPP had fewer

[2] Harold F. Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics* (Washington, D.C., 1942), 7.

[3] Most African parties tend to be of the caucus-type and even some mass-type parties include caucus-type features in their organizational structure—e.g., the UPS in Senegal and the Action Group in Western Nigeria. There does not appear to be any significant difference between the ability of a caucus-type and of a mass-type party to mobilize political support, as expressed in election turnout, through their rather different structures. (Cf. Thomas Hodgkin, *African Political Parties* [London 1961], 68ff. Hodgkin's

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than twenty organized branches and no more than 80,000 party members out of Sierra Leone's population of about 3,000,000, the PDG in Guinea had some 1,600,000 members—out of a total population the same as Sierra Leone's—who were organized into 2,885 party branches, and the TANU in Tanganyika had 800,000 members in 1960.

What is more, while caucus-type parties display their greatest activity during crisis situations (e.g., during elections, which can be viewed as institutionalized crises, and in underdeveloped areas they are often crises properly so-called, characterized by violence, murder, property destruction, etc.[4]), the mass-type parties tend to be perpetually active. They are, in a real sense, continuing institutions that mobilize their membership to perform an array of political, social, and economic tasks, and attempt to influence a major portion of the members' daily life. In Guinea, this situation expresses itself through some 7,000 local government units known as *comités de village*, which are at the same time units of the PDG, whose members are required to meet weekly to discuss a variety of problems relating to the daily life of villagers and party members. And, in Ghana, CPP members who belong to the Young Pioneers, the Workers' Brigade, or the Asafo Companies are daily involved in a variety of party-directed activities. Furthermore, in October 1961 the CPP Executive Committee announced plans that would extend this situation to the whole adult population, and most of the younger people, through the formation of a party branch in "every office, factory, mine, school, every service or industrial enterprise, every social or cultural institution . . . ," the purpose of which was to give every citizen "the opportunity in your workshop, farm or church to contribute directly to the governing of the country through thorough and free discussion, without fear, of all matters affecting your interest."[5]

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characterization of caucus-type parties—what he terms "elite parties"—as organizationally "more primitive" than the mass type would appear to suggest that the former are less politically effective than the latter.) Thus, in the Nigerian federal elections in 1959, the NPC—which is a caucus-type party of the purest sort—was able to manipulate local notables and their organizations (particularly Native Authorities) to effect a 93.7% registration of eligible voters in Northern Nigeria, whereas the mass-type party in the Eastern Region—the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons—secured a 75.7% registration; and only in the Western Region, where the Action Group, another mass-type party, prevails, did the proportion of eligible voters registered exceed that in the North—96.2%. Moreover, the percentage of the poll in the North was 89.4% (the NPC gained 61.2% of all votes), as against 75.3% in the East and 71.2% in the West. (See *Report on the Nigeria Federal Elections, December 1959* [Lagos 1960], 6, 12, 24.)

[4] See, e.g., *Daily Times* (Lagos, September 25, 1961), 1, and *ibid.* (October 7, 1961), 1, for an account of violence and murder accompanying local government elections in Western Nigeria and regional elections in Eastern Nigeria.

[5] *Evening News* (Accra, October 23 and 25, 1961), 1.

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As Neumann has observed with respect to similar parties in Europe (mainly Socialist and Communist parties), these mass-type parties are something more than political parties, properly so-called. He terms them "parties of integration," whose organization may be characterized as "extending from the cradle to the grave, from the workers' infant-care association to the atheists' cremation society. . . ."[6] In the African situation, it is precisely this feature of mass-type nationalist parties that is a major factor in predisposing them to pre-empt the realm of political party activity. For one thing, insofar as their composition is widely representative of all sections of the population, they are inclined to conceive of themselves as the only valid embodiment of the mass will. Consequently, mass-type parties become suspicious of competing parties and are prone to view them as illegitimate arrangements, bent upon challenging the general will. What is more, this suspicion originates in the context of the colonial situation, and under these circumstances opposition to the dominant mass-type party is often regarded not merely as illegitimate but traitorous. When carried into the period of national independence, such opposition has invariably been met with extra-parliamentary restrictions.

Other factors besides purely organizational features of African parties —though related to them—have facilitated the emergence of single-party rule. Significant among these has been the aura of nationalist legitimacy that surrounds whatever type of party is in power at the assumption of independence. This aura of legitimacy involves, in concrete terms, an initial monopoly upon nationalist symbols, myths, and experiences, and it is normally some time before an opposition party can effectively compete with the government party in this sphere. Generally, the mass-type nationalist party appears more effective at perpetuating this monopoly of nationalist symbols and manipulating it to eliminate opposition groups. Thus, in Guinea and Mali the ruling mass-type parties were able, in 1958 and 1959 respectively, to take advantage of their aura of nationalist legitimacy (whose main focus tended to be the party leaders, Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita, respectively) to establish single-party rule properly so-called, which involved the merger of opposition parties with the ruling PDG and *Union Soudanaise*, and was not assisted in the first instance by the use of extra-parliamentary powers.[7] A similar situation has occurred in other African

[6] Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago 1956), 400ff. Cf. R. Rezette, *Les Partis Politiques Marocains* (Paris 1955), 314-16.

[7] See Sékou Touré, *L'Action Politique du Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (Paris 1959), 8-9.

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states governed by mass-type parties, particularly in Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana, and Tanganyika, where the ruling parties have eliminated nearly all opposition parties through astute exploitation of their aura of nationalist legitimacy, though assisted in these cases by authoritarian measures.[8]

As for caucus-type parties, they too have enjoyed an aura of nationalist legitimacy resulting from their role in the attainment of national independence. But, as against that of mass-type parties, it has been of less intensity as regards its active and conscious sway over the masses, and has seldom involved a nationalist leader whose charismatic personality acts as its main focus.[9] Nevertheless, such caucus-type parties as the UPM, the *Parti Progressiste Nigérien* (PPN), *Parti Progressiste Tchadien* (PPT), SLPP, and NPC have demonstrated their capacity to monopolize the aura of nationalist legitimacy through their overwhelming control of legislative representation.[10] It would seem that because of the weaker effect of this aura on the masses in states ruled by caucus-type parties (due partly to the more limited and less activist organizational contact of such parties with the masses), some of their single-party and authoritarian tendencies may be attributed to a more pressing need to protect this legitimacy from competition. In states with a mass-type party, the very strength and scale of party organization facilitate the monopoly of this legitimacy and guarantee it against local organizational inroads by opposition groups (though, as noted above, these same organizational features are themselves contributors to the single-party tendency in such states).

It should be noted, further, that the groups of local notables such as chiefs, emirs, religious leaders, etc., to which the caucus-type party structure is linked are themselves prone to oppose parties that advocate a more radical pattern of social change than that pursued by the ruling party (this generally being the policy of opposition parties in states with a caucus-type party). As shall be shown in more detail below, it is precisely one of the main functions of the leadership articulation characteristic of caucus-type parties to assist the traditional elite or notables in negotiating the transformation from the old to the modern social

[8] See *infra*, 288ff.

[9] Ould Daddah of the UPM, Sir Milton Margai of the SLPP, or Hamani Diori of the PPN do not compare with Nkrumah (CPP), Touré (PDG), Keita (*Union Soudanaise*), or Nyerere (TANU) in charismatic qualities and mass appeal.

[10] For the legislative position of caucus-type parties in French-speaking Africa prior to independence, see Philippe Guillemin, "La Structure des Premiers Gouvernements Locaux en Afrique Noire," *Revue Française de Science Politique* (September 1959), 670-71.

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system without significant loss of their former authority and status.[11] This has especially been the case in Sierra Leone, Northern Nigeria, and Mauritania.

(2) MARXIST IDEOLOGY

Interestingly enough, it has been, thus far, in African states where mass-type parties predominate that some variant of Marxist ideology has taken root and has contributed to single-party rule. In particular, in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali there would appear to be a direct relationship between a commitment to some variant of Marxism on the one hand, and organizational aspects of the mass-type ruling party on the other. The PDG, for instance, is conceived of by its leaders (one of whose fundamental political propositions is that "the unity of action of *la classe ouvrière et de la paysannerie laborieuse* has become an imperative for the success of the African revolution") to be a "democratic dictatorship" or "popular dictatorship."[12] Organizationally, this concept of direct democracy is expressed through some 7,000 local urban and village committees whose activities are coordinated by some 43 regional committees (*comités de sous-section*), which are in turn controlled by the *Bureau Politique National*, the central executive of the PDG.[13] Within this framework, the nation, state, and party become fused—they are one, though the party is the supreme organ—and the individual's worth to society is defined in terms of his contribution to the advancement of this process, which is tantamount to the advancement of society at large. As Touré has put it: "We judge the value of an individual only in relationship to the positive role that he plays in the society. Whether he be a great technician, great poet, rich or beautiful, the PDG will accord him its confidence and will endow him with its authority only on the condition that he loves the country and the people and that he serves them loyally. Our great Party concerns itself only with those who have embedded their existence in that of the nation, their value in that of the Party, and who have identified their personal goals with the general goals, the direction of which has been democratically defined by the people of Guinea."[14] Similarly, in a speech to Guinean schoolchildren Touré declared: "Individualism is damned because we have chosen the freedom, the right, the power, the sovereignty of the people, and not of the individual. Before this people you should

[11] See *infra*, 283ff.
[12] Touré, 35, 216-18.
[13] *Ibid.*, 87-101. See also Sékou Touré, *Parti Démocratique de Guinée au Nom de la Révolution: Conférences Hebdomadaires*, IX (Conakry 1962), 117-32.
[14] Touré, *L'Action Politique du PDG*, 218.

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have no individual personality; your personality becomes a part of the personality of the nation . . . of the people. You cannot have any interest which is opposed to that of the people. . . ."[15]

Similarly, the CPP, which in Nkrumah's words is "socialist in philosophy," is conceived of as being one with nation and state ("the Convention People's Party is Ghana and Ghana is the Convention People's Party") and, like the PDG, "the principle of the Party's organisation is based on democratic centralism."[16] Organizationally, this totalist conception of nation, state, and party takes the form of several thousand party branches and constituency organizations, which are governed by branch and constituency Executive Committees. These, in turn, are under the control of Regional Secretaries, who constitute "the coordinating agency of the branch and constituency organisation activities." The latter form, furthermore, an integral part of the CPP's Headquarters Secretariat and are directly appointed by the Central Committee, which is the "chief directorate" of the CPP and functions on behalf of its National Executive Committee.[17]

Although in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali there seems to be a direct link between Marxist ideology and the conception and organization of the mass-type ruling party, there are other African states with similar parties that have utilized Marxist principles without any commitment to Marxism as such. It would appear, therefore, that the main point at which Marxism contributes to single-party rule on the part of the PDG, CPP, and *Union Soudanaise* is the acceptance of its conception of the political conditions necessary for a radical socio-economic transformation of backward societies. In the Marxist model such transformation involves active and widespread mobilization of human and material resources around centrally defined goals, and it is believed that this can be attained most effectively within an authoritarian political system, which normally includes a single-party arrangement. Thus, as regards the need for total mobilization of resources, Dr. Nkrumah, Life President and Secretary General of the CPP, has observed that "the economic independence that should follow and maintain political independence demands every effort from the people, a total mobilisation of brain and manpower resources. What other countries have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive. Unless it is, as it were, 'jet

[15] Quoted in *West Africa* (July 22, 1961), 799.
[16] Kwame Nkrumah, "What the Party Stands for," *The Party: CPP Monthly Journal* (September 1960), 4-6.
[17] Tawia Adamfio, "The New Party Structure," *ibid.*, 9-10.

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propelled,' it will lag behind and thus risk everything for which it has fought."[18] Similarly, Madeira Keita, Minister of the Interior in Mali, has argued that "the only aspiration, the only will that animates us is to find the means to put the apparatus of the state in the service of economic arrangements which would permit us to realize the most rapid development possible. We are conscious of our cultural backwardness and, moreover, we wish to advance quickly. . . . For us, the essential fact is to mobilize all of the country's forces in order to advance."[19] And in Guinea, Sékou Touré has maintained that "the laboring population of Guinea must undertake, *in perfect harmony*, the political and syndical action to assure the economic development of the country. . . . The mobilization of the laboring masses must be total and unconditional, conscious and voluntary. Workers and artisans, intellectuals and peasants, employees of the public sector and the private sector, must together construct the State and enlarge the frontiers of national liberty."[20] What is more, as against the overwhelming majority of African states, whose approach to economic change is relatively conservative, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali have attempted to overcome the expatriate economic predominance by nationalization measures in such spheres as export and import arrangements, local commerce and retail trade (e.g., Ghana's absorption of A. G. Leventis), and the banking and fiscal system.

It should be noted, however, that the adherence of these states and their leaders to a variant of Marxism is modified by a pragmatic sense, the extent of which has led Aimé Césaire to remark that Touré "est moins de 'marxiser' l'Afrique, que 'd'africaniser' le marxisme."[21] Touré has himself expressed a non-doctrinaire Marxism, as indicated in the following statement: "In Marxism the principles of organization, democracy, control, etc. . . , all that which is concrete and which affects the organic life of established movements, can be adapted to the present conditions of Africa. But we would have failed . . . if we had confined ourselves within an abstract philosophy. I say that philosophy, as such, does not interest us. We face concrete needs."[22]

[18] Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana* (London 1959), vii. It is noteworthy that Nkrumah has also maintained that "capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society." (*Ibid.*)

[19] Madeira Keita, "Le Parti Unique en Afrique," *Présence Africaine* (February-March 1960), 9, *passim.*

[20] Touré, *L'Action Politique du PDG*, 59.

[21] Aimé Césaire, "La Pensée Politique de Sékou Touré," *Présence Africaine* (December 1959-January 1960), 70.

[22] Quoted in *ibid.* See also Sékou Touré, *L'Expérience Guinéenne et Unité Africaine*

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Politically, some form of an authoritarian system (or a modification of democracy in its *laissez-faire* form) would seem a logical complement to the above-mentioned conception of the mobilization of resources as *the* condition of advancement; and in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali the ruling parties have apparently accepted this. Dr. Nkrumah suggested a year before Ghana's independence that under certain conditions authoritarian measures might be required for post-colonial development: ". . . Even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up by measures of an emergency nature in the period which follows independence."[23] Since then, the CPP has integrated all major functional organizations in Ghana—viz., the Trades Union Congress, United Ghana Farmers' Council, National Council of Farmers' Co-operatives, etc.—naming their leaders cabinet members as Ministers Plenipotentiary and Ambassadors Extraordinary, and making membership in the CPP the sole basis for membership in these functional bodies. At the same time, the competitive position of opposition parties has been virtually destroyed through extra-parliamentary powers, with the leadership of the Trades Union Congress spearheading the drive for the institution of a single-party system, properly so-called.[24]

In Mali, the leaders of the *Union Soudanaise* have similarly accepted the authoritarian implications for the party system involved in their conception of socio-economic development, noting that "since the objectives are common, since we are all in accord on methods, it is necessary to have only one party. It is necessary to have only one party in order to be effective, in order to improve the situation, in order not to give advantage (*le moyen*) to the adversary, that is, to colonialism, *anonyme*. . . . It is necessary to have a single party (*le parti unifié*) in order to limit the possibilities of corruption, in order to neutralize opportunism, because these constitute dangers that menace African formations and the action of governments and assemblies. . . . In Africa's present historical period, there is no need to multiply political parties, there is no need to yield to the luxury of a sterile opposition, of a fratracidal opposition . . . if we wish to realize African unity and rapidly advance Africa . . . to the level of other countries, and other peoples."[25]

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(Paris 1961), 401-2, 412, 420, *passim*. Cf. Kofi Baako, *Ghana's Conception of Socialism* (Accra, June 14, 1961), 4-5, mimeo.

[23] Nkrumah, *Ghana*, viii.

[24] See "We Demand One Party System," *Labour: Official Journal of the Trades Union Congress* (November-December 1961), 19.

[25] Keita, 10, 11, 13. Cf. Touré, *L'Expérience Guinéenne*, 353-54, *passim*.

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One interesting difference, however, between Guinea's and Mali's conception of a single-party system, on the one hand, and Ghana's, on the other, is that the former tend not to view the single-party as an expression of class differences or an instrument of class interest, because, as Touré puts it, "there are no classes [in Africa], but only social strata."[26] What is more, this absence of class differentiation, as they see it, constitutes one of the justifications for single-party rule: "We have no reason to multiply parties, because differentiation of interests is not very precise. . . ."[27] Similarly, Touré has argued that "Africa has ideal social and intellectual conditions for conceiving and building total democracy —that is to say, for establishing democratic structures starting from the popular will and not from a social class (bourgeois democracy or proletarian democracy), not from a religious conception (Christian democracy or Islamic democracy), not from a political system (parliamentary democracy or presidential democracy). . . ." Furthermore, he maintains that such a pattern of development would result in a truly classless society, or what he terms "une édification sociale non plus pyramidale, mais cubique."[28] Like the Ghanaian leaders, however, the leaders of Mali and Guinea view the single-party arrangement as capable of containing within it a high degree of democracy, albeit centralized. Thus, in commenting upon "the inner democracy in our party," Madeira Keita has observed that "it is not sufficient that it [the single party] be the expression of true aspirations only momentarily, it must continue to be so. That is possible only to the extent that the party is solidly organized. Only to the extent that there is real discipline in the party, only to the extent that decisions are taken within the party after long debates, long free discussions. . . . Thus, from the standpoint of inner democracy,

[26] Quoted in *Le Monde*, April 4, 1960. Cf. Keita, 7.

[27] Keita, 9. Cf. J. K. Nyerere, "The Challenge of Independence," *East Africa and Rhodesia* (December 7, 1961), 449. Cf. also Ghana Government, *Statement by the Government on the Recent Conspiracy* (Accra, December 11, 1961), 2: "Colonialism was responsible for producing a small reactionary Ghanaian 'elite' drawn from the professional classes and the agents and senior employees of the great merchant houses and educated to look at every social problem from an essentially colonial standpoint. They hoped on Independence to step into the shoes of the former colonial rulers but they had no intention of altering the social system which they hoped to inherit." It is not altogether clear what Nyerere and the leaders in Mali and Guinea mean when they say that no classes exist in their countries, for in Touré's case he also speaks, and rather frequently, of "ouvriers et artisans, intellectuels et paysans, employés du secteur public et privé. . . ." (Touré, *L'Action Politique du PDG*, 59, *passim*.) If these social categories do not constitute "social classes" and a "class structure" as understood in Western countries, they at least represent functional groups, each with its own peculiar needs and interests.

[28] Quoted in Césaire, 71.

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with free discussion, discipline, democratic elections . . . we think that the criteria of democracy are respected."[29]

(3) POLITICAL INSTABILITY—TRIBAL

In nearly all single-party situations in African states, political instability stemming from tribal conflict or unrest has contributed in some measure. This is so, interestingly enough, even for states like Ghana and Guinea, where a commitment to Marxism and the mass-type party structure constitute a built-in tendency in the direction of single-party rule. Thus, in Guinea there were serious tribal-political disturbances during the pre-independence period, particularly in September-October 1956 and April-May 1958, the latter resulting in 30 deaths and about 200 injured.[30] In fact, throughout the immediate postwar period there was extensive and protracted unrest, so much so that Touré has argued that "out of all West Africa, Guinea was the most deeply divided country during the years 1946-1954. . . . We witnessed the birth of spontaneous movements with religious, tribal, or ethnic bases. These movements divided and subdivided our people."[31]

Ghana likewise underwent major tribal-political conflict during the pre-independence period, especially in 1954-1958, when a strong and chief-supported, chief-financed separatist movement—which took the political form of the National Liberation Movement (NLM)—emerged in Ashanti, and a less well-organized but no less tribal-oriented party, known as the Northern People's Party, arose in the Northern Territories. As one observer has described them, both NLM and NPP were tradition-centered and caucus-type parties (as tribalist and separatist parties in Africa tend to be) ". . . which built their organisation around the State Councils of Chiefs in each district. The Na Yiri in the north, the Asantehene in Kumasi, the Okyenhene in Akim Abuakwa became active party leaders: e.g., the use of the Northern Territories Council

[29] Keita, 11, 12-13. Cf. Touré, *L'Action Politique du PDG*, 236-46; Nkrumah, "What the Party Stands for"; Nyerere, 340. In a similar vein Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyika African National Union, has stated: "We believe . . . that a second party will not need to grow, provided that a broad two-way channel of ideas and education is maintained through T.A.N.U. between the people and the Government. It is the establishment and maintenance of this channel of communication which is the real problem of democracy in Tanganyika, not the establishment of an artificial opposition." (*Ibid.*)

[30] *Afrique Nouvelle* (May 9, 1958), 1.

[31] Sékou Touré, *La Lutte du P.D.G. pour l'Emancipation Africaine*, VI (Conakry, n.d.), 36.

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and Asanteman Council as associated organisations of the N.P.P. and N.L.M. between 1954 and 1956."[32]

As regards the tribalist-separatist character and appeal of the NLM, the following account of a rally in Ashanti in November 1954 by David Williams—editor of the British organ *West Africa* and the most reliable and informed correspondent working in Africa—is very instructive: "I went out to the village of Mankranso to hear Baffour Akoto [founder and Chairman of NLM, son of a former Kyidomhere of Kumasi, former CPP member, and a wealthy cocoa farmer] address a delegate meeting. . . . His speech was interrupted at intervals by an intense young man who led the crowd in booing CPP leaders one by one, and by the village chief leading them in war cries. Baffour Akoto gave the usual list of Ashanti grievances, adding that the CPP had even made the youth disrespectful of their elders. . . . What really seemed to attract the audience were references to the military prowess of Ashantis, who met the British seven times, the special nature of Ashanti culture, the arrogance of coast men in dealing with Ashanti; once, said Nana Mensah Bonsu, the Hiahene, who was in the chair, one Ashanti gun would bring the submission of 100 men."[33]

The violence that characterized this tribalist bid by Ashanti cocoa farmers, middle-class elite, and traditional rulers to secure a federal political system for an independent Ghana (a federalism, it should be noted, that involved a major devolution of authority to tribal governments[34]) was much beyond that experienced in Guinea and had far greater implications for the stability of the new Ghanaian state. Intimidation, terrorism, and murder were widely current (responsibility for some of which rested with both NLM and CPP, though the initiative and main responsibility were the NLM's[35]), and some 5,000 CPP

[32] Dennis Austin, "Parties and Tradition in Ghana" (unpublished Seminar Paper, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, October 1959).

[33] "Matchet's Diary," *West Africa* (November 27, 1954), 1115. Cf. K. A. Busia, "The Gold Coast's Future," *ibid.* (September 22, 1956), 742.

[34] See "The Gold Coast Federalist," *ibid.* (December 11, 1954), 1161. Cf. Busia, 742.

[35] Cf. "Matchet's Diary," 1115. In this very important correspondence, datelined Kumasi, David Williams reported that ". . . there are people here who are determined that if no Royal Commission is appointed they will create a situation, *by whatever means*, that will compel the British Government to appoint one. It is impossible to know how much importance to attach to phrases like 'civil war,' 'bloody fight,' or 'no cooperation,' or to the war cries which echo around Kumasi streets or in the villages when meetings are held. But there has been violence, there is much intimidation by the new movement, even of Chiefs, and attempts have been made to blow up buildings in Kumasi. . . . *This is an extra-parliamentary movement, many of whose leaders openly repudiate the electoral method as unsuitable for Ashanti*; even some highly educated young men speak of 'our African way of doing things.'" (Italics added.) Cf. Thomas Hodgkin, "African Political Parties and the Use of Violence" (unpublished Seminar

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supporters and non-Ashanti resident in Ashanti areas were forced to seek refuge on the coast. Furthermore, in June 1958, a Commission of Enquiry (composed of two Englishmen—Mr. G. Granville Sharp, Justice of Appeal in Ghana, and Mr. Justice Charles, Senior Magistrate—and one African—Sir Tsibu Darku, former Paramount Chief and member of the Executive Council) found two former NLM leaders (Messrs. R. R. Amponsah, General Secretary of NLM, and M. K. Apaloo) guilty of a "conspiracy to carry out at some future date in Ghana an act for an unlawful purpose revolutionary in character."[36] This was a unanimous finding by the Commission, and two of its members—Sir Tsibu and Mr. Charles—found the NLM leaders also guilty of "a conspiracy to assassinate the Prime Minister, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and to carry out a *coup d'état*."[37]

Thus, both Ghana and Guinea have experienced significant tribal-centered political conflict; and since it is a major source of political instability in societies in process of forming coherent nation-state communities, some of the single-party tendency in the two countries may be attributable to an attempt to overcome this conflict. Furthermore, this tendency as it relates to tribal conflict is compounded in states like Ghana and Guinea, whose ruling parties, as already noted, have a built-in ideological and structural propensity to pre-empt the realm of political party activity. Though we shall consider the specific methods or patterns of single-party evolution below, it should be noted here that one method used in Ghana and Guinea to overcome tribal stresses upon the political system was to absorb influential representatives of major conflicting tribal groups within the leadership structure of the ruling party. Thus, the first independence cabinet in Guinea contained several leaders of the Fulani tribe that had opposed the PDG—whose main support came from the coastal Malinké—and leaders of other tribal or ethnic groups were also included in this single-party government.[38] The same method was employed in Ghana, but not with comparable results. In view of the more serious threat offered by tribalist forces to the state's stability, the Ghana government supplemented political absorption of tribal forces by passing the Avoidance of Discrimination

Paper, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, October 1959), in which Hodgkin says: "In the case of the NLM the use of violence seems fairly clearly to have been sanctioned by the party. . . ."

[36] *Report of the Commission Appointed under the Commissions of Enquiry Ordinance* (Accra 1959), 26.

[37] *Ibid.*, 43.

[38] See Touré, *L'Expérience Guinéenne*, 209; *West Africa* (November 8, 1958), 1064.

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Act of 1957, which forbade, *inter alia*, the electoral formation of political parties of a tribal, ethnic, religious, or regional character.[39]

Besides Ghana and Guinea, in several other African states political instability stemming from tribal conflict has contributed to single-party rule. In Gabon, the formation of a National Union Cabinet in February 1961 through the merger of the opposition party—the *Union Démocratique et Sociale Gabonaise* (UDSG)—with the ruling *Bloc Démocratique Gabonais* was partly produced by a north-south tribal conflict within the Fang community.[40] Similarly, tribal differences (which also involved religious differences—Muslims vs. Christians and Animists) that followed north-south, as well as southeast-southwest, regional lines contributed to the merger of the ruling *Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen* (RDD), led by Hubert Maga, and the *Parti des Nationalistes du Dahomey* (PHD), led by Sousou M. Apithy, to form the *Parti Dahoméen de l'Unité* (PDU), which became a single-party government in early 1961.[41] Like the situation in Gabon where, prior to the formation of the national union cabinet, the two major parties were nearly equal in legislative representation (44.4% BDG, 38.9% UDSG), the RDD (which ruled through a parliamentary alliance) and PND claimed in 1959 31% and 40% representation, respectively, while a third party, the *Union Démocratique Dahoméenne* (UDD), had 29% representation.[42] The instability of this legislative situation as produced by the elections in April 1959 was compounded by tribal-centered political unrest during the course of them; and during the elections in December 1960 this unrest occurred with greater violence, resulting in three deaths.[43] In the latter elections, the PDU gained 70% of the poll (with Maga and Apithy being elected President and Vice-President, respectively), while the opposition UDD, led by J. Ahomadegbé and Sacca Ngobi, gained 30% of the poll. Though the formation of the PDU in November 1960 had thus represented a significant step towards surmounting the tribal obstacles to political stability in Dahomey (Maga's RDD had its support among northern tribes, Apithy's PND among southeastern tribes), the PDU government was nevertheless bent upon a complete resolution of

[39] Consequent upon this law, the main tribal, religious, and regional parties—viz., NLM, NPP, Muslim Association, and Ghana Congress Party—regrouped to form the United Party, which became the only opposition party in Ghana.

[40] For background to the Fang tribal split, see V. Thompson and R. Adloff, *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa* (Stanford 1961), 348ff.

[41] For background to tribal differences in Dahomey politics, see V. Thompson and R. Adloff, *French West Africa* (Stanford 1958), 143-44.

[42] See "Les Partis Politiques en Afrique Noire et à Madagascar," *Chroniques de la Communauté* (December 1959), 20-26.

[43] See *West Africa* (April 25, 1959), 395; *ibid.* (January 7, 1961), 11.

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the problem. Consequently, it enacted measures restricting the political activity of the UDD (whose main support was among tribal groups in the southwest), and in April 1961 the PDU government dissolved and outlawed the UDD.

A final instance of the role of tribal-centered political conflict in the emergence of single-party rule is found in the Congo Republic (ex-French). During 1959-1960 the Congo was immersed in the greatest unrest experienced anywhere in West and Equatorial Africa, and in February 1959 tribal-political violence held sway in Brazzaville for five days, resulting in an estimated 150 deaths and 500 wounded.[44] Unlike the situation in Ghana and Guinea, where the ruling parties were responsible enough not to initiate tribal conflict for political purposes, the ruling party in the Congo—the *Union Démocratique de Défense des Intérêts Africains* (UDDIA)—encouraged animosity among its Bakongo supporters toward the M'Bochi and Vili tribes, who supported the opposition *Mouvement Socialiste Africain* (MSA). It also instigated tribal violence against Bakongo and other supporters of the Matsouanist Movement (a religious-political cult centered around a messianic leader, André Matsoua) as a means of punishment for their support of opposition policies; and on one occasion 35 persons were killed and 17 wounded.[45] The political instability resulting from this conscious manipulation of tribal violence was no less significant than that experienced in Ghana and elsewhere. In overcoming it the UDDIA government first imprisoned leaders of the MSA and dissolved the party, but subsequently moved to absorb it. This was achieved in March 1961 through a coalition-merger of the MSA and UDDIA, with the former's leader becoming Vice-President; and in September 1962 a full merger of the parties to form a single-party government was announced.

### (4) POLITICAL INSECURITY—EXTERNAL THREATS

Like tribal-centered political instability, political insecurity resulting from real or supposed external threats has contributed in some measure to most of the single-party situations in African states. What is more, as tribal-centered political unrest declines through containment within a single-party government, the influence of externally induced political insecurity tends to increase. This is so because, next to social and economic development, one of the most significant problems confronting African states (especially in West and Equatorial Africa) centers around the politics of Pan-Africanism.

[44] *Ibid.* (February 20, 1959), 203.
[45] See Thompson and Adloff, *Emerging States*, 490-92.

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Without entering into a detailed account of the contemporary background of Pan-Africanism,[46] it should be noted that it has taken the form of two highly competitive blocs of states—the Union of African States (UAS) and the so-called Monrovia States[47]—which differ on the ultimate goal of Pan-African relationships, as well as on the tempo and methods of attaining them. Briefly, the Monrovia States support the most limited kind of Pan-African relationships, primarily those of a functional nature relating to transport, telecommunication, customs, cultural arrangements, etc. The UAS, on the other hand, favors close political union or federation as the goal of Pan-African relationships, and desires immediate efforts in that direction (which is what the UAS itself is supposed to represent[48]). As Nkrumah, the architect of the UAS, has put it: "I firmly believe without the possibility of contradiction that the only and the best solution to our problem is union—real union."[49] Moreover, whereas the Monrovia States insist upon maintenance of and full respect for national territorial frontiers inherited from colonial regimes,[50] the UAS is rather noncommittal on this crucial question, tending to regard these frontiers as illegitimate in view of their origin.[51] Though they no doubt accept their own former colonial frontiers as the territorial limits of their national sovereignty and would do battle in their defense,[52] members of the UAS view those frontiers as temporary or transitional, and the leading member, Ghana (as well as

[46] See Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," *International Organization*, XVI (Spring 1962), 275-90.

[47] Ghana, Guinea, and Mali comprise the UAS, which was formed in April 1961, and on a wider level of Pan-African grouping they constitute, along with Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, the so-called Casablanca Powers, established in January 1961. Some 21 African states comprise the Monrovia States—established in May 1961—including Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and all ex-French West and Equatorial African states (save UAS members), who themselves form the Brazzaville States, including Malagasy Republic. And within this latter grouping there is also the smaller *Conseil de l'Entente* comprising Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Niger.

[48] Cf. *Charter for the Union of African States* (Accra, April 27-29, 1961), Article 3.

[49] *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah . . . at the Opening Session of the Conference on Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa* (Accra, April 7, 1960), 13, mimeo.

[50] During his official visit to Sierra Leone in August 1960, Prime Minister Belewa of Nigeria declared that African states "should be united not by fusion . . . and if we insist on one country swallowing another, we shall have no peace in Africa." (*Sierra Leone Daily Mail,* August 27, 1960, 3.) Similarly, Senghor of Senegal remarked during an official visit to Nigeria in February 1960 that a fundamental condition for Pan-African cooperation must be "to refuse interference in the internal affairs of another African state and consequently to respect its territorial integrity." (Quoted in *West Africa* [February 18, 1961], 187.)

[51] *All-African People's Conference Resolution Regarding Frontiers, Boundaries and Federations—4th Committee* (Accra, December 5-12, 1958), 7, mimeo.

[52] Article 7 of the *Charter for the Union of African States* provides that the members "shall jointly ensure the defence of their territorial integrity."

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Guinea), has a provision in its Constitution enabling the surrender of national sovereignty and territorial integrity for the attainment of Pan-African union.[53] It should be noted, finally, that to the UAS, Pan-African union or federation is not an end in itself but a necessary means to the establishment of Pan-African socialism, that being the ultimate shape and character of the socio-political system to be instituted once union is achieved.[54] The Monrovia States, on the other hand, not only talk mildly about Pan-African federation (they prefer to use the term "cooperation") but talk not at all about Pan-African socialism.

It is in the working out of the inter-African politics of these fundamentally different Pan-African propositions that political insecurity has emerged as a contributor to single-party rule. Generally, it can be said that this insecurity has been felt most by the Monrovia States, some of whom fear that the UAS's (as well as its Casablanca allies') rather weak sympathy toward former colonial frontiers, combined with its vigorous espousal of immediate steps toward Pan-African political union, will—in fact, do—pose a threat to their national sovereignty, their existence as states. More specifically, this fear on the part of some Monrovia States is strengthened by the tactics and methods of Pan-African politics adopted by the UAS, which include the dissemination of militantly radical and Marxist-oriented Pan-African organs like *Voice of Africa*, *Challenge*, and *African Worker* among others, assisting opposition parties and other political groups—especially trade unions—in the Monrovia States, and harboring opposition groups comprised of citizens from Monrovia States. Furthermore, since 1957 the PDG has had a *sous-section* in Freetown, Sierra Leone,[55] and one in the northern area since 1958, 14 of whose members were in attendance at the Fifth Congress of the PDG.[56] Dr. Nkrumah has expressed, moreover, support for an all-African party "with identical aims and programme."[57]

The single-party resultant of this situation as it affects the Monrovia States occurs at two levels. First, in order to cope with an inter-African political situation in which the expectation is one of impending threat to a state's security (a situation which psychologically is tantamount to a state of war), there is a strong propensity to have something approximating total control of the internal political situation, which tends

[53] See *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah*, 12.

[54] Cf. E. K. Ntoloedibe, "Concept of Pan-Africanism," *Voice of Africa* (Accra, August 1961), 26. Cf. also Kofi Baako, "Nkrumahism: Its Theory and Practice," *The Party: CPP Journal* (April 1961), 3-4.

[55] *La Liberté: Organe du PDG* (Conakry, January 15, 1957), 1-3.

[56] *Le Cinquième Congrès National du Parti Démocratique de Guinée, 14-19 Septembre 1959*, IV (Conakry, n.d.), 218.

[57] *The Party: CPP Journal* (May 1961), 14.

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to mean restricting or eliminating the sources of effective political opposition. Thus, when Morocco announced in March 1960 that "la Mauritanie est une partie intégrante du Maroc"[58] (a claim later supported by the UAS as part of the Casablanca Powers), the *Union Progressiste Mauritanienne* (UPM) government moved to restrict the opposition groups that openly supported Morocco's claim. It outlawed the opposition *Nahda* party and imprisoned its leader, Bouyagui Ould Abidine. Other opposition leaders found asylum in Morocco, several of them assuming posts in the Moroccan government—one in the Cabinet and another as Moroccan Ambassador to Guinea.[59] This situation was tantamount to a perpetual threat to Mauritania's integrity, and subsequently it facilitated efforts of the UPM government to absorb all opposition parties. Accordingly, in May 1961, leaders of the *Nahda* party were released from prison and in conjunction with the other opposition party, the *Union Nationale Mauritanienne*, agreed to merge with the UPM to form a single-party government.[60]

Similarly, when the Nkrumah government proclaimed in October 1959 that it supported the integration of Togo Republic "as the seventh region of Ghana,"[61] the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (CUT) government moved to gain complete control of an internal political situation in which a major opposition party, *Juvento*, favored the Ghanaian government's position.[62] To this end, CUT sought to absorb opposition groups, as evidenced by the unified or common electoral list it attempted to form in April 1961. It also endeavored to restrict their competitive capacity, as evidenced by the electoral arrangements in 1961, which required that a party submit a complete electoral list of 50 candidates before it could contest the elections. Furthermore, even though the two major opposition parties, *Juvento* and *Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises* (UDPT) (who together gained 37% of the legislature in the October 1959 elections), met this requirement, the CUT government refused to admit their lists on the grounds that they were submitted too late. Subsequently, the leaders of *Juvento* and UDPT were arrested on a series of charges ranging from political activity considered by the government as "likely to trouble public order" to an attempt,

[58] Quoted in *L'Année Politique, 1960* (Paris 1961), 372-73.

[59] See Immanuel Wallerstein, "What Happened to the Opposition?" *West Africa* (November 25, 1961), 1299.

[60] See *West Africa* (June 3, 1961), 603; S. Willcox, "President Ould Daddah Consolidates His Position," *Africa Report* (March 1962), 7.

[61] *Ghanaian Times* (October 30, 1959).

[62] See Philippe Decraene, "La République du Togo . . . ," *Chroniques de la Communauté* (May 1960), 24-26.

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which the government alleged was "hatched in Ghana," to assassinate the President, Sylvanus Olympio, and "all the members of his government."[63] In February 1962 the parties were outlawed.

The second level on which the single-party resultant of Pan-African political competition occurs in the Monrovia States concerns apparent moves by an opposition party to lend assistance to an African (or foreign) state whose position on Pan-African politics is fundamentally different from that of the domestic state. In such a case, the ruling party is likely to restrict or repress the opposition group. Thus, the ruling party in the Niger Republic, the *Parti Progressiste Nigérien* (PPN), outlawed the *Sawaba* party, led by Djibo Bakary, in October 1959 partly because it supported the Mali Federation comprising Senegal and Soudan (a federation, it should be noted, which was conceived as a "primary federation" that would be the basis of a larger political union). And in Upper Volta, the *Union Démocratique Voltaique* (UDV) government outlawed the main opposition party, the *Parti Républicain de la Liberté* (PRL), in August 1960 for its support of the Mali Federation, and its leader, Nasi Boni, went into exile in Mali along with Bakary of Niger. This situation, finally, has been reproduced in several other states where the activity of opposition groups has lent, or appeared to lend, support, among other things, to a Pan-African policy more radical than that of the domestic government: e.g., in Ivory Coast the *Parti du Regroupement Africaine* was dissolved by the PDCI government in 1959 and its leader, Camille Adam, deported to Guinea, as was the pro-Guinean *Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN) and its leader, Yao N'go Blaise;[64] and in Senegal the Marxist and radical Pan-Africanist *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence* was outlawed and its leader imprisoned in March 1961.

It should be noted, further, that the very intensity and keenness of Pan-African politics, combined with the need for wide control by government over the means (especially finance) necessary to participate in it, may in themselves facilitate the single-party tendency in both Monrovia States and the UAS. This would appear to be the case for such Monrovia States as Ivory Coast, Gabon, Liberia, and Nigeria, which, because of their relatively wealthy position as regards resources for development, have large stakes in defending the Monrovia Pan-African position against that of the UAS. Such defense may require political and economic decisions that have major consequences for influential segments of the population but cannot always be permitted to be called

[63] Quoted in *West Africa* (October 7, 1961), 1107; *ibid.* (December 9, 1961), 1359.
[64] See Wallerstein, "What Happened to the Opposition?"

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into question by organized opposition or be delayed in execution. Recognition of this situation by Monrovia States is seen partly in the fact that most of them have systems of government that concentrate wide powers in the office and person of the President, *le chef de l'état*.[65] In Ivory Coast, for instance, the President, in addition to being *chef de l'état, chef des armées*, and *détenteur exclusif du pouvoir exécutif*, "determines and conducts the policy of the nation," has veto power over acts of the National Assembly which can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, power to submit legislation to referendum after agreement with the bureau of the Assembly, can rule by *mesures exceptionnelles* in emergencies (which the President presumably defines), and makes and ratifies treaties and agreements with foreign bodies and powers.[66] Comparable, and at points even greater, powers rest with the President in other French-speaking states belonging to the Monrovia States.[67]

The intensity and keenness of Pan-African politics as contributors to single-party and authoritarian tendencies hold for the UAS as well, though with a difference. Here it would appear to be a question of having wide control of national resources to permit effective pursuit of a militantly radical Pan-Africanism which, given the scale of its operation, has proved a rather expensive affair. Furthermore, having decided that these political goals should be pursued despite their economic and financial cost, the Ghana government, for instance, is keenly aware of the potential opposition and the need to restrict or eliminate it if the policy is to be followed. Finally, one may even consider efforts to contain tribal-centered conflict and the leaders concerned within single-party rule as partly connected to the need to overcome internal obstacles to the kind of centralized powers required by members of the UAS to pursue their militant Pan-African policies, or by Monrovia States to combat it.

Thus, there are grounds for expecting an augmentation in the in-

[65] Members of the UAS also have strong Presidential systems of government, and Nigeria, a leading member of the Monrovia States, has given consideration to such a system. (See *Daily Times* [Lagos, December 1, 1961], 1.) As regards the nature of the African Presidential system generally, other factors besides the political insecurity of Pan-African politics have contributed to it, among which is the desire for an easily definable focal point of government and power that can act swiftly, and within a wide range, in the many emergency situations that inevitably plague developing states.

[66] *Constitution de la République de la Côte d'Ivoire* (Law No. 60-356 of November 3, 1960), Articles 8, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 53.

[67] See, e.g., *Loi Constitutionnelle Promulgant la Constitution de la République Gabonaise* (November 14, 1960). Text of this and other constitutions in French-speaking Africa are found in *Revue Juridique et Politique d'Outre-mer* (April-June 1961), 225-333.

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fluence of political insecurity centered around the politics of Pan-Africanism—as well as the internal political controls required to pursue such politics—as a major factor in the spread and maintenance of single-party and authoritarian tendencies in African politics.

(5) TRADITIONAL PREFERENCE FOR A SLOWLY CHANGING STATUS QUO

What I have termed, for want of a simpler characterization, a traditionally oriented ideological preference for a slowly changing status quo has been an important contributor to authoritarian and single-party tendencies in states like Northern Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, and Niger, where the governing party and its leadership are closely linked to the traditional elite. In Mauritania the President and leader of the UPM is the son of a traditional ruling family and was educated at *l'Ecole des Fils de Chefs* in Senegal. In Sierra Leone the Prime Minister and leader of the SLPP is the nephew of a Paramount Chief. Finally, in Northern Nigeria there prevails what may be termed an identity of traditional and modern elites—that is, roles of both types of elites are embodied in the same persons, as represented in its purest form by Sir Ahmadu Bello, who is at one and the same time Premier of the Regional government, leader of the NPC (ruling party of the Region and in the Federation of Nigeria), and Sardauna of Sokoto, one of the most eminent and powerful traditional offices in the North. The articulation of modern and traditional elites in these states is seen further in the significant representation of the latter in their states' legislatures. Thus, in Mauritania traditional rulers held 30% of legislative seats as of 1958;[68] they held 25% in Sierra Leone in 1961 (in addition to the fact that most other representatives were near kin of traditional rulers);[69] and in Northern Nigeria some 75% of the seats in the Northern House of Assembly in 1958 were held by officials of Native Authorities (institutions dominated by the traditional elite), as were 63% of the Northern seats in the Federal legislature.[70] In the particularly interesting case of Northern Nigeria, it should be observed further that whereas, in Western and Eastern Nigeria, legislative powers of the traditional elite are constitutionally limited mainly to their role in Houses of Chiefs, which have only delaying powers over legislation, in Northern Nigeria the traditional elite not only has significant influence over legislation through its members in the House of Assembly (lower

[68] Jean-Louis Seurin, "Elites Sociales et Partis Politiques d'A.O.F.," *Annales Africaines, 1958* (Paris 1958), 154.

[69] Martin L. Kilson, "Political Parties in Sierra Leone," in James S. Coleman, ed., *Political Groups in Middle Africa* (forthcoming).

[70] James S. Coleman, *Nigeria* (Berkeley 1958), 380.

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chamber), but also has its own House of Chiefs, whose powers approximate a veto over nearly all legislation enacted by the Assembly.[71] Moreover, the Northern traditional elite has a Council of Chiefs with special consultative powers—again, approximating a veto—relating to all legislation concerning, or likely to affect, the status, power, and functions of traditional rulers. In effect, these powers nearly nullify those of the more democratic institutions provided in the 1960 Constitution of the Northern Region.

As regards the character of party politics, one significant consequence of the foregoing situation is a strong propensity on the part of the governing caucus-type parties to restrict or suppress the activity of opposition parties that advocate a rapid rate of socio-economic change—including a "leveling" pattern of change—or a rate more rapid than that supported by the governing groups. Thus Balewa, Vice-President of the NPC and Prime Minister of the Federal government, has expressed his antipathy to rapid social change among the masses in the following terms: "Drastic change makes people unhappy; we are bringing them in gradually."[72] What is more, since perhaps the main function of the traditio-modern leadership articulation that characterizes the structure of the caucus-type parties like the SLPP, NPC, and UPM is to negotiate the traditional elite's transformation from the old to the modern society without significant loss in status and power, radical socio-political change and its advocacy are seen as a major obstacle to this function. To the extent, however, that such change can be contained within the caucus-type political structure, it may be tolerated. Thus, as regards the rise of the new middle-class group in Northern Nigeria and its impact on social change, Balewa has admitted the necessity of its existence but believes its modernization role must be performed in proper association or "accommodation" with the traditional elite. As he put it: "That this new class must exist is certain, and the Natural Rulers, *whom the North must retain at all costs*, should instead of suspecting it, try to find proper accommodation. . . . I will personally prefer to see such changes coming first from the Natural Rulers rather than from the new class."[73] Similarly, Sir Milton Margai, Life Chairman of the SLPP, has declared: "If we are to advance I believe we have to

[71] See *The Constitution of Northern Nigeria, 1960*, Secs. 27, 28, 74. Cf. *The Constitution of Western Nigeria, 1960*, Sec. 27; *The Constitution of Eastern Nigeria, 1960*, Secs. 26, 27.

[72] Quoted in *West Africa* (December 26, 1959), 1129.

[73] Quoted in G. S. Whitaker, Jr., "Three Northern Nigerian Political Leaders" (unpublished MS., 1960), 22; italics added. Dr. Whitaker's paper contains an excellent analysis of political thought in Northern Nigeria.

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work and go hand in hand with our chiefs. We have our chiefs and they have a place with us in the running of our country and I maintain that they should be very well protected."[74]

However, it is at the point where the advocacy of rapid social change appears to question the caucus-type arrangement for directing change—and the social structure upon which this arrangement rests—that parties associated with this policy are likely to be restricted or suppressed. Thus, it is most interesting that the NPC felt impelled to give public warning to opposition parties in Nigeria, through its Secretary General, that the assumption of independence in October 1960 did not mean "licence" to propagate in Northern Nigeria their comparatively radical ideas on social change. As the NPC put it: "The NPC must . . . warn all those politicians who think that after independence they will have the right to interfere in the affairs of other people. This is not our attitude to independence. Independence is not licence. If our independence is to be worth-while, then our politicians must realise that it does not confirm [confer] on them the right to plan the destruction of constituted authorities. . . . The NPC will not . . . henceforth tolerate stupid and irresponsible actions performed in the name of 'Fundamental Human Rights' [provisions regarding which are entrenched in the Federal Constitution], and it will resist, check and exterminate all unnecessary interference and subversive activities in whatever form camouflaged and from whatever quarters."[75] In a similar vein, Sir Milton Margai of the SLPP informed groups opposed to the traditional elite that he knew "how this 'loss of confidence' [in Chiefs] business goes about," and advised that "it should not be allowed to ruin the Protectorate." Moreover, he warned that "if anybody is found causing trouble [as regards the position and authority of Chiefs] we ought to take the most vindictive steps in dealing with that one."[76]

In view of the foregoing analysis, it is significant that it is precisely in those regions of relatively rapid socio-economic change in Sierra Leone and Northern Nigeria (viz., Kono District in southeastern Sierra Leone, where the diamond-mining industry produces nearly 30% of government's revenue, and the Jos-Bauchi Plateau area in northeastern Nigeria, where tin-mining is a major industry in the North) that some of the greatest political opposition to the SLPP and NPC governments is to be found. What is more, the restrictive measures that have been

[74] *Proceedings of the Eleventh Meeting of the Protectorate Assembly* (Freetown 1955), 14.
[75] Quoted in *Daily Times* (Lagos, September 27, 1960), 21.
[76] *Proceedings of . . . the Protectorate Assembly*, 13-14.

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taken by these governments against opposition parties have occurred mainly in these regions and the parties concerned (in particular, the Kono Progressive Movement—KPM—in Sierra Leone, and Northern Elements Progressive Union—NEPU—in Nigeria) have been keen proponents of rapid social change and are generally the most radical parties in their states.[77] Thus, in Sierra Leone the KPM's radicalism included an anti-Chief policy, for which the party's political activity was restricted by the government in 1960; this entailed the imprisonment for six months of KPM's leader, Tamba Mbriwa, on grounds of conspiring against the lawful authority of a Paramount Chief (the Chief involved was a member of the Native Authority Court that convicted Mbriwa). Similarly, in Northern Nigeria Mallam A. Zukogi, General Secretary of NEPU (whose main support is in the Jos-Bauchi region), was imprisoned by a Native Authority Court for twelve months in 1960 because of political activity, as were thirteen members of the Bornu Youth Movement-Action Group Alliance, who received six-month sentences in January 1961. This harassment of opposition parties in Northern Nigeria was so common in 1961 that one observer remarked that "seldom a week goes by without some UMBC-AG or NEPU-NCNC supporter finding himself before the Alkali Court."[78] Moreover, at the end of December 1961, the annual convention of the divisional organization of the ruling NPC in Bida—which was opened by the Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto—considered "among other things *constitutional methods for the total liquidation of all opposing political groups.*"[79]

It should be noted, finally, that in both Sierra Leone and Northern Nigeria the governmental system itself is such a close approximation of an authoritarian arrangement that it facilitates suppression of opposition politics, and especially that committed to rapid and "leveling-oriented" social change. Thus, in the SLPP government, Paramount Chiefs participate in the formulation of policy *as Ministers* (there are two Chiefs in the Cabinet), in its enactment *as legislators* (25% of seats reserved to Chiefs), in its execution *as members of Native Authorities headed by them*, in its adjudication *as members of Native Courts*, and in its enforcement *as members of Native Authorities that have police powers.*[80] A similar governmental system prevails in Northern Nigeria,

[77] For the political ideology of NEPU, see Whitaker, "Three Northern Nigerian Political Leaders"; and for that of KPM, see Kilson, "Political Parties in Sierra Leone."

[78] "NEPU Prepares," *West Africa* (February 18, 1961), 174.

[79] Quoted in *Daily Times* (Lagos, December 28, 1961), 7; italics added.

[80] There is not space to consider the colonial context out of which this governmental system evolved, but see my forthcoming volume, *Political Change in a West African State.*

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though here the traditional rulers, as already noted, have the additional advantage of their own House of Chiefs with significant legislative powers and a Council of Chiefs with wide consultative powers over legislation affecting the traditional political system. The traditional system, moreover, is at many points identical to much of the modern political system.[81]

In this connection, it is noteworthy that to the extent the pattern of political change in Northern Nigeria fits Professor Apter's model of a "modernizing autocracy," there would appear to be very little evidence to support his proposition that "respect for the past and cultivation of tradition is a necessary condition of democracy . . . ," or that "if we compare the new countries of Africa, we find that the degree of autocracy which emerges after independence is in virtual proportion to the degree of antagonism the government shows to tradition."[82] In fact, his other model of African political change—the "mobilization system" (e.g., CPP in Ghana, PDG in Guinea, etc.)—would appear just as capable of producing democracy at some point as the "modernizing autocracy," and perhaps more capable. It is at least free—and is ideologically and politically oriented to keep itself so—of a politically entrenched social structure that is dominated by the traditional elite. Such a structure, as in the case of Northern Nigeria, is not particularly conducive to the social change one would have thought necessary to provide a social system within which political democracy could prevail.[83] Apter's emphasis upon what he considers the democratically functional role of traditional norms, values, and institutions in African political change is to a large extent an unwarranted generalization from and a simplistic reading of the British pattern of political change. This pattern had so many peculiarities of its own, combined with a relative absence of scarcity owing to the material assistance of imperially controlled resources, that one can hardly apply it generally to African situations of change.

And I take it that it is the British model, or something like it, that Apter has in mind when he asserts that "where traditionalism and modernity are aspects of a continuous process, the prevailing structure of society itself facilitates a natural form of growth, with fewer ruptures

[81] Cf. M. G. Smith, *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria* (London 1955), 170-71. In Ghana and Guinea, where mass-type parties rule, this traditional element in the modern political system has been significantly neutralized—as in Ghana—or destroyed—as in Guinea—and is thus not a factor making for authoritarian tendencies in these states. This is not the case, however, in all states where mass-type parties rule.

[82] David Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton 1961), 476-77.

[83] Cf. Smith, 92ff., 170. Cf. also M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau* (London 1960), 277-93, esp. 291-93.

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and greater compromise both in its government and among its members. . . . Those systems that make use of tradition and render it meaningful and pervasive while not adhering slavishly to old forms and formulas have the greatest prospect of immediate democracy."[84] One need hardly emphasize that this is all rather vague and glib, to the point of not meaning very much at all, either conceptually, analytically, or historically. In concrete terms, what is a "natural form of growth," or "meaningful and pervasive" use of tradition, or "immediate democracy"? Was the British pattern of political change from traditional to modern society a "natural form of growth" and was the result "immediate democracy," and, if so, how immediate was it? By 1830, some 100 years after the start of the Industrial Revolution and nearly 200 years after the Puritan Revolution (and was the latter part of a *natural* growth?[85])—at which point 3% of the adult population enjoyed manhood suffrage, a proportion which the 1832 Reform Act expanded by only 49%?[86]

## III. A Concluding Note: Patterns of Single-Party Evolution and Prospects of Opposition

### (1) patterns

By way of conclusion, let us abstract from the foregoing analysis of the causes of authoritarian and single-party tendencies in African politics the varied patterns of methods of single-party development, and appraise the prospects of opposition parties. Four rather distinct patterns may be delineated, though normally more than one of these is operative in any given state: (1) extra-parliamentary restrictions on opposition parties; (2) government dissolution or outlawry of opposition parties; (3) regroupment or a united-front process; and (4) a voluntary merger of the opposition with the ruling party.

*Extra-Parliamentary Restrictions and Outlawry.* The first two patterns of single-party evolution are best considered together because they in fact occur together, and they are more widespread than the other patterns. Extra-parliamentary or extra-legal restrictions against opposition parties have occurred at one time or another in all of the 19 African states where the single-party tendency is dominant.[87] A variety of gov-

[84] Apter, 477.

[85] Cf. Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714* (London 1961), 119-44, *passim*.

[86] R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (New York 1955), 4, 6; see also pp. 164ff. I am indebted to a discussion of these matters with Professor Samuel H. Beer.

[87] These 19 states are: Congo (ex-French), Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ga-

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ernment measures have implemented these restrictions, among which have been imprisonment of opposition leaders, repression or censorship of newspapers, limitations on rights of assembly, and intimidation by police and/or party activists of the governing party. Imprisonment of opposition leaders has occurred in nearly all the African states noted above, and in three instances it involved charges of conspiracy to assassinate the head of state (viz., Ghana in 1958, Dahomey in 1961, Togo in 1961).

Restrictions on rights of assembly and the ability of opposition parties to agitate have also been relatively widespread. Indeed, if the claims of opposition parties themselves are accepted, such measures are well-nigh universal, not merely in states where the single-party tendency is dominant but also in competitive situations like Western Nigeria, where opposition groups have complained of restrictions by government bodies.[88] In some instances, government simply refuses permits for holding political rallies, as in Tanganyika, where in 1961 the Minister of Home Affairs banned political rallies of the opposition Tanganyika African National Congress (TANC) on grounds that, in the Minister's words, Congress's speakers "disregarded the conventions of public speaking."[89] In this particular instance, another type of restriction on opposition parties was apparent in the TANU government's refusal to permit the Youth Wing of TANC to register as a political organization—a method of restricting political groups that is also used elsewhere in Africa. It should be noted, moreover, that this method of control over the formation of political groups (and also over non-political groups like welfare associations, tribal unions, etc., which often become *political* in African politics) is a continuation by African states of a power exercised by colonial governments. Given the peculiar problems of nation-state formation confronted by African states, some have utilized this power to prevent the establishment of particularistic parties—e.g., in Ghana, as already noted, or in Ivory Coast, where the Constitution holds any group whose purpose is "particularistic propaganda of racial or ethnic character" to be beyond the law.[90] Ivory Coast and Ghana governments have

bon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Northern Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Tchad, Togo, Tunisia, and Upper Volta.

[88] See *Daily Times* (Lagos, October 4, 1961), 1; *ibid.* (January 2, 1962), 10.

[89] Quoted in Tony Hughes, "Tanganyika on the Eve," *Africa South* (October-December 1861), 71.

[90] *Constitution de la République de la Côte d'Ivoire, 1960*, Article 6. Cf. Professor Coleman's emphasis upon ethnic and tribal pluralism as an obstacle to the rise of authoritarian African governments, in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 368.

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even outlawed personal, physical acts of tribal identification, such as facial scarification, etc.

Restrictive measures involving the press have been less frequent than imprisonment of leaders and limitations on rights of assembly and agitation, but have been utilized in several states. In Tunisia, the opposition paper *al-Sabah* was suppressed in 1957 by the Neo-Destour government, presumably for its Pan-Arab tendency;[91] in Ghana the *Ashanti Pioneer* Control Act of 1960 placed the main opposition paper under government censorship; and in Dahomey the PDU government passed a law in 1961 permitting seizure of newspapers for incitement to misdemeanors and for other reasons.[92]

As for outlawry of opposition parties, this has been a pattern of single-party evolution in all but five of the 19 states listed above, these five being Northern Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mali, Tanganyika, and Gabon. An important feature of this pattern has been the simultaneous deportation or otherwise forced exile of leaders of outlawed organizations, even though they were citizens of the state concerned. Thus, in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Niger, Upper Volta, Liberia, Tchad, and Senegal, leaders of outlawed parties or unions have been deported.

One feature of the dynamic of the foregoing methods of single-party evolution is that there would appear to be some relationship between the type of ruling party on the one hand, and the specific government unit executing restrictive measures against opposition groups. Thus, in Ghana, Tanganyika, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, it has been the central government and its organs that execute these restrictions. This is partly due to the natural centralizing tendency of mass-type parties, reinforced in the case of Ghana or Guinea by the government's adherence to a variant of the Marxist pattern of development. On the other hand, in Sierra Leone and Northern Nigeria, where caucus-type parties rule, a major part of the restrictions against opposition has been executed by local government bodies, or more particularly by Native Authority Councils, Courts, and Police. Since the governmental consequence of a caucus-type ruling party has been a significant devolution of government power to local units associated with the traditional ruling elite, the latter has been capable of using this power to harass opposition groups.

*Voluntary Merger and Regroupment Process.* Voluntary merger has been the least current pattern of single-party evolution, the best examples being the merger of opposition parties in Guinea with the ruling PDG in 1958, and of the *Parti Soudanais du Progrès* with the *Union*

[91] See Neville Barbour, *A Survey of Northwest Africa* (Oxford 1960), 318-19.
[92] See *West Africa* (March 11, 1961), 263.

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*Soudanaise* in Mali in 1959. The regroupment or united-front process is somewhat similar to voluntary merger, especially insofar as both patterns have involved the grant of ministerial and other senior government posts to leaders of parties that merge or regroup with governing parties. However, in such instances of regroupment as occurred in Mauritania in 1961, Sierra Leone in 1960, Congo Republic in 1961, and Gabon in 1961, this pattern of single-party development has been preceded by a period of major restrictions against opposition groups by the government. Thus the extent to which the regroupment process has been "voluntary" would appear much less than the two instances of voluntary merger, properly so-called, in Guinea and Mali. Even in the latter states—and especially in Guinea—the post-merger period has witnessed government limitations (imprisonment and outlawry) upon groups tending or wishing to break away from the single-party system.[93]

It should also be noted that the regroupment type of party merger has tended to occur in the context of a national election, taking the form of all parties establishing a national union electoral list that occasionally involves one candidate standing for a given office, and particularly the office of President. For instance, the Presidents of Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo, and Togo were elected at national elections in which, through national union lists, they were the sole candidates for the office.

### (2) PROSPECTS

Generally, the immediate future of effective opposition parties in African politics does not appear particularly bright. Even when they are not subjected to extra-parliamentary measures, they tend to be weak institutions, lacking the financial and other resources necessary for effectively competing with governing parties. The latter, on the other hand, in addition to their aura of nationalist legitimacy (a not inconsiderable advantage), have access to government apparatus as a means of perpetuating their rule, and African governing parties seldom hesitate to employ government funds, transport, and other equipment for electoral campaigns and other political activities. For instance, in February 1962 a Ghana government loan of £497,860 to the Guinea Press—which publishes all CPP organs—was written off for "services rendered by the Press."[94]

[93] Cf. Philippe Decraene, "Guinée An IV: La Révolte des Intellectuels," *Le Monde* (December 29, 1961), 4. Cf. also *Afrique Nouvelle* (July 27-August 2, 1962), 4, for an account of the Mali government's handling of "those who have manifested their opposition to the monetary decision [i.e., the nationalization of the Mali franc] of the party and the government."

[94] Quoted in *West Africa* (February 24, 1962), 215.

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In Nigeria, where a relatively competitive party system prevails and formal expression is given to Western-type democratic procedures, government funds amounting to £2,000,000 have found their way into the service of the governing party in the Western Region, the Action Group, through the indirect method of transference to the party of a part of government loans to a private Nigerian firm (the Nigerian Investment Properties Corporation).[95] Similarly, in the Ivory Coast the PDCI government grants subventions to folklore and youth groups connected with the party, as well as to an array of voluntary associations unrelated to it.

Another aspect of the use of government for party purposes that prevails in most French-speaking African states is the direct participation by civil servants in party politics as party members, officers, activists, etc., thus giving the governing parties a significant advantage over their rather weak opponents. In the Ivory Coast, this situation has even taken the form of organizing "une commission politique" of the PDCI in the departments and ministries of government in order, among other things, "to control the conformity of the authorities to the directives of the party. . . ."[96] Ghana has moved along similar lines, commencing the formation of CPP branches in government ministries in January 1962.[97] Thus, when these situations are combined with those I have analyzed as major causes of the tendency toward single-party rule, there would not appear to be very much in African politics to make one especially sanguine about the prospects of opposition parties.

As some observers have argued, it may be that such a prospect is neither necessary nor desirable at the present stage of African political systems, which function within nation-states still in process of becoming internally coherent. These observers also suggest that the single-party system is capable of sustaining an important measure of democracy, by which they mean widespread participation, active and free discussion, etc.—all of which constitute influence by the *demos* upon the decision-making process.[98] This proposition, however, has not been taken very much beyond the realm of assertion, still wanting empirical demonstration and conceptual definition. What *kind* of decisions, for instance, are influenced by participation and discussion in parties like PDG, CPP, TANU, and *Union Soudanaise*? How real is the choice of candi-

[95] See *Daily Times* (Lagos, August 9, 1962), 1, 3, 9-10. See also *West Africa* (September 15, 1962), 1027.

[96] Philippe Yace, "Le Parti," *Fraternité* (Abidjan, August 4, 1961), 8.

[97] *Evening News* (January 12, 1962), 8.

[98] Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York 1961), 161-67, *passim*.

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dates for party and government office given to the masses in these single-party situations? What are the limits of opposition politics in these situations; that is, what is meant by "opposition" within a single-party when there is no assumption of a right to carry it to its logical conclusion (to *organize* one's opposition) when one's demands are not satisfied?[99] It simply is not enough to say that one index of democracy in a single-party situation is the prevalence of "conditions in which opposition can be expressed."[100]

I should note here that my own reading and analysis of the single-party situations in African politics suggest a more sceptical view as to their democratic character, *but I am not particularly convinced that this is the most meaningful yardstick for appraising them.*[101] Although I myself have used this measurement in much of this article (e.g., my characterization of methods of single-party development as "authoritarian"), I am inclined to look at other functions of African single-party systems besides the democratic one; and my analysis leads me to believe that the governing parties and their leaders do not consider it supreme. More specifically, I tend to concur with Mair's keen observation that "Since the unity of the new [African] States is so precarious, it may well be that their rulers cannot at present afford that tolerance of opposition which is the ideal of representative democracy. . . . The crucial problem for the new governments seems likely to be how to be authoritarian enough to maintain stability and carry through their modernizing policies, and yet not so obviously oppressive as to provoke active or passive resistance."[102]

I should point out, finally, that some observers hold that use of the term "authoritarian" in analyzing African single-party systems may not be appropriate, especially where mass-type parties are concerned, given the large-scale participation provided by such parties, their role in national integration, etc. Thus, Professor Wallerstein maintains that "the one-party system in the African context is often a significant step toward the liberal state, not a first step away from it. . . . The one-party structure is an interim system of African states which they are maintaining for the present."[103] Interesting as this proposition is and *perhaps*

[99] Cf. Ruth Schacter, "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 304-7.

[100] *Ibid.*, 304.

[101] Cf. H. B. Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York 1960), 220ff.

[102] L. P. Mair, "Social Change in Africa," *International Affairs*, XXXVI (October 1960), 456; italics added. Cf. Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston 1941), 8ff.; "In the evolution of our Western World . . . national unification had to precede constitutionalism."

[103] Wallerstein, *Africa*, 163, 166.

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true for the long run, it is not particularly apparent in the thinking of the leaders of single-party states, and certainly not among the leaders of Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, where an effort is being made to employ political power for a revolutionary reconstruction of society. Note, for instance, Touré's adumbration of his view of liberalism and thus, presumably, of the liberal state: "The enemy of revolutionary firmness is liberalism which, from compromise to compromise, drives a party into incriminations and anarchy. The best [liberal] arrangements and the most clever compromises only lead to general discontent and could not possibly preserve the higher interests of the people since they subordinate them, wholly or partly, to the selfish interests of groups or individuals; they could only maintain inequalities and increase antagonisms; they perpetuate confusion and doubt, distrust and discouragement."[104]

Nevertheless, whatever the correct term may be for classifying and measuring African single-party systems—as against other political arrangements—their reversal is not particularly imminent. And this appears true despite such developments as the grant of amnesty to political exiles on the part of the Ivory Coast and Ghana governments, overtures of such amnesty made by Niger and Upper Volta to their political exiles, the release of political prisoners in Ghana and Ivory Coast, or Ghana's revocation of the *Ashanti Pioneer* Act of 1960, censoring that newspaper. Such grants of amnesty to political exiles are primarily an astute response to the manner in which the keenly contested politics of Pan-Africanism may affect the internal political stability of participant states (e.g., the use of an exile for political purposes by the exile's host-state). The latter strategy—i.e., lifting of censorship laws, etc.—may be a unique feature of African politics whereby, once the purpose of a restrictive measure has been secured, its continuation as a formal legal measure is considered an unnecessary demonstration of restrictive intent. In other words, once the intent is accepted as second nature to the political system and its participants, statutory expression of the intent is not required. This does not, however, necessarily alter an African single-party system. It may well strengthen the system.

[104] Sékou Touré, "Message to the Nation . . . on the Occasion of the New Year, January 10th, 1962," in *The International Policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea*, VII (Conakry, n.d.), 219-20. This "Message" is not printed in the French edition of this volume; see Touré, *La Politique Internationale du Parti Démocratique de Guinée*, VII (Conakry 1962).

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# QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

By JAMES R. SCHLESINGER*

THE long-time neglect of the military establishment by the economics profession at large is now in the process of being rectified. It hardly seems necessary to justify this awakening interest. Since resource allocation is fundamental in military problems, the economist, whose primary interest is the logic of the allocative process, is particularly well-qualified to make a contribution. To be sure, this contribution is purely formal. Economics helps to select and frame the questions that should be asked, but the data necessary for the decision-maker to make a choice must be supplied from elsewhere. Though economics may be lacking in substantive content, in that it tells how to choose rather than what to choose, nevertheless such clarification of the logic of choice is not useless to the decision-maker.

The military allocation problem is normally divided into two parts: (a) how much resources to divert to defense, and (b) how to use such resources. A qualitative difference is widely believed to exist regarding what the economist can say about the two issues.[1] With respect to diverting resources to defense, the economist is admitted to have relatively little to say. Total security is unobtainable and the real question is one of trading more or less military security for other goals. Individuals differ in their assessments, and the professional economist, who is presumably neutral, has no license to evaluate the utility patterns bearing on this exchange. It is professionally proper for economists to remind the public of the great flexibility of the economy and the consequent possibility of devoting either more or less resources to defense without provoking collapse. Such a function is not unimportant in a society in which fears are widespread either that our budgetary capacity is in dan-

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[1] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, for example, in *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), before devoting a major section of the book to the problem of achieving what they call "efficiency" in military decisions, treat the question of how much should be diverted to defense in one page of excellent though formal principles (p. 48). Though the authors make every attempt to avoid substantive judgments, the difficulty of avoiding discussion of how much to divert to defense is illustrated by a statement that refers to the postponing of "vital actions such as the dispersing and hardening of our deterrent force" (p. 54).

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ger of exhaustion or that disarmament would inevitably be followed by deep depression. Yet such counsel is quite limited when compared with the much more relevant advice which, as we shall see, the economist is supposed to be able to offer regarding problem (b)—allocation within the defense establishment.

The sharpness of this supposed dichotomy arises from two sources. One is the exaggeration of the degree of assistance in formulating policy offered to the decision-maker by systematic quantitative analysis (systems analysis or operations research). The other is the result of unconsciously accepting the element of arbitrariness in traditional budget-making that systems analysis has now made it possible to reduce. Conventional budgeting methods prescribed a two-step process of deciding how much could be devoted to defense *prior to* determining how such resources would be used.[2]

More will be said below about how much economics can contribute to the problem of diverting resources to defense. In one sense, this decision seems a much simpler one than allocation within. It constitutes one figure, one budget allotment, one announced decision. But it also reflects a congeries of decisions regarding internal allocation. Unless the budgeting procedure is rule-of-thumb, the decision regarding resource diversion emerges as a result of a process of evaluating the particular uses to which resources can be put in achieving national security. Conceptually, the answer to diverting resources emerges simultaneously with decisions on internal allocation, and the economic point of view is equally relevant to both.

To be sure, the weakness of guidance on internal allocation has properly been viewed as the most serious defect in defense planning. In the past, the absence of a market mechanism has meant that budgetary allotments have been based on the dominant enthusiasms of military planners. Defense can, however, no longer be planned on the assumption that one will be able to catch up with modern weaponry some years after the outbreak of war; it must now be planned five or ten years in advance. Economists have consequently been called upon to provide a substitute for the market mechanism that will offer some guide to efficient resource allocation. By contrast, it has been easier to continue

[2] Cf. *ibid.*, 105; though some qualifying remarks take note of interdependence, this is the procedure the authors follow. Arthur Smithies provides a brief discussion of the recent history of this procedural method, and a partial defense of it, in *The Budgetary Process in the United States* (New York 1955), 121-30, 237-40. In light of the political nature of the decisions that must be made, he seems to regard the practice as inevitable—and he expresses a certain sympathy not only for establishing ceilings, but even for the widely criticized Congressional meat-axe.

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to accept the diversion of resources to defense as "a purely political decision," because there the mechanism works tolerably well. However, this pragmatic difference should not be taken to imply that there is an intrinsic difference between the insights that economics contributes to the two problems.

## I

Can the economist really provide a precise framework for deciding allocations within the defense establishment? To the enthusiastic practitioners of systematic quantitative analysis the answer seems obvious. To this writer, however, such confidence is based in part upon the failure to recognize the importance of a distinction between the two different types of problems and the methodological approaches to them that are the subject-matter of quantitative analysis. This distinction is so fundamental that it might well be made the basis of a permanent division of quantitative analysis. In certain problems "output" can be measured. In other cases it cannot be, for the "objective" is only a general phrase that melts together a number of discrete subgoals. In the latter case, the technique of quantitative analysis is to measure inputs in alternative employments for the light such analysis casts on decision-making—a highly sophisticated form of cost accounting, but still only cost accounting. It would be fruitful if the techniques employed to deal with these different sorts of problems were recognized as distinct entities. One way to underscore the distinction would be to redefine, as analytically separate, systems analysis and operations research, terms that continue to be employed interchangeably in general usage. At present the only distinction sometimes drawn between the two is that the former deals with "higher level" and the latter with "lower level" problems.[3] Such a distinction points in the right direction, but fails to

[3] How commonplace is the usage of "operations research" and "systems analysis" as interchangeable terms may be gathered from any one of several standard sources; see, e.g., *Operational Research in Practice*, Report of a NATO Conference (New York 1958). Charles Hitch uses the terms interchangeably in "Economics and Military Operations Research," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XL (August 1958), 200, though mentioning that broader, longer-range, operations research studies are frequently called "systems analyses." Roland McKean may be credited with developing the association between systems analysis and "higher-level criteria" (see *Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis* [New York 1958], 9), though he also does not distinguish between the two on the basis of the type of problem with which each can cope.

In the present article, the position taken is that the term "operations research" should be confined to *efficiency* problems and "systems analysis" to problems of *optimal choice* —thereby avoiding the confusions that have existed. Unfortunately, the conventional use of the term "operations research" both to describe a technique that some experts feel should be limited to lower-level operational problems, and also to encompass all quantitative analysis, is confusing. I have attempted to differentiate by using "operations

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bring out the full import of what should be recognized as the remarkable transition from operations research to systems analysis.

The problems with which economics deals may be classified as maximization problems, completely subject to control through mensuration, and choice-of-objectives problems, which are not. In maximization problems one is attempting to optimize a clearly definable objective function; the solution is embodied in the available data, if they are used correctly. These are the problems for which operations research was initially designed, although one should not underestimate the skill required to select the objective or achieve its maximization. In choice-of-objectives problems, on the other hand, the fundamental question is the selection of the appropriate mix of goals. The data suggest no solution in themselves. Even after the quantitative data is collected and organized, the pressing question still remains: what does one want to do? Sophisticated costing may provide considerable assistance in revealing the tradeoffs among various alternatives—but the ultimate decision, the choice of the strategic approach to the problem, remains a matter of faith that will always elude rigorous quantification. The attempt has been made to apply the methods of operations research to this class of problems and—when this is done—as frequently as not the term "systems analysis" is tagged on. But the two classes are not amenable to the same type of treatment. The chief danger in the first sort of problem is that of mathematical miscalculation or mishandling of the data, whereas in the second the danger is something akin to consumer ignorance.

Unfortunately, the fact that the systems-analysis approach to the choice-of-objectives problem developed out of operations research, in addition to the fact that there is some parallelism between the techniques of the two analytical methods, has hidden the very great differences between them. The conceptual difference between the two types of problems and analytical methods should be emphasized. Failure to do so, up to the present time, helps to explain an atmosphere of misunderstanding and mutual distrust that surrounds the subject. Technology-oriented practitioners who believe that operational research should be confined to problems where there is a clearly defined objective function view with suspicion, if not contempt, the systems-analysis approach because of its imprecision and "unscientific" nature. Those analysts who fail to see the complexity of the criterion problem and who see no

research" when the limited meaning is intended, and by using "operational research" as an inclusive and general term incorporating systems analysis.

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limits to operational research are likely to feel, with some justification, that no one understands or appreciates them. Economists, by comparison, are inclined to view both groups, the little-OR and the big-OR people, with skepticism, owing to the frequency with which inadequate or improper criteria are chosen. Recognition that there are really two techniques, each with its own limitations and one of which may be usefully employed in casting light on problems in which a multiplicity of objectives exists, would reduce such misunderstanding.

Although an attempt is made in this article to deflate some of the claims made in behalf of systematic quantitative analysis, this should not be taken to imply that the writer has any doubt that both techniques have an increasing and a welcome role to play. Systems analysis, which is of primary interest to the economist, has become the rage in Washington. The ideas of Charles Hitch, who is both a high official in the administration and one of the seminal minds in the development of systems analysis, are now having upon budget-making a revolutionary effect—one which conventional economics never was able to achieve, for the terminology and method of thought of systems analysis possess a bureaucratic acceptability that the more abstract concepts of marginal analysis lacked. Traditionally government bureaus have been split (in a sort of internal Cold War) between the "planners" and the "budget people," the former living in a fictitious world where programs were developed on the hypothesis that resources were free, while the latter were engaged in trimming the fondest aspirations of the planners in light of the funds made available. Optimal decisions could not be attained when the budget people had to choose, sometimes indiscriminately, among plans and portions of plans drawn up as if resource limits did not exist. Not only were the planners in a state of continual frustration, but resources were not employed as effectively as they might have been under more suitable circumstances. Systems analysis is now helping to bridge the gap between the two groups. When planners have learned to visualize programs in terms of resource limits, they will recognize that the budget people are more than negativists to be shunned and can provide valuable assistance in achieving the most effective employment of the resources made available.

This change in budget-making technique is a remarkable accomplishment. But there is a very real danger that the nature and limits of systems analysis will go unperceived. Systems analysis provides assistance to logical thinking, but it can never "solve" problems in the same sense that operations research can. Neglect of this fact in itself will lead to

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less-than-optimal solutions, and undo at least some of the benefits that systems analysis can bring.

## II

It was perhaps inevitable, in view of its successful employment during the war and its suitability in assisting corporate management in decision-making, that a broadly construed operational research would be seized upon as the guidepost for efficient resource use where the market provides little or no guide. Originally designed for the solution of low-level, operational problems, the range of operational research has gradually been extended over the years, despite the protests of many of the older practitioners, so that it now includes higher-level problems. This transition is fraught with dangers chiefly because the habits of thought developed in dealing with operational problems may readily prevent the analyst from thinking through the complexities of higher-level problems. If OR has become a mechanical contrivance, the danger becomes quite great that, in the press for quantification, the nonquantifiable elements will be obscured, and in higher-level problems it is the nonquantifiable elements that are of greatest importance. Most obviously is this true in the process of choosing the pattern of goals, which is quite likely to be reduced in practice to a single, quantifiable "objective function." As issues analyzed become more complicated and more "qualitative," the greater becomes the value of recalling the traditional outlook of economists embodied in the simple precepts of marginalist thinking.

The extent to which operational research falls within the purview of economics is debatable, and it is perhaps wise not to enter that tangled thicket at this point. Suffice it to say that the attempt to apply quantitative methods to choosing between competing goals clearly falls within the domain of economics. Even for low-level problems, which are fundamentally engineering in nature, it is probably the duty of economists to check whether important considerations have not been overlooked. In the name of technical efficiency, technologists have regularly committed innumerable acts of waste. Since OR has been designed in the main by engineers, mathematicians, and scientists, it has acquired certain characteristics of the technological outlook. A tendency exists to oversimplify problems, and especially to think that definitive answers to social or economic problems may be readily obtained. If it is too difficult to obtain a nonlinear expression of a relationship, why, a linear one will do. Everything significant is assumed to be quantifiable, and, conversely, whatever is not quantifiable is not significant. The tendency

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is therefore to narrow fundamental questions down to that part of the whole which is solvable by a narrow technique.

While recognizing the inadequacies of economists in dealing with technological issues, it would seem incumbent on economists—who are doubtful whether all relationships are linear or even expressible, who are alert to the fact that returns must be measured in "values" of an abstract nature, and who are not seduced by mere physical quantities no matter how sublime the technology—to examine both what OR is doing to decision-making and what it should be doing.

Without attempting to discuss the more recondite techniques of the discipline, a brief examination of the method and limitations of OR is necessary. Special note should be taken of what Dorfman refers to as "the style of operations research,"[4] since it is here that habits of mind rather than the general theory of the discipline are reflected. The doctrine itself, though vague, is perfectly satisfactory in principle; it comes to little more than a prescription to apply orderly analysis to organizational problems. By using a *team* of specialists to look at an organization from the standpoint of overall objectives, the benefits of the division of labor may be obtained while avoiding narrowness, and through OR the optimum decision from the standpoint of the whole system may be obtained.

The analytical method is something different—reflecting perhaps the scientific cast of mind of the progenitors of OR and the dominance of schools of technology in curricular training in OR. After formulation of the problem under review, the second step is to construct a *mathematical model* to represent the *system* under study. The assumption that an organizational system can usefully be expressed in terms of a mathematical model may be regarded as the chief postulate of OR in practice—for it is reconcilable with the belief that OR represents orderly analysis only if orderly analysis and mathematical expression invariably coincide.

The solution to a given problem is obtained by testing alternative methods of achieving the objective by the formal model that has been constructed. Estimates of the relative gains and costs from each alternative method may then be obtained. The applicability of the techniques of OR thus depend upon the fulfillment of the following conditions: (1) that the objective can be defined with precision; (2) that a formal model can be constructed expressing the relationship between that objective and the variables and constraints involved in its attainment;

[4] Robert Dorfman, "Operations Research," *American Economic Review*, L (September 1960), 577.

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and (3) that sufficient quantitative information is available to permit an intelligent calculation of the parameters. In practice such conditions are most likely to be realized in low-level, technical, and repetitive functions—in other words, in narrow operational decisions rather than broad policy ones.

The possible impediments are many. Selecting the criterion or objective is no easy task. Even if it is obvious, it may not be subject to quantification through a formal model. In fact, the more quantifiable the objective, the greater may be the doubts that the proper one has been selected. If there are several objectives, these may be incommensurable. The problem of uncertainty is, to put it mildly, difficult to handle; in practice its treatment may be close to guesswork.[5] How does one treat problems of time—what rates of discount should be applied, and how should this be varied (if indeed it should be) as the degree of uncertainty changes?

Enough has been said to indicate that OR is most satisfactory for low-level decisions. This remains true in military matters, where OR found its beginnings in dealing with operational problems. Logistical or inventory problems, or choosing the composition of a fleet of transport planes, or deciding where to put runways and how long to make them are all problems that may be handled effectively through OR. The trouble is that higher-level policy decisions cannot be treated so readily. How can one decide on "efficiency" grounds among allocating resources to civil defense, ICBM's, Polaris submarines, anti-submarine warfare, limited war capabilities, and so forth?

The higher one goes in decision-making, the more difficult it is to define the objective. No single criterion is appropriate, other than a meaninglessly broad one like "national security" that obscures the complexities of choosing a strategy. The higher one goes, the less commensurable become the several goals, and the greater are the difficulties created by time and uncertainty on account of the lengthening of the time horizon. Finally, the higher one goes in the decision-making process, the less quantitative and the less systematic becomes the analysis. This happens because one is examining rare events, single events, or mere possibilities—rather than repetitive and routinized operations.

[5] The conventional approach is to make estimates (guesses?) of the probabilities, the ultimate decision being based on probability densities. One must remember, however, that these are not large-number cases, but usually unique events. In addition, the significance of the Knightian distinction between risk, which can be calculated for in advance, and uncertainty, which cannot be so calculated and where the decision-maker (entrepreneur) must take upon himself the burden of deciding on the incalculable, has not been fully explored.

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One may conclude that the clear-cut benefits to be obtained from operations research for low-level decisions begin to disappear at higher levels. Though undoubtedly the latter category includes the vital ones, one should not overlook the cumulative importance of many low-level decisions even in the overall sense. In this respect OR will be especially useful in the military establishment, not only because there is no substitute guide to efficiency, but because the savings to be obtained due to the rapidity of technological change may be greater than in private industry.

## III

As decision-making moves to higher levels, it is generally recognized that it becomes, if not qualitative, at least "more qualitative." The emphasis shifts from measurement to "evaluation." The attempt is made to employ the methodology of operations research in dealing with these higher-level problems. In this case the term "systems analysis" is as commonly used as "operations research." Systems analysis is newer[6] and has not earned such universal acceptance as has operations research. The purity and force of the original discipline begin to disappear along with its precision. It is to be noted that some of the keenest practitioners of the art have warned against this attempt to push the operations-analysis type of approach to higher and higher levels. O. M. Solandt, who must be numbered among OR's founders, has been especially direct in his comments. While recognizing that the new emphasis on systems analysis may be a good idea, it is a long way from the equipment problems in which the worth of OR was first demonstrated. He observes: ". . . systems research that is not based on a thorough knowledge of the ele-

[6] Herman Kahn comments: "About six or seven years ago there was a 'technological breakthrough' at The RAND Corporation in the art of doing Systems Analysis." (*On Thermonuclear War* [Princeton 1960], 119.) Despite a certain flamboyance in the remark, the institutional pride is justified. Much of the pioneering work and much of the very best work in systems analysis has been done at RAND. Many of the criticisms that follow, regarding tendencies in systems analysis, do not apply to RAND work. RAND analysts have been particularly cognizant of the multiplicity of objectives. Kahn and Irwin Mann have criticized the emphasis on mathematical models. They have lampooned the diseases they refer to as "modelism . . . analysitis . . . and technocratism." Albert Wohlstetter has dealt sharply with the use of "manipulatory techniques . . . cookbook fashion." The fact that these men have felt it necessary to emphasize these points is, however, not without significance; it is suggestive of the tendencies and tenor of much of the work in systems analysis. Nevertheless, RAND studies have rarely been guilty of ignoring either the multiplicity of or conflicts among objectives. On the contrary, such studies have frequently served to counteract very simple (if non-mathematical) models in the minds of policy-makers. Not infrequently, it is the policy-makers themselves who come to believe that there is a single objective to be maximized, when this is not the case. In such circumstances, systems analyses may provide a corrective.

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ments that go into the system can become sterile. I think it is particularly dangerous for operations-research workers to deal with continually larger and larger systems until finally they study the political and social systems of the whole world."[7]

Despite a similarity in the way of looking at problems, it is essential to recognize that systems analysis is basically a different tool from traditional operations research. In OR, the objective may be precisely expressed and readily quantified. In systems analysis, there are normally a number of different objectives, which are incommensurable. In OR, the goal is to obtain the most efficient method for achieving a given objective, but in systems analysis one is not concerned with a simple means-end problem but with the actual selection of the mix of objectives or the choice of a strategy. The quantitative information is sought, not to provide data on least-cost methods of production, but to provide data on the terms of exchange as among different objectives, so that the decision-maker is better able to choose among the possibilities on the basis of his utility pattern or system of preferences. It is important to recognize both this difference and the fact that this is not an efficiency problem but a choice-of-objectives problem. What systems analysis does is to provide data on costs or prices of achieving different objectives through the several alternative systems. But if the "demand" for particular objectives is inelastic, then the technical substitutability of weapons systems is low, and, consequently, prices and costs should matter relatively little in selecting the weapons-system mix. Information on costs is highly desirable in decision-making, but the rational decision-maker may be no better advised to alter his strategy on the basis of costs than the rational consumer would be to buy brewer's yeast (or candy) instead of vitamin pills because of their seeming cheapness. The rationality of the purchaser in determining his wants is in both cases a more fundamental question than accuracy in manipulating quantitative data. The great danger in systems analysis is that it may result in an attempt to transform problems of optimal choice into measurable problems of efficiency, a possibility that disappears when one moves outside the framework of a given weapons system. One ought not deceive oneself: when choosing among weapons systems, one is selecting a strategy—a decision into which, under the best of circumstances, some degree of prayer and hope must be infused.[8]

[7] O. M. Solandt, "Concluding Remarks," in "A Decade of Military Operations Research in Perspective—A Symposium," *Operations Research*, VIII (November-December 1960), 857. Reference should also be made to Dorfman, 613-22, and to G. D. Camp as cited in Dorfman.

[8] One is reminded of the story of General Marshall, who dozed off one day during

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So long as the nature and limitations of the analysis are kept firmly in mind, there is little cause for concern, but several obvious dangers exist. The first is that the distinction between choosing a strategy and obtaining efficiency will be obscured—particularly through the use of nebulous terms like "qualitative."[9] Such phraseology leaves the impression that the only difference between systems analysis and the more traditional operations research is the difficulty in *measuring* the results,[10] whereas the really important difference is the difficulty of deciding on goals and selecting as preferable one pattern of results over another. The basic problem is that there is no obvious criterion. When it is strategy that is under consideration, this fact should be recognized rather than assuming that measurement is the problem.

A second danger is more elementary—the failure to recognize the unsuitableness of quantitative analysis. Both the methods employed and the training of the practitioners provide a psychological pressure to quantify[11]—or, what is equally harmful, to make the quantitative ele-

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a meeting of the Policy Planning Staff. When he awoke, his aides were *still* groping with "on the one hand . . . on the other hand, etc." "Are you still wasting your time on the preliminaries?" asked the general. "Make a decision." These problems do *not* yield to analysis, simple or complex; a decision must be made for which the statesman bears the burden of responsibility: "The buck stops here."

[9] The very name "Weapons System Evaluation Group" (the operational analysis organization for the Department of Defense) implies recognition of the qualitative or evaluative nature of conclusions regarding higher-level problems, but this seems to forestall perception of the more vital ends-efficiency dichotomy. Consider, for example, the following description: "We are likely to be deeply involved in the doctrine of the total system—and in the choice of the appropriate mixture of weapons in the total system. This is a field in which quantitative parameters are particularly difficult to find. Consequently more of our work is done in qualitative terms than is the case for other operations-analysis groups." (George E. Pugh, "Operations Research for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," in "A Decade of Military Operations Research," 842.) In light of the pressure for quantification, it is interesting to note that the author later looks longingly toward the day when more of the work can be done in quantitative terms.

[10] See, *inter alia*, Hitch, "Economics and Military Operations Research," 200.

[11] In this regard, take note of the words of the retiring president of ORSA, Martin L. Ernst: ". . . the plea for improved measures of effectiveness was sounded early in the Society's career. Unfortunately, there has been little response to this plea, and there are few indications that any progress whatsoever has been made in this most fundamental area of operations research. Basically, we still make claims to being one of the quantitative sciences, *with employment of qualitative measures being reserved as a last resort.* If we engage increasingly on major problems, we will in due course be faced with a choice of alternatives. Following one path, we may give up the emphasis on quantitative analysis, and simply employ nonquantitative logic as the basis of our effort. To follow the other path, wherein we maintain our quantitative capabilities, we will be completely dependent on improving our abilities to measure fundamental characteristics of the objects of our studies. *Quantitative science simply cannot exist without yardsticks,* and herein perhaps lies our greatest weakness." ("Operations Research and the Large Strategic Problems," *Operations Research*, IX [July-August 1961], 443-44; italics added.)

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ment predominate even where it is inappropriate. One might even observe that a ritualistic recitation of the dangers of excessive quantification characteristically precedes the attempt to push quantitative analysis too far.

Experienced and detached practitioners argue that it is the *approach* of quantitative analysis which is most useful. It provides for a more orderly review of a problem by indicating what is known, what is unknown, and what one would have to know in order to obtain a solution to the problem. Even under such circumstances, however, it is not unlikely that the analysts will become excited about the numbers and come to think that a problem is truly quantitative. This may be another variant of Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." It leads to a tendency to adopt decisions that are justified because they are supported by numbers—and by an entranced researcher who fails to provide his chief with the proper (qualitative) warning. Under somewhat poorer circumstances, the drive for quantification takes the form of manufacturing dubious formulas for which little supporting evidence can be provided. Every analyst can mention numerous examples. They are particularly prevalent in the business community, where they are retailed by the thousand (this may be a form of poetic justice, since the business community in its marketing policy adheres to *caveat emptor*).

A third and more obvious danger arises from those who see no limits to the fields that operational analysis can conquer. Ellis A. Johnson, for example, has argued that in the age of the computer the policy confusions and the administrative cross-currents in the Department of State can and should yield to the methods of operations research.[12] There are few who would insist that State has reached such a pinnacle of efficiency

[12] "Operational research is badly needed in the United States State Department. The State Department is faced on the one hand by a population, industry, Congress, Senate, and Administration primarily engrossed with domestic affairs, and on the other by a set of world societies, many in the process of national revolution and all in a most vigorous sociological interaction. All aspects of this sociological interaction—political, economic, military, and cultural value system—are in a state of violent and revolutionary change. . . . The State Department is as yet unprepared for the modern technical aspects of diplomacy, either by education or *by prior studies by operational research*. This makes it very difficult for its traditionally trained executives to understand and always bear in mind the great twentieth-century interdependence between technology and diplomacy when political policy is being established or political decisions are being made. . . .

"I believe that it is in the State Department and in politics that *the greatest possible advances in operational research can be made in the future*, and that here there can be *a tremendous use of symbolic logic and computers* to provide for all of the interrelations in a way that is presently beyond the comprehension of any single human being or of any group of diplomats of reasonable size." (Ellis A. Johnson, "The Long-Range Future of Operational Research," *Operations Research*, VIII [January-February 1960], 7-8; italics added. By contrast, one might consider the words of Solandt, quoted above.)

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that there is no room for improvement, though it is clear that many of the conflicts within the Department that may strike the outsider as signs of inefficiency are simply built-in organizational devices for recognizing the multiplicity of objectives to which attention must be paid. A naïve attempt to streamline the Department in the name of efficiency might readily lead to less optimal policies. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to assume that OR has no role to play—particularly for such agencies as AID, in which using the dollar most effectively may have some operational significance. But even here it is not at all clear what the objective of foreign assistance is. If it is to maximize the contribution to the growth of GNP, some useful calculations can be made, but to what extent are we more interested in propaganda or in power relationships as opposed to economic progress or political stability, taken by themselves? In the quest for efficiency the enthusiastic operations researcher may ignore the intangibles and complexities of the real world and urge violation of the rules of his discipline. This reflects the failure to recognize the vagueness and incommensurability of objectives, the immense weight of uncertainty, and the impossibility of providing a precise model.

## IV

Operational research is a new field, and in the early years practitioners of new arts tend to regard them as panaceas. This enthusiasm for technique has characterized all of the newer branches of mathematical economics, as well as human relations, communication theory, cybernetics, etc. Unlike Columbus, explorers of the intellectual realm ordinarily assume that they are discovering new worlds. Until experience breeds a sense of proportion, such enthusiasm is contagious and may prove dangerous. Among others, Charles Hitch has warned against what he calls the "naïve" use of quantitative analysis—i.e., the tendency to extract more than warranted from the data. But he argues that, at least under present circumstances, any tendency to push systems analysis too far will be held in check by those in the operating departments who rely on the intuitive approach.

In the long run, however, as systems analysis becomes more readily accepted in the government, will the situation remain as comforting? The ordinary practitioner of a discipline must be expected to accept the formulas of a discipline uncritically and to apply its methods mechanically. In quantitative analysis, a long-run threat to optimal decision-making exists in the pressure for quantification and in the failure to recognize not merely the qualitative but the *inherently subjective* na-

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ture of the decisions that must be made. While estimates of exchange ratios can be made more or less accurately on the side of costs, they cannot be on the side of objectives. Precise utility maps exist only in the textbooks. In quantitative analysis, energy is diverted to the search for numbers, and, what is worse, a decision may be distorted because of the disproportionate weight given to those aspects of a problem that are quantifiable.

In a sense this represents a deficiency of all high-powered mathematical techniques when applied to situations both too complex and amorphous. (Would Henry Adams exchange the computer for the dynamo as the symbol of the modern age?) A complicated reality is oversimplified and distorted. Important insights are excluded from precisely formulated models and the results may be ludicrous. Both Marshallian and Keynesian theory, to cite examples, suffered from more rigorous formulation than the originators intended. It is unwise to use tools that are too sharp in relation to the material with which they are used. Mathematical treatment becomes inapplicable or misleading under two sets of circumstances. In the first, the formulation of the model leads the researcher, in order to reveal the parameters, to seek quantitative evidence that is really unobtainable.[13] At best this represents a misdirection of effort; at worst, it leads to a misleading model based on flimsy evidence. In the second, the formulation of the model results in the exclusion of important variables or relationships. As it happens, such is the case in a large number of strategic problems. Under these circumstances, systems analysis *should* become a synonym for the logical ordering of a problem, and refined techniques become superfluous.[14] In R. G. D. Allen's words, "Some problems are adequately treated by relatively simple logical reasoning and the introduction of mathematical symbolism is then only destructive of clarity."[15]

[13] Wherever sufficient data are lacking, the attempt to give quantitative significance to a model is useless, at best. This need for sufficient data to ascertain the parameters explains why OR is most suitable for repetitive, technical operations. To take a simple example, the problem of diabetic control in principle should be susceptible to the methods of OR. In principle, diabetes is a relatively simple inventory problem. But OR offers no assistance to the practitioner, because in practice sufficient quantitative information is unobtainable without causing endless discomfort and loss of time to the patient. The result is that medical practitioners continue to operate, as they must, by "feel" and intuition.

[14] In an excellent analysis of the national security problem with the suggestive title, "The National Security Dilemma: Challenge to Management Scientists" (*Management Science*, VIII [April 1961], 195-209), Marshall Wood argues that management scientists, through an inclusive systems approach, can help solve our security problem. The orderly analysis that follows, however, would have come into being even if management science had never existed.

[15] R. G. D. Allen, *Mathematical Analysis for Economists* (4th edn., London 1949), 2.

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At this point one can recognize certain advantages of the traditional marginalist method of economic analysis, which by its nature readily lends itself to a sympathetic interpretation of qualitative problems. Its mathematical underpinnings, which represent the simple logic of maximization, are sufficently rudimentary that it need not become bogged down in either unobtainable or manufactured quantitative evidence. Yet it does point clearly to the intuitive or subjective nature of the decisions that must be made in strategic matters by its acceptance of the fact that, whenever a number of goals exist, we can do little more than consider carefully how much of one goal we are willing to trade to obtain more of another. Of course, some of the present difficulties with quantitative analysis also were experienced in the attempt to press forward with the statistical formulation of marginal concepts. Nevertheless, wherever quantitative information is absent or insufficient, marginal analysis is most convenient for dealing with subjective evaluation, partly because the tools are not sharper than the nature of the material warrants, and partly because it has traditionally been used to indicate the principles of public finance.[16]

There is no intrinsic reason why problems of subjective evaluation cannot be dealt with under the heading of systems analysis. The insights of marginal analysis might be regarded as part of or a supplement to the newer field. The barrier lies in the scientific-quantitative origins of operational research, which make it psychologically difficult for practitioners to accept such a procedure. To put it another way, the difficulty lies not with operational research, the *theory* of which is sufficiently broad to incorporate any logical procedure, but with the operational researchers. If systems analysis is adapted so that it is recognized as dealing with issues wherein the clash between multiple and incommensurable goals must be settled by judgment; if it is accepted that the lack of quantitative guidance is a permanent condition and not a temporary frustration, so that "measures of merit" are no longer expected to appear spontaneously as a *deus ex machina*; then systems analysis may indeed play a large role in the guidance of resource allocation within the estab-

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Is there any reason to believe that Lord Keynes' judgment is no longer appropriate? He wrote: "Too large a proportion of recent 'mathematical' economics are mere concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols." (*The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* [New York 1936], 298.)

[16] Charles Hitch refers to these as "pretty empty principles" in "The Uses of Economics," *Research for Public Policy* (Washington 1961), 99. This is perfectly true, in that they are devoid of quantitative guidance in expenditure decisions, but it is their "emptiness" (or formality) that makes them useful in evaluating goals.

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lishment. To be sure, it would be illusory to expect perfection even if systems analysis were able to provide a complete substitute for the market. Markets are efficient only if one accepts the market criterion of satisfying consumers. If consumers, facing an array of products, are unwise in their choices, the results are unsatisfactory. The same is even more true in the case of strategic choice, where failure may be catastrophic. Consequently, in military resource allocation it is essential to concentrate attention on the weighing of objectives and the choice of strategy.

If it be granted that, in coping with choice-of-objectives problems, systems analysis can do no more than provide relevant information on performance and costs that may help in making subjective decisions in problems involving incommensurabilities and uncertainties, then a few words should be added with respect to the conventional distinction, mentioned earlier, between how little the economist can say regarding resource diversion to defense and how much regarding allocation within the defense establishment. The latter part of this antithesis is based on the doctrine that operational research now makes possible scientific handling of the internal allocation problem. It has been noted that this is not the case; systems analysis does not provide a mechanism for objective decision-making. Any decision regarding internal allocation involves strategic choices based upon faith that certain objectives are of a greater order of importance than others—a position that must be taken in the face of incalculable uncertainties.

But cannot the same observation be made concerning the decision to divert resources to defense? Once it is recognized that systems analysis provides no definitive answers, the external problem becomes similar to the internal one. One attempts to compare objectives in the security field with those outside it. A certain weapons system will provide the capability for achieving a particular objective. One discovers the additional costs associated with this capability—and one decides whether it is justifiable to ask the taxpayer to make the additional sacrifices (of nonstrategic objectives) to provide the capability. Although the choice is now wider, one is still engaged in evaluating incommensurable objectives. The total amount provided for defense represents the sum of funds allotted individually to different weapons systems to achieve the objectives chosen. Systems analysis provides a means for rationally comparing different weapons systems by treating each as a unit in terms of its costs. But by permitting each potential capability to be examined on its own merits, it permits the question to be raised whether it is in the interest of the taxpayers to provide that particular capability.

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Total resource diversion reflects the number of affirmative decisions in the case of individual weapons systems. No longer does resource diversion to defense have to depend upon a single decision that is based either on a rule of thumb or on the response to the global but indefinite question: how important we think defense is *in toto*. Thus systems analysis, by permitting weapons systems to be analyzed separately, has outmoded the sharp contrast of the conventional argument. Allocation decisions, both internal and external to the defense establishment, are on the same footing because systems analysis provides exactly the same kind of data to help in the selection of objectives, security and nonsecurity alike.

Acceptance of the contention that the economist can speak with equal appropriateness about external and internal allocation would bring to an end the paradoxical situation in which economists sedulously avoid discussion of the adequacy of the amount of resources devoted to defense. The tendency to confine discussion to achieving efficient resource usage in the defense establishment may have represented a misdirection of energies. After all, it is easy to compensate for such inefficiencies by increased expenditures, and in view of the habits and attitudes of military officers in association with the vast resources of the American economy, it may be the better way. Granted that the economist has no special warrant to impose his judgments about objectives on the American public. If he were to attempt to do so he would be unsuccessful, since his preachments would reach only the ears of those already converted. But he does have the privilege—indeed, the obligation—of pointing to the need for consistency between the importance ascribed to particular objectives and the means provided to achieve those objectives. This plea for optimal resource allocation applies with as much force to comparisons between security and nonsecurity objectives as to comparisons between weapons systems themselves.

## V

National security is too broad a problem to be solved by any single professional insight. In determining policy, the decision-maker draws judgments from several sources and attempts to reconcile views as diverse as those of the blind men in the case of the elephant. Inevitably clashes occur; the only thing that can be said of the ultimate decision is that it cannot and should not coincide exactly with any individual professional judgment. The conviction of the economist that "efficiency" is important will be shared by the technologist—with whom he may

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be associated in operational research. Differences do exist. The technologist is likely to be enamored of technological processes or hardware; he is likely to choose a single variable to be maximized. The economist will be more alert to the need to weigh intangibles and to maximize "values-in-general" rather than a single variable. But both are likely to be in a deeper conflict with the professional officer. On the surface, there would appear to be a rough parallelism between the economist's notion of his discipline and the military definition of strategy (a plan best to employ resources toward the achievement of aims). Both emphasize allocative functions, but despite the similarity of words, there is a difference in the range of considerations that reflects the conflict of professional values. Economists tend to assume that the kinds of efficiency that they take into consideration are equivalent to the requirements of national security. When military officers discuss efficiency, however, they refer not only to weapons systems or organization in the broad sense, but also to organizational continuity, discipline, morale, *esprit de corps*, and tradition. The rationalist's notion of efficiency is likely to overlook the psychological elements in an organization's efficiency upon which the military is likely to lay stress. Those interested in abstract efficiency are continually generating plans for the drastic reorganization of the armed forces, which the latter resist—and properly so: it is not only a matter of vested interests, but recognition of the role of long personal associations and tradition in the building of morale. After all, organizationally speaking, what is more irrational than the Marine Corps, yet what is more useful?

Economists tend not only to calculate in terms of a particular type of efficiency, but also to assume that governments are really *interested* in efficiency, and that when information is provided it will be acted upon. Part of the conflict lies with the decision-making politician-statesman, whose training and instincts lead him toward compromise, toward reconciling different views, toward the achievement of the possible. Some of the politician's modifications are necessary and proper: externally to avoid actions alarming to allies or provocative to an enemy, internally to manage public opinion. But some of the compromises are for less respectable purposes—to maintain the image the public desires of a stable world order, or to see to it that military bases in selected Congressional districts remain undisturbed. Not only may the necessary information to provide efficiency not be acted on, but its existence may be avoided or ignored. Congress, for example, has resisted the use of performance budgets at least in part because their absence facilitates the use of the meat-axe on expensive projects that pay low political divi-

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dends, and also permits the use of resources for "uneconomic" projects that are politically productive.

The services themselves are not always delighted with the information produced in the search for efficiency. This is true in spite of the recognition by the services of their own weaknesses in selecting the most appropriate weapons-system mix and the need to turn to outsiders to provide the detachment lacking within the services. The independent operations-research groups established by the services have not always had an easy time of it when the conclusions reached were not regarded as satisfactory from the standpoint of the sponsoring service.[17]

Thus the mere uncovering of ways to increase efficiency is not sufficient. Even where a decision is clear to the disinterested observer, it is difficult to persuade committed men that their programs or activities should be reduced or abandoned. The price of enthusiasm is that those who have a commitment will be "sold" on their specialty and are incapable of viewing it in cold analytical terms. This may be especially true of the military establishment, where the concepts of duty, honor, and country *when particularized* lead to a certain inflexibility in adjusting to technological change and the new claims of efficiency. But it is also true in the civilian world: for conservationists, foresters, water resource specialists, businessmen, union leaders, or agrarians, some aspects of their value-systems run directly counter to the claims of efficiency. The economic view strikes them all as immoral as well as misleading. (After all, is it not a value judgment on the part of economists that efficiency calculations are important?)

Even in the case of fairly low-level decisions, if they are political, systematic quantitative analysis does not necessarily solve problems. It will not convince ardent supporters that their program is submarginal. Nevertheless, quantitative analysis remains most useful. For certain operational decisions, it either provides the decision-maker with the jus-

[17] Consider, for example, the implications of the following evaluation: "So far the integrity and competence of the major military operational-research groups has remained high. At times their work has been very unpopular in Washington, even within their own services, during this period of crucial decision and controversy—because integrity and honesty do not always provide the best ammunition to win Washington battles. As a result, the Services have in some cases sought with success more amenable operational-research organizations for certain studies, and in two cases have taken organizational and personnel actions to ensure better 'cooperation'" (Johnson, 16). It is noteworthy that the Army recently severed its long-time association with ORO because of a long-standing dispute over control of research, and established the Research Analysis Corporation, whose findings would presumably be less unsatisfactory to the Army. Dr. Johnson, ORO's director, was quoted as saying that "the Army has wanted to run the research—and that we couldn't tolerate." (See *Missiles and Rockets*, June 5, 1961, 11.)

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tification he may desire for cutting off a project or forces him to come up with a nonnumerical rationalization. It eliminates the *purely* subjective approach on the part of devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of argument. They must talk about reality rather than morality. Operational research creates a bridge to budgetary problems over which planners, who previously could assume resources were free, are forced, willingly or unwillingly, to walk.

When confronted with a negative decision, to the effect that a particular program is too costly relative to its benefits to be accepted, the obvious response on the part of devotees, since they cannot argue with the cost figures, is to charge that the wrong criterion has been chosen. This contention may be correct, particularly in higher-level problems; but even if it is not, it may be advantageous because it places emphasis on the important part of the problem, the question of strategic choice. One concrete example of a current problem might be offered, and in order to reveal the striking increase in the rationality of such discussion, one might compare it with the B-36—carrier controversy of the late 1940's. Suppose one wishes to analyze the advantages of the submarine-based Polaris missile system compared with a land-based missile system (say, the Minuteman). One would note that the initial procurement costs per missile (including configuration or the pro-rated share of the submarine) are much higher for the Polaris than for the Minuteman. In addition, the maintenance and operating costs, inclusive of crew, port facilities, etc., are very high for Polaris, moderate for Minuteman. Moreover, the readiness of Polaris is much lower. Submarines will be laid up for repairs on an average of from one to two months a year; time must be allowed to provide leave for the crews; and time will be lost cruising to and from port. Polaris is also probably less reliable and possibly less accurate than Minuteman. The upshot is that to achieve equal destructive power will require a vastly larger investment of resources in Polaris than in Minuteman.

When confronted with such a presentation, supporters of Polaris are not likely to argue about the facts, but maintain instead that the criterion of destructive power on target, *ceteris paribus*, is not appropriate; the strategic problems are much broader. They are likely to emphasize that at present the Polaris system is virtually invulnerable; that it is vastly more difficult for Soviet intelligence to gather information on the whereabouts of Polaris subs than of Minutemen; and that in the event of Soviet development of a defense against missiles, it is likelier to be much more effective against the Minuteman ICBM than the Polaris IRBM. Moreover, they might point out that an additional benefit

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is that the Polaris system may force the Soviets to devote substantial resources to development of an anti-submarine warfare capability that they might otherwise use for other purposes. The sensible, *and highly qualitative*, conclusion likely to be reached is that the United States ought not to place all of its deterrent eggs in one basket—and that both systems should be included in the weapons mix. An example of this sort indicates how quantitative analysis is useful in concentrating attention upon realities and at the same time upon overall strategy. It also supports the contention that a simple dedication to "efficiency" in the spirit of operations research might easily lead to the wrong decision.

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# *Review Articles*

## THE PROBLEM OF APPEASEMENT

By GEORGE A. LANYI

Sir James R. M. Butler, *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), 1882-1940*, St. Martin's Press, 1960, 385 pp. $10.00.

Arthur H. Furnia, *The Diplomacy of Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to World War II, 1931-1938*, Washington, D.C., The University Press of Washington, D.C., 1960, 454 pp. $6.00.

Iain Macleod, *Neville Chamberlain*, New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1962, 319 pp. $5.75.

A. L. Rowse, *Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 1933-1939*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1961, 123 pp. $3.00.

Robert G. Vansittart, *The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart*, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1958, 568 pp. 35s.

AN evaluation of British foreign policy towards Nazi Germany is still overlaid in England by political controversy. The two main political parties cannot deny their descent from the parties that confronted each other in the 1930's. The question of responsibility for that tragically unsuccessful foreign policy and for the ensuing war still produces heated reproaches in the political arena and equally heated debates among historians. The belief that, had Britain taken the "right line," the war could have been prevented is still very strong. In the words of the Oxford historian, A. L. Rowse: "There *was* a hope then, and it did matter what line we took; during that last decade this country exercised a leading influence in Europe and still held a position of leadership in the English-speaking world. All that has changed: the real decisions are made elsewhere" (p. 4). Had Hitler been checked and the exhaustive blood-letting avoided, would the "real decisions" still be made in England? These nagging questions arise again and again on the rostrum, in the newspapers, in Senior Common Rooms. They have produced two sets of legends, of which various versions circulate. The Right asserts in Quintin Hogg's words that "the Left was never right,"[1] and that by demagogically exploiting the public's pacifist temper it kept Britain from rearming so that the Conservative governments had no alternative to appeasement.[2] The Left, on the other hand, developed the legend that Tories feared Soviet Russian communism more than

[1] *The Left Was Never Right* (London 1945).

[2] National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, *Armaments and Policy, 1919-1939* (London 1945), *passim*.

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Nazism and saw in Hitler the man who stemmed the Red tide from spreading westward. The Communist version of this goes further; it asserts that Neville Chamberlain, in true Machiavellian fashion, encouraged Hitler to expand towards the East in order to involve him in a serious conflict with Stalin.

## I

"Appeasement" is today a dirty word in political controversy, with a specific meaning in academic writing on international politics. Its significance changed in the late 1930's, though it was still given its traditional meaning by defenders of the policy. The fourth edition of the *Oxford Concise Dictionary* (1951) derives the noun from "*appease*: pacify, quiet (strife, anger, person)." But the revised edition (1954) adds: "*Appease*. (Also) try to conciliate or bribe (a potential aggressor) by making concessions, freq. with implications of sacrifice of principles." Similar changes occur in American dictionaries.

In pre-Nazi days, "appeasement" meant a most respectable policy, usually following international or civil war. It was the equivalent of today's "lessening of tensions," or "détente." General Smuts, thoroughly familiar with the process in his own country after the Boer War, commended Britain in 1923 as an adherent of "the great cause of appeasement among nations."[3] Even much later, British statesmen regarded Europe as a region where this process had not been quite completed, where one's main aim should be to create a more relaxed atmosphere by making all-round peaceful settlements. When they spoke of "general appeasement," they did not specifically mean concessions to Hitler (or Mussolini), but a rather vague coming together of the Great Powers, perhaps even a revival of the nineteenth-century European Concert. Even Anthony Eden assured the House of Commons on March 26, 1936, that ". . . it is the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have constantly before us," and explained that this entailed three objectives: ". . . first, to avert the danger of war, second, to create conditions in which negotiations can take place and, third, to bring about the success of those negotiations so that they may strengthen collective security, further Germany's return to the League and, in a happier atmosphere, allow those larger negotiations on economic matters and on matters of armaments . . . to take place."[4] Neville Chamberlain, though his critics already used the word disparagingly, continued to use it in the old sense.

[3] Quoted in Lord Strang, *Britain in World Affairs* (London 1961), 322.

[4] *Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons, Official Report*, Vol. 310, column 1446.

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Defending the Munich settlement, he emphasized that, no matter what the nature of this treaty was, he regarded it mainly as implementing a more general policy: "Our policy of appeasement does not mean that we are going to seek new friends at the expense of old ones, or, indeed, at the expense of any other nations at all. . . . [Our] objective is . . . to obtain the collaboration of all nations, not excluding the totalitarian States, in building up a lasting peace of Europe."[5] Today, however, this former meaning of "appeasement" seems confusing, even wholly misleading.

In textbooks, "appeasement" is now the label of an ill-conceived policy. Hans Morgenthau regards it as ". . . a foreign policy that attempts to meet the threat of imperialism with methods appropriate to a policy of the status quo. . . . appeasement is a corrupted policy of compromise, made erroneous by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo."[6] But Morgenthau also fears that this specific meaning of appeasement is undergoing in popular parlance an illegitimate broadening in the direction of a general rejection of any traditional diplomacy whatsoever.[7] He quotes with approval Sir Winston Churchill, who said on December 14, 1950: "Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace."[8] This statement, however, omits the vital question of the nature and policy of the *other* power towards which the policy of appeasement is directed. Was it, for instance, "magnanimous and noble" of Britain to conclude a naval agreement with Germany in 1935 (which Churchill condemned then and later[9]), when Britain was still comparatively very strong? Was it not the beginning of all the various direct and indirect encouragements and concessions that helped Hitler to strength while raising his imperialistic expectations? Moreover, appeasement might become the only realistic policy for a weak country confronted with an aggressive and stronger power, a policy that could delay war, or postpone the raising of further, perhaps irreconcilable

[5] *Ibid.*, Vol. 339, column 552 (October 6, 1938).

[6] *Politics Among Nations* (3rd edn., New York 1960), 64.

[7] Cf. also Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York 1956), 158; Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations* (2nd ed., New York 1962), 106-7.

[8] Morgenthau, 66-67. The same view was also taken by the earliest and still the best historian of the Munich Pact, John W. Wheeler-Bennett, in *Munich* (New York 1948), 7.

[9] *The Gathering Storm* (Boston 1938), 140-41.

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demands, and allow it to improve its relative strength or obtain allies, or to hope that, through some unforeseen development, the international configuration would change to its advantage.

There are, in fact, two kinds of appeasement, active and passive. Active appeasement begins by lending a sympathetic ear to certain concrete demands or grievances expressed by the government of an expansionist or potentially aggressive power. It continues through more or less friendly negotiations, finally satisfying all or most of the demands. It may, or may not, be accompanied by moral considerations (e.g., the belief that it was imperative to apply the doctrine of national self-determination to the Sudeten Germans more fully than the Paris peace conference cared to do); in this, it does not necessarily differ from passive appeasement. That Neville Chamberlain, a man of action, conducted a policy of active appeasement is recognized by those, including Iain Macleod and Arthur Furnia, who regard Chamberlain's premiership as a new phase of British foreign policy towards Nazi Germany, but there can be little doubt that it was not only preceded, but in some respects was caused, by the earlier phase of unplanned, pragmatic, and—with one or two exceptions—largely passive appeasement.

Passive appeasement occurs when a power permits its potentially or actually aggressive adversary to improve its position considerably by violating peace treaties, by accumulating massive armaments, and by developing economic and ideological spheres of interest. The passive appeaser may express its moral disapproval of such actions, may confer with its allies, may appeal to the conscience of the other side, or to world public opinion, but, in fact, takes no effective action to stop the march of its adversary towards a powerful position in the very region in which it itself has vital interests. Moreover, the passive appeaser does not increase its own armaments but tends to underrate both the increasing strength and the aggressive intentions of its adversary. It may thus invite irreconcilable demands, or even a war of aggression. It was passive appeasement that was largely practiced by the Baldwin government, by a long line of French governments, and—mitigated only by America's somewhat less direct involvement in European affairs—by the Roosevelt administration. Inasmuch as resistance to rearming was for a long time one of the British parliamentary opposition's most effective planks, the Labour Party and various kinds of opposition Liberals must be regarded as passive appeasers, though it is hard to decide to what extent a political party can be held accountable for the policies of the government it opposes.

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## II

What kind of outlook on international affairs, what kind of world view, favors the adoption of a policy of appeasement?

It seems clear why the bulk of the Labour Party was unfriendly to active appeasement. The non-Communist intellectual Left and the trade union leaders were closer to Weimar Germany than the Conservatives, and for this reason, and because of their greater ideological sensitivity to Fascism, were ardently opposed to and highly critical of the whole Nazi syndrome. On the other hand, most of them were confused about international affairs and blind to the importance of military power. Until late in 1937 they opposed even the modest measure of rearmament proposed by the government, and even after that their cooperation was half-hearted. Had they been in power, they would have been passive appeasers, perhaps even more so than Stanley Baldwin.

On the other hand, Winston Churchill and a handful of Tory imperialists, like Leo Amery, were not necessarily unhappy about Fascism as such—the worst excesses of Nazism were still in the future—but became increasingly alarmed by the growing military might of Germany. They who, quite wrongly, opposed appeasement in India and the colonies and were not always sensitive to the necessities of social reconciliation at home, knew full well that active appeasement would encourage Hitler, and that only vigorous rearmament could save Europe from what Churchill called an "unnecessary war."

Those in power—Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir John Simon, Lord Halifax, and even, to a certain extent, until late in 1937, Anthony Eden—acted as if Hitler could be effectively appeased. They did not belong to the old-time Tories, but were rather actually moderate liberals (Sir John Simon headed the dissident National Liberal Party), committed to the gradual transformation of the Empire into a Commonwealth, believing in a welfare state and in social reform as long as the budget remained balanced; in both their domestic and their foreign policies, they were closer to the mainstream of British public opinion than were their critics on the Right and Left.

By the 1930's their doubts about the League of Nations were almost abated; the doctrine of the Continent divided by a balance of power, which still dominated the minds of at least part of the Foreign Office, was forgotten; they were more interested in the Commonwealth and Empire than in Europe. Some, notably Chamberlain, were not reluctant to rearm. But others, especially Baldwin, had been permeated by a great

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deal of pacifism. To them, the often impatient demands of certain French governments for security sounded a jarring note, wholly out of date in a modern world in which war was no longer conceivable.

Most appeasers were almost unbelievably deficient in their analysis of human nature and of the nature of government.[10] They failed to understand totalitarian government, its necessity to expand, and its ability to mobilize all the material and spiritual resources of a nation for an aggressive foreign policy, even for war. As the memoirs of Sir John Simon[11] and Lord Halifax show, they were far too English not to be horrified by Hitler's personality; Lord Halifax wrote in his diary: "One had a feeling all the time that we had a totally different sense of values and were speaking in a different language."[12] Yet they were unable to realize how dangerous such a dictator, at the helm of a powerful totalitarian country, could be for the world. They attributed their own sentiments to the Germans, and often even to Hitler. They grossly underrated the intuitive sophistication of that uneducated political genius. Nor was their outlook on the international system much wiser. Although Chamberlain recognized the failure of the League of Nations and the unworkability of collective security under the circumstances, he tried to substitute "general appeasement" and a European Concert, in which the Western democracies would confront the two dictators as equals, omitting from these summit meetings both the United States (an obvious potential ally) and Russia (which he distrusted). Not even after the seizure of Prague were these men able to see the Continent in terms of realistic power relationships. Sir Lewis Namier rightly said that "In the 1,250 large pages of the British pre-Munich documents, the question of Europe's political and strategic configuration after Czechoslovakia had been obliterated is nowhere dealt with: amazing mental reticence . . . a blind wall is raised against the future. . . . All they knew is that war must be averted."[13]

## III

Fresh food for thought on these problems is provided by a new crop of books every few years: a selection is listed above. It includes a diplomatic history by an American scholar, Arthur H. Furnia, who puts the blame squarely on the last two prewar British governments, largely

[10] Kenneth Waltz's "first" and "second image" in *Man, the State and War* (New York 1959), *passim*; on appeasement, see 220-23.
[11] *Retrospect: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon* (London 1952), 202-3.
[12] *Fullness of Days* (London 1957), 188-89.
[13] *In the Nazi Era* (London 1952), 163.

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exonerating their opposite numbers in France. A member of the present Conservative cabinet, Iain Macleod, sometimes regarded as a possible future Prime Minister, presents a new biography of the architect of "appeasement" which, according to the jacket, "reveals Neville Chamberlain as one of Britain's most persevering and courageous statesmen." Sir James Butler, formerly Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, adds to this an authorized biography of the "mysterious" Lord Lothian, often regarded as the philosopher of "appeasement." Lord Vansittart, highest career official in the British Foreign Office during some of the most crucial years, has much to say about those who ignored his advice and relegated him to a position of dignified innocuity. Finally, A. L. Rowse, diary in hand, reminisces about members of the "appeasing" establishment who as Fellows, or former Fellows, were regular visitors at All Souls College in Oxford,[14] where he himself, a young historian and an unsuccessful opposition candidate for Parliament, questioned, challenged, and teased them.

As an analysis in depth, Furnia's book is perhaps least helpful. He uses the term "appeasement" rather indiscriminately and does not inquire into the motives and influences behind British policy. This might be attributed to the shortcomings of traditional diplomatic history, but a diplomatic historian should not omit from his investigation (and even his bibliography) some of the most revealing memoirs—e.g., those of Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare),[15] Leo Amery,[16] and Lord Vansittart—or the key sources on the not negligible role of *The Times*,[17] not to speak of the highly significant material published by Tom Jones.[18] Furnia's book provides a diligently compiled chronology, using American diplomatic documents, both published and unpublished, which in many ways round out the picture. Its main thesis, however, is rather unconvincing. Undoubtedly, Neville Chamberlain played first violin in the history of active appeasement and Baldwin's and MacDonald's governments had an important role in the preceding phase of passive appeasement, but it is really not possible to clear the French, and particularly Daladier, of substantial complicity in the act. Chamberlain's "duplicity" towards the French, of which the author makes a great deal, is not really proved, as Professor Medlicott has rightly observed,[19] un-

[14] The English edition is entitled *All Souls and Appeasement: A Contribution to Contemporary History* (London 1961).

[15] *Nine Troubled Years* (London 1954).

[16] *My Political Life*, Vol. III: *The Unforgiving Years, 1929-1940* (London 1955).

[17] *The History of the Times, 1912-1948*, Part II (New York 1952); and Sir Evelyn Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times* (London 1955).

[18] *A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950* (London 1954).

[19] Review in *International Affairs*, XXXVIII (January 1962), 84-85.

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less traditional secret diplomacy can be called duplicity. Daladier does not, after all, emerge from the book as a tragic hero, nor Chamberlain as a scheming villain. There is, moreover, very serious doubt whether the French really meant to act against the German occupation of the Rhineland; if they did, there is good evidence that they did not have the means to act effectively.[20]

The other four books, none of which can be regarded as a systematic investigation into the phenomenon of appeasement, nevertheless contribute a great deal to its understanding. In many ways the most interesting, and certainly the most articulate, among British appeasers was Lord Lothian. He was, *par excellence*, the intellectual in politics. He shied away from a parliamentary career, though he could have had one, and was in office for a short period only. In politics he started as a Tory but soon became and remained a Liberal. During various periods of his life, however, he exercised great influence, for which, as a deeply religious person, he accounted only to his conscience. He was a member of Lord Milner's *Kindergarten* in South Africa, and later continued his work of liberalizing imperialism as Editor of *The Round Table*. He was a strong influence behind the creation of the Commonwealth of Nations, and at times hoped that the United States would join it, and that it would be generally considered as "the perfect example of the eventual World Commonwealth." During the First World War, he was a member of Lloyd George's secretariat; during the Paris peace conferences, he exercised an influence behind the scene, great enough to draw Churchill's anger. It was Lothian who drafted the "war-guilt clause" of the Treaty of Versailles: he argued against the Treasury experts who thought that reparations should be scaled down. These errors in political judgment—which he, of course, shared with others, such as his chief, Lloyd George—weighed heavily on his conscience and became the cardinal motive in his obsessive insistence that Germany should be given "justice," even though ruled by Hitler. During the 1930's, he was often considered the *éminence grise* whose influence swayed doubters towards a policy of active appeasement. He had two long interviews with Hitler, he wrote articles and gave lectures, he argued on country weekends with leading politicians, he was persuasive before distinguished gatherings at Chatham House, he wrote long letters to Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries as well as to *The Times*. On

[20] There were no French military plans for the eventuality of a German occupation of the Rhineland that was not preparatory to an immediate attack against France. Therefore, as W. F. Knapp's excellent paper proved, there was no real deterrent to keep Hitler from occupying the Rhineland. (*The Decline of the Third Republic*, St. Antony's Papers, No. 5 [New York 1959], 67-85.)

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June 3, 1936, he wrote to Anthony Eden, trying to persuade him to yield to Germany's claims in a number of areas: "It is only by agreeing in time to give Germany equality in Europe and predominant influence in Eastern Europe that France herself can obtain security both in Europe and overseas. . . . Once Germany is given justice and equality in the full sense of these words there can be twenty-five years' peace in the world . . . and . . . cessation of the competition in armaments in favour of economic reconstruction" (Butler, 362).

Lothian combined an almost Utopian belief in the eventuality of world government (because real peace and order could exist only if there were a common government), with a dislike of the nationalism of small countries, a horror of the nineteenth-century system of alliances and alignments, a doctrinaire liberal belief in the blessings of free trade and social-minded capitalism, and a deep conviction that "justice" was possible in international affairs. As a Christian Scientist, he was full of an optimism about human nature that seems naïve when compared with his usually rather sophisticated and learned discourses. This same optimism took on a liberal coloring when he discussed the constitution of individual governments: he had little doubt that mankind would turn sooner or later towards constitutional democracy. He was thus unable to understand the irrational forces that could be mobilized by Hitler, nor could he believe that the German dictator could willfully lie or break his promises. The influence of this selfless, dedicated, lively and, to many people, supremely attractive intellectual was, therefore, rather devastating. No wonder that some regarded him as "sinister" and others even called him "Lord Loathsome."

We are indebted to Sir James Butler for not concealing the facts and for printing Lothian's notes on his meetings with Hitler and his letter to Eden in the *Appendices*. Unfortunately, Sir James is not sufficiently interested in political thought; his analysis of Lothian's thinking is not really penetrating, though it is possible to piece the elements together. Nor does one obtain enough enlightenment on the degree of influence Lothian wielded during this crucial period. Undoubtedly, he influenced the Astors and their friends in Cliveden and, through Tom Jones, the former Cabinet Secretary and life-long intimate of Baldwin, he had the ear of the Prime Minister, while his arguments and intellectual weight confirmed Geoffrey Dawson, Editor of *The Times*, in what he regarded as right anyhow. Dawson, in turn, was definitely an influence on Lord Halifax. It has been denied that Lothian and his Cliveden friends had any *direct* influence on Neville Chamberlain, who conducted a personal diplomacy. But Chamberlain was enough of a politi-

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cian to know that his foreign policy needed the support of influential circles and of the important organs of public opinion with which they were connected. Such aid and comfort Lothian provided.

Another meeting point of those who were in positions of responsible power or irresponsible influence was All Souls College in Oxford. It is fascinating to be led by A. L. Rowse into this circle. There is, again, Geoffrey Dawson of *The Times*, who regarded himself as almost as important as the Foreign Secretary, and who toyed with the idea of a world-wide balance of power, in which Britain would have hegemony over much of Asia and Africa, while Germany would run Europe. There is Tom Jones, equally ignorant of European realities, who arranged for Lloyd George's visit to Hitler, and tried but failed to get the xenophobic Baldwin to follow suit. There are two Foreign Secretaries, Lord Halifax and Sir John Simon. And there is the ubiquitous Lord Lothian. Only two of the Fellows who kept returning to All Souls were in the smaller camp of anti-appeasers: Leo Amery and Sir Arthur Salter. Rowse's little book adds some data and confirms others, but does not materially change the general picture. His explanation of why these men supported and carried out such a fateful policy is interesting but not entirely convincing. He regards the whole group (and he would add Baldwin, Chamberlain, and Hoare to it) as essentially "late Victorians . . . , sharing to the full the standards of that era, with all their limitations, public-spirited and respectable, conventional and unimaginative" (p. 113). Their debacle demonstrates for him "the decadence of British empiricism . . . carried beyond all rhyme and reason" (p. 115). He thinks it remarkable that most of the men in this group knew and cared much more about the Empire than about Europe or the rest of the world. Much of this seems to be true, but Rowse also believes that they were all basically middle-class, "with the typical confusion between the interests of their social order and the interests of their country." That is why they were more afraid of Russia than of Germany. On the other hand, the real aristocrats in the regime, "Churchill, Eden, the Cecils," had a "hereditary sense of the security of the state" (p. 116) and, therefore, knew why Germany endangered it.

The difficulty with such a theory is that it approaches very closely the English Left's legend about the "real reasons" for appeasement. There is very little evidence to support it. Even Rowse has to make exceptions when he simply relegates Halifax to the middle classes "because he had a middle-class mind," and cannot explain why the thoroughly middle-class Amery or Salter was not an appeaser. That the ap-

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peasers disliked Bolshevism is, of course, true but none of them were fanatical anti-Communists. Nor were they, at that period, particularly concerned with Russia, let alone the danger of Communism. In their view, there was little to fear from a country that was executing so many of its political and military leaders and seemed to be in the throes of a permanent economic and political crisis. Although Hitler's assurances that he had "saved Germany from Communism" met with some credence among Conservatives, no close reading of documents or memoirs shows that this was really in the center of their minds. They were concerned with peace, with economic reconstruction, with a peaceful evolution of the Empire into a Commonwealth, with social reconciliation at home. Hitler disturbed their view of the world, of society and of humanity, and while they had earlier rejected Bolshevism (which was easier to comprehend, and not only for the middle-class mind) they could not perceive the right-wing version of totalitarianism. Their misunderstanding of the realities of international politics, however, can hardly be attributed to their social origin, or to their education (no different from that of the aristocrats). It was because they rejected the Victorian model of European politics that they could not see the danger in a German-dominated Continent.

Iain Macleod, in his impressive apology for Neville Chamberlain (for which he made extensive use of the voluminous Chamberlain papers, as the earlier biographer, Keith Feiling, did[21]) maintains quite rightly that the luckless Prime Minister must be regarded as a person of stature and courage. In domestic policy, he was in the reformist and liberal wing of his party; in foreign policy, he was one of the few who urged rearmament. Although largely ignorant of Europe, he was not pro-German, nor was he attracted by the Nazi regime, and even less, after his pre-Munich visits, by Hitler himself. According to Macleod, there was no alternative to Munich and "It is not at Munich but at the locust years, 1934 and 1935, that the finger of criticism should be pointed" (p. 258). Macleod's strongest argument in defense of Munich must be the main argument for any policy of appeasement: Britain was unable to fight war successfully in September 1938, and appeasement therefore provided a breathing spell during which effective rearmament, particularly in the air, was possible. Appeasement, therefore, is a logical, even a necessary, policy for the weak. This argument would be more convincing were there not a respectable body of opinion that argues that Germany, too, was not well prepared for war in 1938, and that the

[21] *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London 1946).

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breathing spell which the British were granted was not fully utilized for really imaginative and massive rearmament, so that even by the summer of 1940 they were not ready for what they had to face. Furthermore, there is little doubt that Neville Chamberlain did not understand the importance of Central and Eastern Europe to a European equilibrium, and that he looked with disdain on those in the Foreign Office who tried to speak to him in the language of a Sir Eyre Crowe. Moreover, Chamberlain, on his return from Munich, gave repeated evidence that he sincerely and with unwarranted optimism believed that he had initiated there a real "general appeasement" of Europe. That he nevertheless continued rearmament was probably due to his sound business instinct, which told him to keep some kind of reserve in the background in case the newest venture should, after all, fail. Active appeasement was for him a great, constructive, political and moral enterprise, and not merely a policy of emergency. Iain Macleod certainly succeeds in raising one's respect for Chamberlain as a man of integrity and courage, but he fails completely in trying to justify or even to explain convincingly his foreign policy.

Lord Vansittart's autobiography (not quite finished before his death) is, in his own words, "the story of a failure" (p. 550). It is also the work of an impassioned and bitter critic, and a somewhat fanciful *littérateur*, who should perhaps have never gone into the Foreign Service, in which he rose to the very top only to find his advice ignored by those whom he regarded as rank ignoramuses. One can draw many interesting conclusions from this bulky volume, in which fact, anecdote, opinion, and mere gossip are amusingly intermingled, and much of which must be taken with a grain of salt. The central question for us here is why Vansittart, scion of those very same middle classes, remained through all the crucial period a staunch anti-appeaser and a constant reminder of German military might and political aggressiveness. Lothian, in a letter to Smuts, said that his political adversaries were "a combination of three forces, the traditional anti-Germans, the whole of the Left which at present times is as mad about anti-Fascism as the Right used to be anti-Red, and the Foreign Office which is pledged to the French view of European politics" (Butler, 220-21). This was not an unperceptive assessment, though it was incomplete. Vansittart, at any rate, was a combination of the first and the third type: he was a career Foreign Service officer, Francophile to be sure, and from his youth a convinced anti-German. But he was also inclined to dramatize British foreign affairs: he "knew at an early age" that Britain would always have "one mortal enemy" (p. 20). This belief could be well fitted into Sir Eyre Crowe's concep-

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tion of the balance of power, on which Vansittart and his generation of Foreign Service officers were nursed. Had he not advanced his views so very emphatically, and had he not erred in overrating French capacities and French willingness to stand up to Hitler, he might have been taken more seriously when he submitted figures on German military preparations that events proved to be correct.

In reviewing the heterogeneous though relatively small group of anti-appeasers, it seems clear that an outlook on foreign affairs that was mostly determined by ideological hostility did not necessarily—as it did not in the case of a large part of the English Left—lead to opposition to passive appeasement. National prejudice against the potential aggressor proved a potent source of opposition to both active and passive appeasement, as was shown, for instance, by Duff Cooper on the Right,[22] Hugh Dalton on the Left,[23] and, last but not least, by Lord Vansittart himself. National sympathy for the aggressor's traditional antagonist—in this case, France—also militated against active, and probably also against passive, appeasement. The two, of course, were often combined in Britain. And, finally, a somewhat old-fashioned, certainly "Victorian" belief in the necessity of a balance of power, even at a time when it was bad form to say so aloud, tended to engender a sensitivity towards a would-be aggressor that, if well developed, could have been a particularly reliable seismograph.

[22] *Old Men Forget* (London 1953).
[23] *The Fateful Years* (London 1957).

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# THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE CRITICISM IN INDIA

By DAVID H. BAYLEY

Sampurnanand, *Indian Socialism*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House (New York, Taplinger Publishing Co.), 1961, 131 pp. $6.00.
Atulananda Chakrabarti, *Nehru: His Democracy and India*, Calcutta, Thacker's Press and Directories, Ltd., 1961, 438 pp. 25 rupees.

A NEW mood of criticism is abroad in modern India. The mood can be characterized as one of dismayed re-evaluation of the entire direction of development efforts since Independence. Its character was presaged by the withdrawal from politics of J. P. Narayan as long ago as 1953, but it has only been in the last two years that the mood has begun to produce tangible political effects as well as to liven markedly public debate. To be sure, the efforts of the government of India have, for many years, come under sustained attack by leftists—notably, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party of India—the force of their argument being that those efforts have fallen far short of what is necessary for the certain amelioration of the lot of the mass of Indians. The singularity of the new wave of criticism is that it is producing a genuine conservatism, in the sense that its thrust is directed against the headlong pace, as well as the novelty, of Prime Minister Nehru's "socialist" program. The Swatantra Party, founded in 1961, is the organizational manifestation of this mood in active politics. It is being led by the redoubtable C. Rajagopalachari, former Vice-President of India and veteran of the Independence struggle. The central tenet of the new conservatism is that India's ills can be traced to overrapid innovation and too sweeping a departure from Indian ways. India's economic and social predicament is not amenable to Western social engineering, based primarily upon socialistic components within a democratic political frame; it can be bettered only by a return to the methods of spiritual appeal, individualistic effort, and tutelage in the fundamentals of political democracy that are associated with the revered name of Mahatma Gandhi.

The books by Sampurnanand and A. Chakrabarti are representative samples of this new mood. Both books exhort India to make haste more surely toward a future of economic well-being and political democracy by returning to precepts of political democracy unalloyed with socialistic elements and reinvigorated with the spiritual *élan* of India's patron saint.

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Dr. Sampurnanand, an active Congress Party politician and Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh from 1955 to 1960, believes that the task of government in India is to chart a careful course between the twin evils of fascism and communism. The problem of modern India is that the implacable desire of the Indian people for economic betterment impels the government to attempts at producing miracles overnight. In the scramble, materialistic ends replace spiritual ones and the freedom of democracy gives way to statism. In this predicament it is encumbent upon every thoughtful Indian, says Dr. Sampurnanand, to bend his efforts to the formulation of a viable alternative—one that will permit, indeed encourage, requisite material growth, while at the same time contributing to the political liberation of the individual. The model for such an alternative Sampurnanand calls "Indian Socialism." Thus, when he states that he will investigate the nature of Indian Socialism, he should not be construed as implying that he is undertaking an empirical investigation of socialism in modern India. "Indian Socialism" denotes a heuristic category. Dr. Sampurnanand's book is an appeal and a polemic; it bears throughout the stamp of the author's personal assessment of India's contemporary ideological dilemma.

A central theme of the new conservatives, and one duly emphasized by Dr. Sampurnanand, is that the loss of vigor, initiative, and spirit in modern India can be traced directly to the substitution of entirely materialistic goals for the more exalted ones of traditional India, which stressed man's spiritual nature and his duties to God and his fellow men. In Dr. Sampurnanand's words: "Our leadership considers thought a luxury: it hopes to fight ideas with tubewells and culverts. We insist that ours is a Welfare State and consciously or unconsciously tend to equate welfare with bread and the material comforts which bread symbolises. And we are surprised if people do not respond to our calls for sacrifice. It is forgotten that the spirit of sacrifice and self-dedication is awakened only when a man identifies himself with something higher and greater than himself, an ideal that will not be reached by the kind of activities in which we indulge to satisfy our cravings on the material plane" (pp. ix-x).

Dr. Sampurnanand and many other thoughtful Indians are distressed by the growing incidence of corruption in government, the petty bickerings of politicians concerned largely with the perquisites of office, the growth of indiscipline and anomie, the failure to infuse into community development a spirit of enthusiasm and self-help, and the parochial fanaticism of groups based upon region, language, and religion. In part Dr. Sampurnanand's disquiet reflects a disillusionment that is a

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natural consequence of having to adapt a revolutionary movement, united only in its opposition to an alien government, to the sterner and more protracted task of coping with problems of responsible governance. But at the same time he is raising implicitly a profound question that, regrettably, has received relatively little attention in the West: What will be the character of a national consensus built through the agency of programs devoted primarily to economic development? What will be the character of political beliefs and institutions in a country that is compelled to stress material renovation and progress almost exclusively and finds in these efforts one of the few real ties that bind the nation together into a cohesive political entity? It is not enough to say that we in the West must refine our assumption that rapid economic development is a means to the creation of liberal democracy. Could it be that a failure to stress strongly enough the ideational or "spiritual" attributes of human life in development plans may cause a permanent forfeiture of any opportunity to achieve these prized ends at a later date?

Dr. Sampurnanand's own solution to this problem is vexingly vague. Beyond making a few *ad hoc* comments about apparent excesses of socialistic planning, the author does little more than urge his readers to adopt a philosophy of life founded upon the concept that man rather than society is the measure of social progress. He gives content to this ethical injunction by stipulating that the fundamental character of man is spiritual, and not material, as the Communists would have one believe. Accordingly, development efforts must stress more than physical well-being; they must stress human freedom, man's capacity to respond to beauty, the search for transcendent truth, and so forth. The entire argument rests ultimately upon the assertion, common to Vedantists, that the universe is consciousness or *Brahma.* Setting aside the logical difficulties of proving a linkage between ethical norms and ontological propositions, Dr. Sampurnanand's thesis contains very little of substance to guide the practicing politician and the hard-pressed economist. One is left with the proposition that to rejuvenate the spirit of social progress in India and to keep development plans within the limits of democratic rectitude the leaders of government must inculcate in the people a more humane ethic. Indeed, he devotes considerable space to a demonstration that communism's inhumanity is the inevitable outgrowth of philosophical materialism. If India is to avoid the cruelty and regimentation of Communist states, a trend toward which he believes is already discernible in India, the government must turn its attention to the spiritual resuscitation of the mind and heart of India.

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The body of Dr. Sampurnanand's book is only fifty-seven pages long. Four appendices have been added, however, which more than double this length. The first appendix, written by the author himself, reproduces an article that appeared in the *A.I.C.C. Economic Review* in 1958. It reiterates many of the points already made in the text. The second appendix is an article written by Prime Minister Nehru, which also appeared in the *A.I.C.C. Economic Review*, and in which he subscribes to many of the criticisms of Indian development made by Dr. Sampurnanand, to whom Nehru refers. A standard Marxist critique of the Nehru-Sampurnanand concept of social progress is contained in the third appendix, written by Academician Yudin for the *World Marxist Review*, 1958. Dr. Sampurnanand returns to do battle with Academician Yudin in the fourth appendix. In many ways this final appendix is the most incisive and satisfactory part of the book. Dr. Sampurnanand is much better at refuting the mistakes of others than he is at coping originally with the problems of society that occasion the governmental responses he so often criticizes.

Atulananda Chakrabarti's exposition of the problems of Indian development, both political and economic, centers upon the same two theses found in Dr. Sampurnanand's book—namely, the growth of a materialistic philosophy and the subtle erosion of democratic standards and principles. It is ironic and tragic, says Chakrabarti, that India's "experience with democracy has sadly coincided with the growth of a materialistic civilisation founded and strengthened by science in the pursuit of the knowledge of matter" (pp. 116-17). Since "the country is desperately trying to be rich like America by planning like Russia" (p. 327), India's democratic experiment is being deflected from its proper path. For Chakrabarti, the villain of the piece is Nehru's socialism. People are being taught to focus upon the products of economic planning, which are wholly material, and by so doing are learning to define progress in sensual terms. The criterion of social advance is becoming hedonistic, to the total neglect of the spiritual attributes of man. Furthermore, Nehru's socialism is encouraging the growth of the bureaucratic state. "Under the misunderstood or overenthusiastic consideration for economic development the individual courts the disaster of losing his political liberty" (p. 172). Chakrabarti quotes Karl Mannheim: "Under the veneer of social peace they have become at least semi-totalitarian" (pp. 133-34). In fact, says Chakrabarti, Nehru has become a "democratic dictator" and parliament a "staged contrivance for the illusion of government by people's consent" (p. 154). The substitution of sensual goals and the erosion of democratic vigor

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have caused political life in India to "run at a tangent—respecting democracy and, one may say, hobnobbing with socialism, and it suits Indian hero-worship and passivity to live in trustful idleness that their government in its socialistic way will get everything done for them" (pp. 183-84).

There can be no doubt at all that the questions which Chakrabarti raises about the effect of central direction of the mobilization of economic resources upon the character of the people and the nature of political institutions are important and deserve the sympathetic attention of observers in the West. One is therefore disappointed to discover that in a book of over four hundred pages the author has failed to specify how India is to balance socialism and democracy, which he says is like "reconciling the irreconcilables" (p. 181). Indeed, one suspects before long that for him the categories "democracy" and "socialism" are merely honorific and pejorative, respectively, and almost without denotative content. At one point Chakrabarti describes them as "two radically rival doctrines" (p. 181) and he states that "socialism . . . is but a pathological form of arrested democracy" (p. 130). At another point, however, he observes that history would seem to bear out the proposition that "Democracy does the better the more a country is economically secure" (p. 181). Since socialism is one way, supposedly, of improving the economic position of a country, he is led to the conclusion that "some amount of socialism, or some kind of it, may not be incompatible with democracy" (p. 180). And he properly asks—alas, only rhetorically—"But then, what amount and what kind?"

Chakrabarti's categorical statements as to the manner in which political liberty and national economic development may be blended harmoniously, following as they do upon his failure to examine the dynamic relationship between democracy and socialism, are bound to appear hollow and unconvincing. Chakrabarti seems to be advocating that the government address itself as a matter of first priority to the educational task of tutoring the people of India in the goals and procedures of democracy. The establishment of a democratic political framework must precede governmental economic planning. A people nurtured in democracy will not then fall prey to the enervating blandishments of a socialist state. Moreover, democracy is a force for development in itself. The potentialities of democracy for solving the manifold economic and social problems of contemporary India have been stunted by the too early introduction of socialist schemes. "Before we decide to be salvaged by socialism, we should be fair to democracy and make sure we have rightly and intelligently exploited all its gifts, latent and express, or, if

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instead, we have been prematurely angry with a democracy made defective or ineffective by our own impatience or incompetence" (p. 184). As Chakrabarti says at another point: "Improvement by socialistic ideologies would only suppress democracy's process of self-improvement to adapt itself to growing complexities of this changing world and obstruct its evolution in its own lines" (p. 175).

For Chakrabarti, socialism and the central direction of economic enterprise are synonymous, while democracy is identified with the complete absence of central planning. Democratic socialism is thus an impossibility; the Fabian argument that socialism is democracy transferred to the realm of economics has been dismissed out of hand.

Admitting the portion of truth in many of the charges leveled against democracy in India—that it is more trappings than reality, that the people are in thralldom to a charismatic leader, that the role of popular consent in decisions of government is meager—there is still one question looming large that must be grappled with at some point: Can India afford to place less emphasis upon economic growth? Since the transition from traditional to modern society is in full stride in India, with all the attendant factors of ideological ferment, social dislocation, and growing impatience, can political tutelage in the ways of democracy be founded upon any other base than rapid economic development? Few people today would maintain that economic progress is in itself a sufficient condition for the establishment and maintenance of democracy. But few would doubt that it seems to be a necessary condition. If this is the case, then government in India has no choice but to marshal the resources of India as efficiently as possible, in a manner consistent of course with her moral principles, even though it must be admitted that the realization of a democratic state may very well be a casualty of the marshaling process.

Having said that government has a prior obligation to foster the growth of democratic principles, Chakrabarti moves to specify the role that government may properly play in this process of tutelage. The task is a formidable one; Chakrabarti makes no bones about that. He maintains that Indians are apathetic, malleable, unpossessed of courage, and susceptible to authority. They are unaware of democracy's benefits and unlettered in its requirements. What then can government do? Government, says Chakrabarti, must teach without recourse to constraint in any form. "The need of independent India is not so much obedience as to learn the right use of independence" (p. 306). So careful must government be that one wonders in the end if it has any role at all, apart from the issuing of pamphlets and the sponsoring of speeches. "The

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fundamental point is, either men are individually capable of governing themselves and managing their own business of living together, or they are not. If they are, they should be left as much alone as possible; if they are not, no government can possibly help them" (p. 335).

The role of government, it would appear, is to rule not by sanction but by example, and to associate the people to the fullest extent with every decision of government. The Panchayat Raj Act is a step in the right direction. Chakrabarti's view of the role of government in educating the masses in the requirements of democracy rests upon the assumption, never explicitly stated, that the State of Nature, in India at least, is democratic. He rejects the Hobbesian philosophy, and with it the notion that sparing the rod and spoiling the child may contain as useful a lesson for the tutoring of transitional groups as for the instruction of individuals. Chakrabarti is a conservative in the eighteenth-century, laissez-faire sense; the dynamics of social change receive from him little attention and less understanding.

Quite apart from the intellectual shortcomings of this book, Mr. Chakrabarti's effort is marred almost beyond repair by careless and imprecise presentation. The book stands in desperate need of a thorough editing. There are errors of fact, grammar, and word selection. When these defects are combined with prolixity and a pretentious and often quite unsuccessful use of quotations, the message of the book becomes almost totally obscured.

Mr. Chakrabarti and Dr. Sampurnanand, moved by deep concerns and noble emotions, have adopted a philosophy perilously close to social romanticism. They evidence a trusting faith in the perfectibility of man left to his own devices. And this faith in man's ability to redeem himself is coupled with the romantic's yearning for a force—be it an ennobling cause or an exalted personality—that will arrest the strident voices of petty men and unite all mankind in the pursuit of a hallowed goal. Their trust in the efficacy of such a force explains in large part their peculiar ambivalence toward Jawaharlal Nehru. On the one hand, Nehru is criticized with ill-concealed bitterness. Chakrabarti, for instance, takes him to task for being moody, flighty, and neurotic. He even accuses him of being morally irresponsible: ". . . since the effects of his experiments involve some four hundred million souls . . . it would be fair if experiments had some moral obligation to these people, and were not entirely his intellectual excursions" (p. 171). Common to both Chakrabarti and Sampurnanand is the theme that Nehru has ceased to be a "leader" and has become a "politician," with all the

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invidious overtones of that word. Where once he led, now he is content to compromise.

Beneath this scathing criticism, amounting almost to contumely, one detects a secret, deeply lodged, almost shameful yearning for a saint in Khadi. The two authors' castigation of Nehru is founded upon despair for an idol fallen; theirs is the fury of disenchanted lovers. This is the subtle ambivalence of their position. The criticism of Nehru is not so much that he is a charismatic leader, for so was Gandhi. Rather, it is that Nehru has not been able to "pull it off." He has not been able to sublimate social conflicts by the sheer force of moral leadership. What the new conservatives seek in Nehru is "the valiant warrior of independence," as Chakrabarti says, a man who seems to rise above government, above Plans, above politics, and above material striving. In short, for all their protestations about the dangers of central leadership lulling the people into quiescent acceptance of governmental programs, Sampurnanand and Chakrabarti—especially the latter—place their hope finally in the authoritarianism of overpowering personal example. Thus, when toward the end of his book Chakrabarti says, "India is proud she has a Nehru to depend upon, but should she be permitted by Nehru to depend upon him in this helpless manner?" (p. 420) one suspects that the answer quietly entreated, although publicly denounced, is "Yes." The fault is not the fact of dependence. The fault is Nehru's failure to make it work and the character of developmental programs entailed in this particular dependency.

And indeed, though this entreaty can be labeled romantic, we must not overlook the fact that charismatic leadership may provide one of the few counterweights to regimentation and force in the underdeveloped countries. Discipline through moral suasion is undoubtedly a more attractive alternative than a gradual constriction of consensus through the application of formal laws and ordinances. The new conservatives may, in this, be closer to political reality than one might at first suspect. But, with Louis Fischer, one must observe: "I think Gandhism would be the answer, but where is Gandhi in India? You tell me."[1]

[1] From Chakrabarti-Fischer correspondence, quoted on p. 207.

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# THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

## New Approaches to a Familiar Subject

By CHARLES B. NEFF

Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1962, 576 pp. $7.50 (text).
Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics*, Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962, 722 pp. $8.75 (text).
John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations*, New York, Random House, 1961, 421 pp. $6.25.

THREE recent texts on international relations, chosen out of the welter of new books and revisions that have appeared in the last few years, are the subject of this review. They have been picked because in some ways each is an excellent and important work. They are also books which in their strengths and weaknesses complement each other. Each author or set of authors has a distinct emphasis in outlook and in method, but at the same time the books exhibit a core of agreement about certain fundamental aspects of world politics today that indicates a growing consensus among contemporary analysts and scholars. A comparative review of this type can thus be used not only to evaluate the suitability of these books as texts and their contributions to international relations theory, but also to assess this consensus and to indicate its main outlines.

In view of the general remark already made about these books, it may not be necessary to repeat that this reviewer is highly impressed by all three of them. The task of compiling a comprehensive text is arduous, the work of years. A review can offer only a highly selective approach to the authors' lengthy efforts. The comments and criticisms that follow leave unmentioned sections of these volumes which themselves could be the subject of other reviews.

### I

Let us begin by evaluating each of these books separately as an undergraduate, introductory text. The volume by Padelford and Lincoln is in this respect perhaps most satisfactory. This is an entirely new book, not a rewrite of the familiar text by the same authors. It is written in

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a clear and forceful style. Each of the main sections (The Setting of International Politics Today; Basic Factors Affecting the Positions and Policies of States; The Formulation and Shaping of Foreign Policy; Instruments and Patterns of Foreign Policy; and Organizing the International Community) stands as a separately defined unit. Each of the chapters within these sections provides an exhaustive discussion of the topic at hand. The subjects selected and the emphasis they receive are, of course, a matter to be considered on a different plane; but, given the subjects, the discussions of them are as nearly complete as could be desired. Furthermore, there abound sufficient broad generalizations and hypotheses about international politics to stimulate lively discussions. The book comes equipped with numerous tables, graphs, and charts; of the three volumes under review, this one presents by far the greatest amount of raw information about the contemporary world. If something is left out, it tends to be the historical background. All in all, this is the kind of book that ought to appeal to students and teachers alike: it is full without being too long, and its format lends itself to easy digestion of the material.

Stoessinger's entry in the field is a welcome one because of its refreshingly original approach. Although obviously designed as a text, this book is more accurately described as an extended essay on international politics. The traditional topics are all discussed, to a greater or lesser extent, but they are woven into a narrative that is organized around two "broad conceptual principles": "the tension between the struggle for power and the struggle for order"; and the four-cornered struggle between communism and democracy, nationalism and colonialism. The style is compelling, occasionally impassioned. This is not a large book, but its brevity does not detract from its worth. Stoessinger is unequivocal in his stand on various issues, many of them controversial ones. This in itself is enough to generate discussion. A good deal of attention is paid to developing the historical background, and the case-study approach, which is used throughout the book, provides specific information about some important contemporary problems. But praiseworthy as this is, it is not quite enough for a good text. Statistics, maps, charts, are entirely missing. To supplement this book, data of this type would have to be supplied from other sources.

The Sprouts have written a book that attempts to be more than a text—a text *cum* readings. This approach, when successful, has a great deal to recommend it. Readings can be used to expand, supplement, and set off textual comments. But for reasons that will be discussed below, the Sprouts have not been entirely successful in marrying the

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text to the readings, although many of the readings are certainly of great interest. Perhaps in this case a separate volume of readings or a section devoted to extra materials at the end of the book would have been more appropriate.

However, it is not primarily on the basis of its readings that *Foundations of International Politics* succeeds or fails. It is not the best introductory undergraduate text because its scope is too narrow; the focus is not international politics *per se*, but the foundations of international politics (a point that will be discussed further below). But this is the first textbook since Quincy Wright's widely used survey that can and should receive wide usage in upper-division and particularly graduate courses. The emphasis of this book is not so much upon the contemporary world as upon certain key factors in international politics and upon the construction of an analytical framework that will make our understanding of these factors clearer. The reader will find numerous hypotheses to discuss and test, as well as schematic devices and collections of trend data. He will also find an excellent chapter on methodology and international relations ("Intellectual Tools and Perspectives"). The style of the book matches the approach: it borders on the ponderous though its vigorous forward movement saves it from being dull. This is not a book to stimulate discussion but rather to promote further individual inquiry.

We have so far been basing our judgment of these books upon their current value as texts. Currency is a fleeting value and, generally, the more current a book, the more quickly it becomes dated. Consequently, if we try to guess which of these texts will be around and in use the longest, we would change our order. The Sprouts' book comes out on top in this regard, with Stoessinger's next. The Padelford and Lincoln book, for all its many fine qualities, is liable to be the first to become dated.

## II

Let us now reverse the previous order and talk further about the Sprouts' book. It is my contention that this book has been misnamed. The Sprouts have produced a volume which, although entirely new, could more accurately have been given the same title as one of their previous works.[1] It can of course be argued that the foundations of national power do constitute simultaneously the foundations of international politics. However, international politics include not only nation-states and their power positions, but also the interactions among

[1] *Foundations of National Power* (2nd edn., New York 1951).

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these states and, more recently, among supranational organizations as well. Although subscribing to this stand in theory, the Sprouts do not demonstrate the importance of these two components to the same degree in the course of their book.

We are already familiar with the Sprouts' concern for the effects of environment—which, broadly defined, includes human as well as non-human factors—and with their concept of environmental possibilism. No one has made us more aware than they have of the role that environment does and should play in the national policy process. They divide environment into two parts: "psychological" factors and "objective" factors. While admitting the need to understand fully the psychological environment, the Sprouts' main concern is with making us more aware of the objective environment and with devising ways to measure and assess it more accurately. They wish to narrow the gap between our perception of the world and "things as they actually are" (p. 124) or "the real world" (p. 127).

To this end, the Sprouts have accomplished a great deal. Their chapter on population is the best anywhere in the literature, especially its section discussing population as more than manpower. Likewise the chapters on the revolution in science and technology and "The Geographic Setting: Images and Reality" provide us with superb introductions to these complex subjects. It is not only with non-human factors that the Sprouts demonstrate their thoroughness, insight, and rigor. Their conceptual scheme for the study and summary of national character should help to guide future research. But notice that all of this is at the level of *analysis*. This is the Sprouts' main contribution and also their main bias. It is a contribution because of the way that it aids us in structuring some parts of a chaotic world more concretely. It is a bias because it masks a subtle preference for the objective environment (in their terms) and even for some selective parts of it. (We will return to the broader question of objectivity toward the end of this review.)

The Sprouts evidently believe that there is a real distinction between the psychological and objective environment, a point that in itself is debatable. But let us grant that *at the extremes* one can make a useful distinction between image and reality. If we define the extremes as the most physical of the non-human factors and the most psychological of the human factors, then we see that it is precisely with these extreme factors that the Sprouts have been primarily concerned and with which they have done their best job of analysis. Where the distinctions are least evident, a no-man's land exists that is neither clearly image nor reality, but a mixture of both. This is the area where greatest interac-

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tion in politics occurs, and it is with interaction that the Sprouts are only mildly concerned. Their interest in interaction extends only to the degree in which it operates on national power and becomes a factor in national power—in short, to the degree that it is part of the environment. They are not concerned with interaction itself as one of the principal shapers of international politics. Their main contribution, as the title suggests, is toward an understanding of the foundations of international politics, not with the process of international politics.

The drawback in a fascination with "objectivity" in the sense in which the Sprouts have defined it is that it has a built-in bias for the physical, the past and present, as opposed to the future, and for the nation-state, as opposed to any larger structures. The latter point may raise some eyebrows, but the reasons are simple. The concepts of environment and environmental possibilism imply (even require) units of observation, actors, users of resources. The unit that the Sprouts have chosen to examine most thoroughly is quite defensibly the nation-state. But the nation-state and the environment become inextricably intertwined, become necessary for the explanation of each other. Hence one finds throughout the book that the concern is for the effects of environment upon the nation-state *as* a nation-state, not as a collection of human beings or social groups who are being absorbed into a larger community. The reason for the absence of any discussion of interaction among nation-states also explains why there is virtually no discussion of integrative trends that are breaking down in a number of ways the traditional national boundaries.

This leads us to speak about two main structural flaws in the book. The two flaws are bound up together. The first is the tendency to mention important hypotheses, and then neither to demonstrate them nor to discuss them fully in subsequent passages. Thus we read that a changing technological environment has rendered war an ineffective technique of statecraft (p. 165), or that the nuclear stalemate has increased the importance of non-military factors (p. 420), but these statements are nowhere examined in detail. Similarly, the stimulating analysis of national character leads to no conclusions about its role in international politics. Again, in these cases it is the discussion of interaction which is left out. We find statements throughout the book to the effect that international politics is in a period of transition, yet we are not told much about the nature of this transition. The second flaw is that when the Sprouts do offer a discussion of some of these points, they more often than not let others speak for them. This is quite surprising in view of the eloquent plea that the authors make for analytical precision

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and neatness. There is nothing at all precise about the last part of the book. Reading sections grow longer and longer and the Sprouts are content to offer a few neutral interpolations. Furthermore, the selected readings are often organized around quite different methodological assumptions and approaches from the ones that the Sprouts have so carefully constructed. Simultaneously they miss the opportunity to examine and test their own concepts and they allow others to advance conclusions that are not clearly the same as theirs.

And so this is, finally, a book and a half. One book is an excellent analysis of broadly defined environment, containing many provocative hypotheses and suggestions for future research. The last half remains just that, failing to examine the interaction of nations with each other and the effects of a changing environment upon the character of present international politics.

## III

If the Sprouts place primary emphasis upon analysis, Padelford and Lincoln, on the other hand, are most concerned with policy. Not that analysis is missing; in some cases it is most instructive. But the authors are at their best when describing a rapidly changing world and the type of responses that nations, particularly the United States, must make to these changes. They have tried to accomplish a great deal in a single volume and the results are often mildly contradictory. For instance, it is doubtful that any book can successfully be "addressed to the present world" and also "provide a systematic analysis pertinent to the world order at any particular time in history" (p. vi). As stated before, policy involves more than analysis; it involves application and action and hence is bound to come into conflict with analysis. In the case of Padelford and Lincoln, it is analysis that suffers.

A number of concepts are developed in the chapter, "A Framework of Analysis for International Politics," that receive only limited or imprecise usage in the discussion which follows. One of these is the concept of power, which Padelford and Lincoln break down into coercive power, consensual power, and prestige; but thereafter it is referred to simply as "power" without mention of its component parts (it seems that in this respect the Sprouts' similar concept of "potential," despite its semantic awkwardness, is more useful). Or, to take another example, Padelford and Lincoln use an "objective-subjective" classification for the environment that bears a marked similarity to the Sprouts' scheme, but the discussion that follows does not deal empirically with what makes the environment "objective" or "subjective," but lists instead

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the parts of each. Obviously the listing and the discussion of these parts are welcome but they are not the same as an analysis of the original proposition, and in no way "prove" it. The discussion of ideology typifies this. It emerges (though nowhere is it stated) that ideology is part of neither the "objective" nor the "subjective" environment, but forms part of both.

Another of the concepts that Padelford and Lincoln half develop is that of community. It is a sense of community that leads to attempts to create order out of chaos or threatening chaos. This is a very important concept, for it goes beyond a recognition of the fact that order is necessary and deals with the means by which order can be brought about. But since this is essentially a long-range problem, it receives short shrift in comparison to more immediate policy imperatives. The most consistent formula or hypothesis which is advanced is that the important economic and military problems of the world have a political basis. Until the political *modus vivendi* is found, they will remain insoluble. This is somewhat closer to coming to grips with the question of integrative trends (all three books are fully aware of disintegrative trends) but, like the Sprouts, Padelford and Lincoln do not really give the question much attention. Thus the United Nations is described in pragmatic, institutional terms; and regional organizations (Padelford and Lincoln have a nice classification scheme here) are viewed to a large extent in terms of United States foreign policy.

Again, this is not to belittle either the analysis or the concepts developed throughout the book. It is simply a recognition of the imprecision of both. The authors are certain not to be offended by this statement because they have quite explicitly given themselves over to a pragmatic and eclectic approach, or, as they put it, a "method of approach." This method is clearly centered on calculating the effects of a changing environment for effective policy. Analytically the best chapters are those that deal with "The Changing Nature of National Security" and "The Nature and Role of Foreign Policy." The remainder of the book is a highly successful attempt to apply the ideas contained in these two chapters to the foreign policies of specific countries and to relate certain means to goals. But it is the method again that is interesting. In attempting to view a problem in its entirety, the authors look at it from many angles; sometimes the conclusions are contradictory, sometimes the lists are overlapping and not mutually exclusive. But this does not overly concern them. They resolve things as far as they can and leave loose ends hanging when it is obvious that to tuck them in might serve theoretical neatness but not descriptive accuracy. They want to show

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the many facets of a rapidly changing world and the complexity of the process facing the policy-maker. One is tempted to call this a foreign-policy cookbook written in American, with footnotes in other languages.

## IV

Stoessinger's central emphasis, and hence the subjects he treats, are different from either those of the Sprouts or of Padelford and Lincoln. Whereas the other two books under review emphasize analysis and policy, respectively, Stoessinger's theme is normative. With our "scientific" emphasis these days, most of the profession is automatically skeptical of the word "normative." But this book does not represent a throwback to fuzzy-minded Wilsonian legalism or to the soupy idealism that characterized some books in the interwar period. Stoessinger is quite frankly concerned not only with describing a rapidly changing world, but also with demonstrating the dangers inherent in these changes and the responses that must be made in order to save the world from destruction. His prescription is quite clear: the development of viable international institutions.

This is an eloquent book and its general description of the world rings true; the message that it imparts is worth our sober consideration. Stoessinger does not sound the alarm and then hold his hand on the button relentlessly. His plea is well reasoned and backed up with compelling logic. Organizationally, his book is quite the opposite of the Sprouts' and far less traditionally structured than Padelford's and Lincoln's. In one brief but cogent chapter he surveys all his basic factors—power, nationalism, and the nature of foreign policy. There is little that is original here, but it is a very effective job of synthesis and summary. The main body of the book consists of a description and analysis of the contemporary world, organized around the main themes that were mentioned earlier. Stoessinger states his base instead of establishing it by argument and analysis. Then he quickly goes on to a discussion of the interaction of key forces in the contemporary world.

The main conflict, as Stoessinger sees it, is among communism, democracy, nationalism, and colonialism, fought along a continuum with power at one end and order at the other. Quantitatively his book is divided about evenly between the two foci, power and order; but his chief concern is with ways of achieving order despite the struggle for power and despite (as well as, in some cases, because of) the effects of technological and military advancements. He addresses himself more specifically than any of the preceding authors to the question of what

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the presence of nuclear weapons has done to the concept of sovereignty. But, admirably, he stops short of saying that dangers of atomic warfare automatically will produce something akin to immediate reliance on international order. He is quite suspicious of the balance of terror as a reliable instrument of international politics, and rightly points out that some institutionalization of order must replace the instability of a balance based upon mutual fear. But he certainly goes too far (simplification is both one of the strengths and one of the weaknesses of this book) in stating that "All obstacles [to stabilizing the balance of terror] can be reduced to a common denominator of mutual distrust" (p. 171).

Several sections in this book deserve special mention. They are noteworthy for the fresh insights they provide and for the excellence of their arguments. In his chapter on colonialism, Stoessinger deftly shows how the anti-colonial struggle has itself created the impetus for a new imperialism among the newer nations of the world. He also addresses himself much more fully than the other authors to the *process* of integration. He is not merely content to describe integrative trends, but also makes a real attempt to analyze the factors that promote or oppose integration. He sees what the other authors missed: that integration is not merely a response to a rapidly changing world, but itself is one of the forces that are effecting change.[2]

In a book of this scope and brevity, a number of interpretations are bound to be made that are challengeable. While showing admirable factual accuracy,[3] Stoessinger nevertheless leaves himself open to criticism on a number of points. A few examples must suffice. It would seem that Stoessinger is reading present attitudes into the past when he states that the United States regarded the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's as being infallible and cunningly calculating (p. 57). On the contrary, almost the exact opposite can be said to have been true. If anything, the United States and other Western nations did not take the Soviet Union seriously and, far from possessing an "inferiority complex" in this regard (*ibid.*), possessed something akin to a superiority complex (to the extent that the United States paid very much attention to Soviet Russia at all). It also seems inaccurate to see the roots of "pan-Africanism in ancient African tribalism" (pp. 98-99). Nkrumah, far from supporting tribalism, has done all he can to play it down. His pan-

[2] Stoessinger's discussion of regionalism, though, is marred by a rather imprecise usage of the term. By no stretch of meaning can the Commonwealth be referred to as a regional organization and its goals are far from regional in nature.

[3] One factual error cannot go unnoticed. Stoessinger states that 85 per cent of US aid goes for defense and military purposes. The exact percentage depends upon interpretation, but it is clearly not this high.

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African vision is that of a twentieth-century modernizer with delusions of grandeur. Quite the opposite deficiency appears in the analysis of Katanga and the Congo crisis (p. 137). Here, where a real reason exists to emphasize tribal differences, the conflict is entirely laid to financial interests and mercenaries.

One statement that surely deserves to be challenged is Stoessinger's assertion that the interaction of the two main conflicts of our time (colonialism vs. nationalism, East vs. West) has not produced an intensification of them (p. 142). His proof is that, in both the Suez and the Congo crises, the establishment of UN emergency forces actually "produced a lessening of international tensions" (*ibid.*). This argument demonstrates his normative bias favoring international organizations. But, quite apart from this, it is no proof at all. The establishment of the UN forces helped somewhat to reduce tensions *after* they had been intensified almost to the final breaking point by the two great conflicts and their interaction. Only if the use of these forces leads directly to the institutionalization of tension-reducing devices of a permanent character can his argument be said to have any validity. This has not yet occurred and it is far too early to tell what the outcome will be.

In fact, it can be said that in his desire to demonstrate the need for order, Stoessinger rather needlessly simplifies the causes of conflict. This is all the more surprising in view of his excellent critique of two famous simplifying schools of thought: the war-in-the-minds-of-men school and the functionalist school. Having demonstrated that these theses leave out, respectively, the roles of power and physical environment and the role of institutions, Stoessinger falls back upon an explanation of his own that is equally unsatisfactory. His final chapter, "Toward a Theory of International Relations," presents neither a novel theory (if indeed it is a theory—more accurately it constitutes a hypothesis about one important but by no means all-inclusive aspect of international relations) nor even a very convincing demonstration of the idea that he advances. But the idea is an important one. We need to turn here to the opinions of all our authors.

## V

Briefly, Stoessinger holds, as do the Sprouts and Padelford and Lincoln, that one of the contributing factors to conflict in the world today is the gap between the image men hold of the world and of each other and these entities as they actually are. As do the Sprouts, he treats reality as if it can be objectively defined and image as if it were something that

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can be, even that should be, eliminated. Furthermore, Stoessinger can be accused of rather imprecise usage of the term "image." After having made the acceptable points that "under certain conditions" men respond to images rather than to "reality" and that images are just as important in international relations as "objective factors," Stoessinger goes on to treat images largely as stereotypes. This is both a highly simplified and an analytically inaccurate conception of "image" as a factor in international politics. An image is made up of a number of components. Nowhere in Stoessinger's discussion is any attempt made to discuss these component parts and thereby to point to ways by which distorted images can be corrected. Curiously, the sum of Stoessinger's argument seems to confirm the very viewpoint to which he formerly objected: that conflict begins in the minds of men, and that the way to reduce conflicts is to do away with images.

As mentioned earlier, the Sprouts have also advanced a highly simplified and erroneous dichotomy between image (psychological environment) and reality (objective environment). In drawing a sharp distinction between "psychological" reality and "objective" reality, they have put themselves in the position of emphasizing, perhaps unwittingly, those factors that fit most neatly in these two categories. "Psychological" reactions accordingly should be reduced and objective assessments should be increased. The assumption is that "objective" assessments are somehow more objective, more real, than psychological ones. Again let us emphasize that it is only at the extremes that this is true. Nor is it any more true that the policy-maker sees the world around him only through some kind of subjective mechanism and that the outside observer (presumably the independent analyst or the academician) is automatically capable of more objective judgment. In the first place, this assessment (itself an "image") is unfair to the policy-maker who for the most part strives to be as objective as possible. In the second place, it assumes that the outsider by virtue of his position possesses a keener or more objective judgment. Even if the latter follows the rules that the Sprouts have so carefully laid down, he will never be able fully to remove his own values, his own bias, his own preconceived perspectives from the process of analysis. To the extent that he can reduce these biases, our knowledge is all the richer and our understanding perhaps also. But as the Sprouts themselves point out, no analysis has any value in international politics until translated into policy. In emphasizing the advantages of analyzing the environment, they have definitely played down the crucial process by which our understanding of the environment (enhanced precisely by the type of analysis they have out-

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lined) becomes translated into policy, for in this process the distinction between objective and psychological factors ceases to have much meaning. All policy judgments are based upon images, upon guesses about the environment, capabilities, the effects of actions, and the type of reaction that will be produced.

Padelford and Lincoln offer the most satisfactory description of the differences between image (subjective environment) and reality (objective environment). But unfortunately their treatment of this vital subject is almost purely descriptive and far too brief. In fact, their arguments must be pieced together from several passages throughout the book. They make essentially the same point as the other authors when they state that international relations "are partly the reciprocal interaction of how one group of people see the world situation, and the factors therein, with the ways that peoples and leaders of other states view the same situation and factors" (p. 50). But they go on to show that "image" is not a uni-dimensional concept (p. 132); rather it is made up of at least two parts: the psychological screen (including stereotypes, the effects of ideology, etc.) and the quality of information (p. 132). They also call our attention to the elements of uncertainty and risk in any policy choice (pp. 246-47). These are related and highly important points.

We might wish that Padelford and Lincoln had gone further in analyzing the concept of image. Their dichotomous model needs amplification. Access to facts is only part of the problem. The validity of the facts themselves can shape images. To this must be added the process of information assessment (intelligence), the effects of ideology, the uses to which intelligence are put in the decision-making process, and the feedback of the decisions themselves upon the original images. This partial list may serve to demonstrate the need for a more complete definition of "image" than any of the authors has provided.

If our goal is the admirable one of reducing the gap between image and reality, it cannot be achieved by placing much of the blame for today's conflict upon a rather loosely defined concept of "image," as Stoessinger does. Nor, on the other hand, can it be achieved merely by increasing our knowledge of the "objective" environment, as the Sprouts are wont to advocate; for there are limits, as we have noted, both to our objectivity and to the extent that we can ever fully comprehend "reality." Our best bet is to recognize that our knowledge will always be imperfect so that guesses and opinions, made as objective as possible by a thorough study of our environment, will constitute the basis for action. The analyst strives therefore not for the elimination

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of image—because this cannot be done—but for the maximum elimination of distortion. That distortion can be eliminated is both a "realistic" expectation and also an extremely useful goal to shoot at. For this we will require a more operational definition of "image" and more evidence about how the component parts contribute to the final product.[4]

## VI

Taken separately, these books represent a welcome addition to the literature, each demonstrating the value of its particular emphasis. But together they are even more valuable, for they show us that writers in the field of international relations are beginning to realize that politics among nations cannot be classified simply. All three have avoided reliance upon a single factor. All three have tried honestly to come to grips with the complexities of a rapidly changing world. All three have approached their subjects with humility, and are conscious that they have not provided *the* answer, but merely *an* answer that may help us better to understand the workings of the world around us.

Over the years, certain dominant viewpoints have been characteristic of books on international relations. We are all familiar with the periods of fascination—primary or exclusive—with legalism, economic determinism, and power. Taken together, the three books under review indicate that we are perhaps entering another period. All five of these authors are fascinated by the context of a rapidly changing world, by the influence of certain secular factors, particularly technology, upon policy alternatives, and by the problem of perceiving changes rapidly enough so that they can be dealt with effectively. All authors, to a varying degree, are also concerned with the time differentials of crucial world problems and thus with long-range planning as well as short-range solutions. All of them are concerned with the changes wrought in national interest and in the nation-state itself by problems that now are common to all the nations of the world. All of them have worked out an expanded concept of power. It is no accident that one sees in each of these books some of the terminology and approaches recently advanced by comparative studies of developing areas.

What we see, then, is a general acceptance of Quincy Wright's field analysis,[5] but with subtle changes in emphasis. The main difference is that Wright's field, while rife with signposts, is a place of movement

[4] By fortunate coincidence the August 1962 issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, which arrived after this review article was written, is addressed to a discussion of this problem.

[5] See Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York 1955), 531–67.

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circumscribed by definite boundaries. Our authors are conscious that these boundaries are not fixed, that they can be displaced, and that they are in fact being displaced in some areas more than others. Their concern is also with movement, but with movement that has *direction*: not so much with a field as with a road or a path. If these books are indeed a true indication, we are entering upon or have already entered the period in which international relations is viewed as the politics of flux. But since this consciousness of flux is also accompanied by an awareness of or a search for direction (not just change, but change *toward* something), we might more accurately call this the period of international relations as developmental politics.

Future writings, criticism, and discussion among scholars will reveal whether this new emphasis constitutes merely a new fad, or whether we are finally on the track of an approach to international politics that will both help us to make more accurate, realistic analyses and at the same time point the way to the solution of the problems that threaten to overcome us.

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# FOREIGN POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY

## Or, Can Congress Survive the Solicitude of Its Friends?

By NELSON W. POLSBY

Holbert N. Carroll, *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs*, Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, 365 pp. $5.00.
James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*, Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press, 1962, 262 pp. $5.50.

THE necessity for books dealing with Congress and foreign policy is not immediately apparent. The authors of both volumes under review remind us that Congress is not central to foreign policy-making, and that foreign policy-making is not central to the business of Congress. The fact that this is so poses indirectly a question important to both books. Given the increasing impact of foreign affairs on America's future, is it enough for Congress merely to lobby, to warn, to complain, to snip at budgets and attempt to modify policies set by a burgeoning, technically specialized executive? Must not Congress change its ways, or shrink into an unequivocally subordinate place in our Constitutional system, as foreign affairs occupy more and more of the landscape?

### I

Holbert Carroll's book deals principally with the House of Representatives. After a brief historical introduction, Carroll discusses, antiphonally, most of the major foreign policy events involving the House from 1945 to 1957, and (in rich detail) the politics of the various House committees that had a hand in shaping these events. Artificial distinctions between "domestic" and "foreign" policy evaporate in the course of this discussion. Foreign policies are portrayed as largely indivisible from and interdependent with domestic policies. An impressive argument in support of this claim is made simply by accretion, as page after page is devoted to the faithful description of the staggering variety of Congressional concerns with one aspect or another of "foreign" affairs: tariffs, the sale of agricultural surpluses abroad, immigration, the European Recovery Program, the St. Lawrence Seaway, international

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patents, shipping regulations, balance of payments, and so on. The "domestic" implications of these policies are many and various, and are lost neither on Carroll nor on Congressmen.

One way or another, Carroll finds, most of the committees of the House deal from time to time with foreign affairs. As Woodrow Wilson discovered before him, Carroll notes that each of the committees is a political institution unique unto itself, and individually quite powerful in affecting the course of legislation in its charge, regardless of the interrelations of one bill with others handled elsewhere, or the implications of policies handled one way for policies handled another.

And so, by gingerly steps, and interspersed with an excellent factual treatment of the later stages of legislative action, Carroll confronts us with what he identifies as a Congressional "problem" of "coordination." There is, it seems, a need for someone to oversee the legislation of all foreign policies; a need for protection from interest groups in order to preserve the internal logic of interrelated policies; a need for greater responsibility, coherence, "integrity" in the Congressional handling of our foreign affairs. Apparently, we are appalled to learn, "Congress prefers confusion" to coordination. "The House of Representatives does not adequately bring its political judgment to bear upon the extraordinarily complex, interrelated, and vast range of policies it must test. . . . The House considers patches of policy, rarely relating these patches as parts of a very broad range. . . . Its approach is fragmented and at times erratic, a natural consequence of the dispersion of leadership and authority" (p. 280).

A variety of familiar reforms are volunteered: four-year terms of office, more joint committees, a return to the omnibus budget bill, more debate on the floor, stronger party leadership, "better" staffs, and so on. Carroll recognizes the political infeasibility of most of these, but this does not prevent their full ventilation in his book.

More to the heart of the issue is that these reforms are thought to be desirable at least in part in order to preserve for Congress an important and responsible role in foreign policy-making. There is no guarantee, however, that even the more technical of them will accomplish this end. It would appear, on the contrary, that the more politically and constitutionally drastic of these solutions will entirely subordinate Congress to the President, in foreign policy matters, and quite likely in everything else as well. This seems to me to be the consequence of (1) separating Congressmen from independent interest-group bases and linking them more closely to the President for electoral purposes, and (2) depriving them of the devices by which they specialize sufficiently to gain for

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themselves a certain amount of expertise in limited policy areas. If coordination means the end of independence in power and knowledge for Congressmen, it is, perhaps, no wonder that they prefer confusion.

## II

The major themes of Robinson's book are less easy to identify, in spite of an explicit statement of them by the author. In his preface, Robinson asserts "that Congress' influence in foreign policy is primarily (and increasingly) one of legitimizing and amending policies initiated by the executive . . . and, second, that one of the key reasons for this development lies in the changing character of the information or intelligence needs in modern policy making" (p. v). Not all of the seven chapters that follow speak directly in aid of either of these contentions; in fact the changes over time mentioned in Robinson's original statement are nowhere empirically established.

There are indications that the author is attempting to reach a disparate audience. On the one hand, his discussion is quite elementary. This appears strikingly in several places. In Chapter I, Robinson explains that the Committee on Foreign Relations has most to say in the Senate about foreign policy matters. In Chapter IV, he analyzes 616 Senate bills and resolutions before this committee in the 81st through the 85th Congress, concluding that measures ultimately passing tend to be those given favorable committee action and sponsored by members of the majority party, by members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and by its chairman. Other, less obvious predictors of success are given no clear explanation by the author. In Chapter VI, Robinson reports on the results of interviews with Congressmen, in which they were asked how frequently they had routine contacts with the State Department and also what some of their attitudes were toward the State Department. Among the numerous intercorrelations of various of these responses that are given, one in particular stands out: Congressional Democrats tended to disapprove, Republicans to approve, policies of the State Department under John Foster Dulles.

These findings and assertions seem, at first blush, to be best suited to an audience of beginners, except for the facts, first, that they are to a certain extent embedded in an exposition which presupposes some knowledge of statistics and, second, that the book also contains materials which seem to be directed at scholars reasonably well advanced in their acquaintance with the literature of political science.

This, at any rate, would seem to be the most appropriate audience for

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Chapter III, which consists of a long narrative, continuing the story of the Monroney resolution at the point where Robinson, in another publication, had left off. A certain amount of sophistication also seems in order for a proper reading of those portions of the text which deal with what political scientists have said about various bibliographical, theoretical, and methodological topics such as the concept of influence and the case study. And this is especially the case where Robinson makes use of materials of whose merits or relevance he is himself somewhat in doubt.

Three illustrations of the latter may be useful. In his first chapter, Robinson discusses (and presents a vivid figure from) Lawrence Chamberlain's study of 90 bills, enacted between 1880 and 1945. Of these bills, which indicate a dramatic decline in Congressional initiatives, Robinson says, "The 90, unfortunately, do not contain any foreign policy measures . . ." (p. 8). In this same chapter, Robinson also presents findings on Senatorial influence by Warren Hollinshead, which, he comments, "are . . . not very helpful in predicting the success of Senators in getting their bills reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations" (p. 18).

The second chapter consists of a recounting of 22 cases of Congressional participation in foreign policy-making, which, Robinson says, "are of course by no means an adequate sample. . . . The selection of case studies has unfortunately been most unscientific. . ." (pp. 23-24). The 22 vignettes discussing the roles of Congress and the Executive are neatly summarized in a table at the end of the chapter in which the Executive is discovered to have predominated in decision-making most of the time. Robinson comments on this table: "The assignment of each case represents a 'judgment' rather than a 'calculation' on the part of the author. Admittedly the vignettes presented earlier in this chapter do not always reveal the bases or data for these classifications" (p. 65).

Unfortunately, it does not follow that because a book is ill-suited to beginners, advanced students will therefore profit from it. I myself found two things of especial interest in Robinson's book. There is a useful account of legislative-executive liaison arrangements since Roosevelt in Chapter V; and in Chapter IV, Robinson's data test and reject Donald Matthews' contention that Senators who introduce many bills and resolutions are less successful than their less active colleagues in obtaining favorable action.

But more knowledgeable readers will, perhaps, find persuasive Robinson's modest prefatory judgment that his text of 216 pages does not fill the need for an adequate treatment of Congress and foreign policy.

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They may, as well, find themselves asking precisely what need the book does fill, given its inattention to the systematic exposition of its argument, and its corresponding preoccupation with matters which seemed to this reader to verge, by turns, on the arcane, the obvious, the irrelevant, and the speculative.

## III

The final speculation in Robinson's book echoes a theme in Carroll's. Foreign affairs in the future, it is suggested, are going to become more complex, and this is going to lead in turn to greater technical specialization in the executive departments. As the executive becomes more technically specialized, it becomes better and better able to grasp the problems that confront it, while Congressmen lose ground in their quest for the knowledge that will enable them effectively to influence policy-making. This trend, Robinson suggests, can probably not be materially retarded by anything Congressmen do, short of setting up a rival bureaucracy.

The pessimism of this prediction can, I think, be somewhat allayed by arguing from slightly different premises about American politics. It may be useful, for example, to dispense momentarily with the Constitutional categories in discussing agencies of government. If the Congress does not speak with one voice, neither does the executive. It does not follow that officials in Bureau X will trade favors with officials in Bureau Y in preference to a similar exchange with certain Congressmen, simply out of loyalty to the dear old Executive Branch. In fact, Congressmen have been known actually to promote cleavages in the executive branch so as to enhance their own policy positions. Presumably, as technical specialization leads to more bureaucratic compartments, the lines between executive agencies dealing with foreign policy and Congressional Committees will proliferate, not decrease. This, at least, seems as plausible as Robinson's prophecy.

It may be that both these books reflect to a certain degree a slight general tendency to underrate the opportunities for affecting policy outcomes that accrue to officials who engage in such activities as consulting with the National Security Council, examining the foreign aid budget line by line, conducting "educational" investigations like Senator Jackson's, or punitive investigations like Senator McCarthy's, or cooling-off investigations like the MacArthur hearings. The number of decisions that are initiated or headed off by virtue of Congressional activity may be greater than Robinson's argument seems to allow. Carroll, indeed, supports such a contention, but the fact brings him little com-

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fort, because of the massive problem of coordination that Congress seems thus far to have ignored.

We often think of coordination as a particular method of achieving certain ends. The method usually entails an explicit division of labor, a hierarchy of responsibility, and organizational goals that are clear and unequivocal. But this type of coordination is not necessarily efficient if, as in our political system, a variety of officials subject to differing pressures and constraints are each expected to specify some of the goals for the system, and to reach agreements about ways of achieving them with other actors differently situated.

The decision-making process that has evolved has been described as a "foreign policy consensus" in which various officials send up trial balloons, consult informally, trade favors, "educate" one another, anticipate reactions, leak information to the newspapers, bluff, and argue. This process goes on throughout the executive branch and embraces Congress as well.

If the outputs of a system such as this one appear sporadic, confusing, self-contradictory and, in terms of many of the system's goals at any one time, irrational, who can say whether the inadequacy is in our policies or in our attempts to describe them?

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